An Economic Study of Rough Rice Marketing in Louisiana. by Boonstra, Clarence
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1942
An Economic Study of Rough Rice Marketing in
Louisiana.
Clarence Boonstra
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Unpublished theses submitted for the masterfs and doctor*s 
degrees and deposited in the Louisiana State University Library 
are available for inspection# Use of any thesis is limited by the 
rights of the author# Bibliographical references may be noted, but 
passages may not be copied unless the author has given permission# 
Credit must be given in subsequent written or published work#
A library which borrows this thesis for use by its clientele 
is expected to make sure that the borrower is aware of the above 
restrictions#
LOUISIANA. STATE UIOTERSITY LIBRARY
119-a

AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF ROUGH RICE MARKETING IN LOUISIANA
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
In
The Department of Agricultural Economics
ByClarence Boonstra 
B. A., Michigan State College, 1936 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
F.9099
42
A o m m u m m E m
The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. E. J. 
Seville and to Dr* Bear A* Ballinger for their guidance during his 
years of graduate study &ad for their aid in his research endeavors. 
The efforts of these sea* together with the cooperation of the other 
numbers of the Department of Agricultural Economics, of the Louisiana 
Agricultural Experiment Station, and of the many persons actively en­
gaged in the rice industry, made possible the presentation of this 
rice marketing research project as a concluding step in his graduate 
program*
t a b u  of CONTENTS
CHAPTERS Page
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOUISIANA RIGE INDUSTRY .... 1
Importance of the Louisiana Rice Industry  ....   2
Rice Investigations in Louisiana 8
Characteristics of the Louisiana Rice Area ...... IX
Rice Acreage and Production 13
Production of Rice •••.••••••••••••......   20
Production by Varieties .......   28
Consumption of Rice ............................. 33
II. PRICE MOVEMENTS FOR ROUGH RICE  ....    36
The Trend of Prices  .......   37
Rough and Clean Rice Prices  ....   44
Factors Affecting the Price of Rice 50
Rice Acreage and Prices  ....     56
Prices by Varieties  .....    59
Prices by Grade ................................. 63
Seasonal Variation 73
III. STORAGE AND MARKETING  .............   BO
Marketing Procedures ............................ 81
Attempts at Rice Marketing Improvement  ....   84
Present Grades Used for Rough Rice .............. 86
Utilisation of Rough Rice Grades  ....    88
Compulsory Rough Rice Grading 90
Other Marketing Improvements .................... 91
Movement of Rough Rice 97
Location of Rice Warehouses  ......... 98
Services Rendered by Public Warehouses  ....   101
Storage Capacity in the Rice Area 104
Control of Rice Warehouses  ......   108
Charges for Rice Storage  ........      Ill
Condition of Warehouses  .....   115
Costs of Warehouse Operation • •....   118
Miscellaneous Services    120
Problems in Rough Rice Storage  ..........   122
Storage on Farms  ...........    126
IV. ECONQMIGS OF THE RICE MILLING INDUSTRY.....  133
Marketing Clean Rice  ......   136
iii
Page
Physical Characteristics of Louisiana Rice Mills • 144
Buying Rough Rice ................................. 147
Areas in Which Mills B o y   ..........    150
Examination of Rough Rice  ....      151
Making Payment for Rice .......................... 152
Distribution of Rice Milling Costs.........   154
Inventory Problems of Rice Mills .......... 159
Failure of a Rice Futures Market   ....   163
Location of Rice Mills  ....      167
V. MARKET OUTLETS FOR RICE  ....     177
Rice Growers and the Export Market .............  180
International Politics and Rice  ........   189
Tariff Preferences in the Cuban Market  ....   192
Reciprocal Trade Agreements 197
Outlook for Rice Reports  ........   198
Development of Rice Markets ...................... 201
Separating Foreign and Domestic Demand 206
VI. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN THE RICE INDUSTRY  ....   208
Adoption of Marketing Agreement  .......   212
Nature of the Southern Rice Marketing Agreement •• 213
The Revised Marketing Agreement  .... 218
Factors Causing Abandonment of Marketing Agree­
ments    .....   223
Amendment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act ..... 227
Incidence of the Processing Tax on Rice 230
Agricultural Conservation in 193&  ....   232
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 .......... 234
Recapitulation     . 237
Effect of the Rice Programs............    238
Geographical Effects      ••••.<• 244
Evaluation of Rice Adjustment Programs  ...... 251
•’Two—Price" Proposals ..••••••••••••.... •.•......  252
VII. COOPERATIVE MARKETING IN THE RICE.INDUSTRY.......... 257
American Rice Growers Association  ....... 262
Structure of the American Rice Growers Cooperative
Association  .....    265
Present District Organizations  ..... 266
Membership Contracts  .............   271
Marketing Agreement of American Rice Growers Co­
operative Association  .....   272
Marketing Fees .....................  274
Subsidiary Organizations  ............... . 278
Marketing Services  ....     279
iv
Page
Average Annual Prices Received......     231
Services to the Rice Industry  .........    283
Financial Operations  ........   237
Future Activities  ......   238
VIII. SUMART AM) CONCLUSIONS  ..............    292
Marketing Between the Farmers and Millers  .....    294
Efficiency in Milling and Distribution  .....   299
Influencing Market Outlets  ......   302
Governmental Policy  .......      303




X, Acreage, yield, production and farm value of rough
rice in the United States, 1909 to date   16
II. Acreage of rough rice harvested in the United
States by states, 1909 to date 19
III. Production of rough rice in the United States by
states, 1909 to date    25
17. Production of rice by varieties in Louisiana, 1929-
1940..........................................  31
7. Average annual price received by fanners for rice
in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, California, and 
United States, 1909 to date  .......   40
71. Average price per pound of extra fancy clean rice
at Slew Orleans, by varieties, 1935 to 1941 ....... 62
VII. Relation of grading factors to prices for lots of
rice sold by the American Rice Growers Cooperative 
Association, 1938  ....   68
Till. Relation of grading factors to prices received for
Blue Rose rice sold by American Rice Growers Co­
operative Association in May, 1931  .....   70
IX. Relation of grading factors to prices received for
Blue Rose rice sold by American Rice Growers Co­
operative Association in March, 1933 •••••»•••«••• 71
X. Relation of grading factors to prices received for
Blue Rose rice sold by American Rice Growers Co­
operative Association in February, 1935 ....   72
XI. Prices received by Louisiana fanners for rice ex­
pressed as a percentage of October price, 1920-41. 77
XII. Rice, roughi receipts at mills in Texas, Louisi­
ana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, by months, 1914-15 
to 1938-39  ................................ 100
XIII. Storage capacity and ownership of 88 bonded rice

















Total bonded warehouse and mill storage capacities 
for rice at leading rice centers in southwestern 
Louisiana, in bags, 1940-41  ...... •
Associated business enterprise and type of owner­
ship for 95 rice warehouses located in southwest 
Louisiana, 1940-41 ......................... ..
Rates charged for storage in 79 public bonded rice 
warehouses in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41, per 
large bag  ...............*........... .
Usual storage rates at most important rice storage 
centers in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41  ........
Age of 31 individually owned public rice ware­
houses in southwest Louisiana, and years operated 
by present owners, 1940-41.............. .
Capacity of farm warehouses related to total idee 
acres in fara, 38 farms in southwest Louisiana, 
1940-41 ...............-.....................i.
Type of building used for rice storage on 40 farms 
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41 •••*•*..••......
Average capacity and cost of 30 recently con­
structed rice warehouses on fame in southwest 
Louisiana, 1940-41  ............ .
Proportion of various products out turned from 
rough rice in the milling process, by weight and 
value  ..........................
Number of active mills and their milling capacity 
by milling points in Louisiana, 1940-41, 34 mills*
Milling capacities of 34 mills operating in 
Louisiana during 1940-41  .......
Distribution of income and costs for milling 
123,363 barrels of rough rice in a medium capacity 
mill in Louisiana, year ending July 31, 1940 ••*»
Annual consumption of rice in the United states 
and territorial possessions, 1935 to 1940 ......
Exports and domestic utilization of American rice 


















United States exports of rice in terns of rough 
rice, 1935 to 1940 ............. ..........
United States exports of rice to specified coun­
tries, 1926-30 average, and 1935-38  ......
Wholesale price of milled rice at important world 
markets, 1925-37 • •..... ..... ....... .
Change in Cuban import duties on clean rice, 1937 
to date  .............................. .
Imports of milled rice into Cuba, 1931 to 1940 ••
Prices received by farmers for rice expressed as 
a percentage of the 1910-14 parity price, by 
months, United States, 1930-41 ..................
Price, farm value, payments, and purchasing power 
of value of rough rice in the United States, 1921- 
22 to date............. ....... ........ .
Carry-over, crop, and supply of Southern, Califor­
nia, and United States rough rice during years of 
government programs, 1928 to date .
Acreage of rice planted and acreage of partici­
pants in Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
programs in the United States, 1935-38 ..........
Rice Acreage allotted by the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Administration in Texas and actual planted 
acres, by counties, 1938-1940
Rice acreage allotted by the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Administration in Louisiana and actual 
planted acres, by parishes, 1938-1940  .....
Humber of barrels of rice handled by American 
Rice Growers Association, 1921-28  .....
Total barrels of idee handled by American Rice 
Growers Cooperative Association, 1928-1941 .....
Percentage of total rice production handled by 
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association in 
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, 1928-1941 ......
Marketing commissions charged in local districts 
of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Associ­




Barrels of rice handled by local districts of 
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, 
1920-1941...........*............. ...
Average price received for rice sold through the 
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association 
compared to government estimates of prices re­







1« Location of southwest Louisiana rice area in
reference to other type-of-farming areas in 
Louisiana  ....     6
2* Rice acreage reported in Louisiana parishes for
1939, according to Census of Agriculture, 1940 • • 7
3. Rough rice acreage harvested in the United
States shown as a cumulative total of important 
producing states, 1909 to date ......     18
4* Rate of change in rice acreage harvested in the 
United States and in principal rice producing 
states, 1909 to date 21
5* Production of rough rice in the United States
shown as a cumulative total of important produc­
ing states, 1909 to date 24
6* Comparison of rough rice yields in the rice pro­
ducing states, 1909 to date 27
7. Price received by farmers for rough rice in
Louisiana, 1909 to date 39
8. Relation of annual average rough rice price to
general price level changes, 1909 to date ....... 42
9. Comparison of prices received by farmers for rice
and wheat in the United States, 1909 to date .... 45
10. Wholesale price of fancy Blue Rose rice at New
Orleans and price received for rough rice by 
Louisiana farmers, 1929 to date • • • • •.....   47
11. Production of rough rice and price per bushel in
the United States, 1909 to date  .....    53
12. Relationship between price and production of 
rough rice in the United States, expressed as 
percentages of average price and production for
the years 1920 through 1938 .......     54
13. Average price per pound of extra fancy clean rice
at New Orleans, by varieties, 1935 to 1941 ...... 61
x
Page
14* Comparison of monthly average rough rice prices 
reported by the American Rice Growers Cooperative 
Association and by the Agricultural Marketing 
Service, 1931 to 1941................   63
15* Index, of avera.e seasonal variation for rough rice
prices in Louisiana, 1930-1939  ....   75
16* Price received by Louisiana farmers for rough rice 
expressed as a percentage of October price, by 
months, 1920 to 1940  ........   76
17* Average monthly distribution of rough rice receipts 
at mills in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and 
Tennessee, 1935 through 1938 *.....   99
18. location of independently operated public bonded
warehouse enterprises in Louisiana, 1940-41 ..... 102
19* Location of rice mills in Louisiana during 1940-41
milling season  ....   140
20. Exports and imports of all rice products expressed 
as equivalent bushels of rough rice, United States,
1917 to date.............    183
xi
ABSTRACT
Rice is a leading farm crop in Louisiana, generally being 
the source of about 15 per cent of the total agricultural income 
received by farmers of the state. Economic problems of the rice 
industry have received relatively little attention from organized 
research agencies, since the industry is important only in the four 
states of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and California. Difficult 
economic problems exist, however, particularly those associated 
with the marketing of rough rice by the numerous small-scale growers 
in Louisiana. This study describes and analyzes rough rice market­
ing problems and recommends economic policies which, if adopted, may 
increase the returns of growers from their rice crops.
Price trends for rice have become particularly significant 
to Louisiana growers because of a 30 per cent increase in United 
States rice production since 1935 > a period during which Louisiana 
production increased only 19 per cent. The chief factor affecting 
the long-run trend of price is the general price level, as modified 
by the 3upply of rice available for sale in the domestic market and 
the quantity which must compete with Asiatic rice in foreign markets. 
The demand for clean rice in the protected domestic market is rela­
tively inelastic, and the export demand, although more elastic, is 
subject to highly erratic fluctuations since worId prices are con-
xii
trolled by Asiatic rice, and since nationalistic policies greatly 
affect world rice trade.
Rough rice prices closely follow movements of clean rice in 
the wholesale markets, with farmers usually receiving about 81 per 
cent of the equivalent wholesale price. Although variety price dif­
ferentials are well established, increased production of varieties 
bringing highest prices apparently tends to reduce these differences. 
According to the best data available, quality differentials in rice 
are generally accompanied by distinct price differentials, in spite 
of frequent complaints that quality factors are overlooked in rough 
rice trading. The time of sale is an extremely important factor af­
fecting the price received by an individual grower, since iuany farmers 
store rice after harvest and sell during the winter. If a consistent 
policy is followed, sales in November or in January will bring the 
highest average returns, but the irregular price fluctuations result­
ing from abrupt changes in demand make the seasonal variation expected 
from supply forces highly uncertain.
Data gathered during a survey of public rice warehouses used 
by Louisiana farmers during 1940-41 Indicated that warehouse facili­
ties and storage charges vary greatly throughout the rice belt. More 
than half of the storage space available to farmers was controlled by 
large enterprises engaged in financing or processing rice, so that 
considerable pres -ure could be exerted on farmers in rice bargaining. 
Few farmers used warehousemen as marketing agents, since selling of 
rough rice was usually carried out by individual negotiation between
xiii
farmers and mill buyers. Storage on the farm was relatively unimpor­
tant, although apparently highly economical on large rice farms* The 
survey indicated a need for independently operated storage facilities 
where competitive rice selling could be encouraged, for the use of 
marketing agents to reduce the expense of individual bargaining, and 
for more general utilization of rough rice grades and standardized 
buying practices.
Since there are no middlemen between the farmers and the 
millers, and since there is no rice futures market to pemit hedging 
of inventories, the holding of rice stocks by either fanners or 
millers is a highly speculative operation. Rice mils ers are often 
more concerned with shrewd speculation in rice than with technical 
milling problems. Ordinarily the millers have a better insight than 
farmers into market conditions and farmers frequently are out­
bargained, being forced to hold rice when the mafcket is dangerous and 
to sell rice at prices which permit large inventory gains for millers 
when market conditions are improving. Fortunately, the milling indus­
try in Louisiana is highly competitive, so that farmers, by intelli­
gent action, can take advantage of the anxiety of millers to utilize 
the great excess milling capacity existing in the Louisiana area. 
Farmers need en improved current market news service to give them 
adequate knowledge of market situations, in order to avoid unusual 
discrepancies between rough and clean rice prices rising from specu­
lative operations.
Rice exports, which in the past several years have absorbed
xiv
as much as 25 par cent of the southern crop, are extremely difficult 
to maintain in markets where Asiatic rice is available. In Europe, 
American rice in normal times has a fairly stable outlet for small 
quantities on a quality basis, but in Latin America, United States 
growers can seU very little rice unless substantial tariff or quota 
preferences are granted by the importing countries. Since 1940, the 
war shipping shortage has automatically restricted the movement of 
Asiatic rice and American growers have secured an excellent outlet in 
Cuba, but the restoration of normal shipping conditons would quickly 
wipe out this export market. ̂ Consequently, rice growers should exert 
constant pressure toward legislation favoring tariff or quota prefer­
ences for American rice, and toward the establishment of a differential 
price policy between domestic and foreign markets which will permit the 
sale of American rice abroad in competition with Asiatic supplies.^!
A historical analysis of the effect of government adjustment 
programs in the rice industry indicates that the various adjustment 
measures, including marketing agreements, processing taxes, soil con­
servation, and subsidy programs have resulted in few permanent changes 
in the rice industry. Their main effects have been temporary price 
increases and subsidy payments to farmers.
Cooperative marketing, which has developed in the rice industry 
since 1910, has been responsible for the chief improvements so far ac­
complished in rough rice marketing. The American flic-' Growers Cooper­
ative Association operates in the Texas-Louisiana area and markets more 
than half the rice produced in Texas, although it has seldom handled as
xv
much as 20 per cent of the Louisiana crop. The association has less 
support in Louisiana than in Texas because of the many small-scale 
growers in Louisiana who have intimate credit and personal relation­
ships vidth buyers and millers. ’Hie cooperative organization, however, 
has accomplished much for Louisiana growers in the distribution of 
market news, in the enforcement of competition, and in presenting the 
growers* point of view in federal legislation.
The study concludes with a positive program for the improve­
ment of rough rice marketing in Louisiana. Recommendations include 
the establishment of independent storage and credit facilities to en­
courage competitive bidding for rice, centrally located sales offices 
to reduce the expenses of individual negotiation, and a daily market 
news service over local radio stations during the months of active 
rice marketing. In addition, public support is needed for the cooper­
ative association and for legislative measures enforcing competition 
among millers, for research in the processing and utilization of rice, 
for governmental policies retaining essential export xnarkets, and for 




CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOUISIANA RICE INDUSTRY
Economic problems associated with the marketing and distribution 
of rough rice^ have never drawn attention in Louisiana comparable to that 
given to cotton and sugar cone, since the industry is localized and has 
seldom pressed into the national spotlight. Important marketing problems 
exist, however, particularly those associated with the imperfect nature 
of the market for rough rice. The absence of objective grades for rough 
rice and the personal nature of bargaining between producers and proces­
sors lead to numerous difiiculties, such as unequal bargaining power and 
unequal knowledge of the demand and supply conditions determining the 
competitive price of rice* Failure to understand and utilize familiar 
marketing principles frequently causes misunderstandings and at times 
has impaired the economic welfare of Louisiana rice farmers*
Specific objectives of this study, sponsored by the Louisiana 
Agricultural Experiment Station, are to clarity the present situation in 
regard to the marketing and processing of rough rice in Louisiana, to 
analyze the available historical data relevant to rough rice marketing 
problems, and to examine past, current, and prospective plans for the 
improvement of rice marketing. Various attempts at market improvement
•̂The term "rough rice” describes threshed but unhulled rice as it 
comes from the thresher* Rough rice is termed "paddy” in the Orient and 
occasionally in the United States.
1
2
have been made by government, grower, and processor agencies, and within 
a few years, new or revised schemes will likely be added to those already 
injected into the market structure. These aspects of the rough rice 
marketing problem make this study of more than historical interest, since 
public representatives must consider the past record in formulating de­
sirable future policies affecting the idee industry.
In conducting this study, all available statistical data con­
cerning rice were assembled from government, trade association, coopera­
tive organisation, and private sources, and adapted for analysis from the 
marketing point of view. The writer made a personal survey of ill rice 
mills and public rice warehouses in the state and interviewed the manag­
ers to obtain uniform statistics on processing and storage procedures.
A number of rice farmers were visited in order to obtain data on farm 
storage and opinions on marketing problems. Irrigation companies, credit 
organizations, government agencies, research workers, and private indi­
viduals were sources of valuable information never presented in published 
form. The reconciliation of this large collection of objective and sub­
jective data with known principles of marketing and economic theory es­
tablished a problem of academic as well as of practical interest.
Importance of the Louisiana lice Industry
Kice is a principal food crop for a great portion of the world' a 
population. Its production requires the major attention of agriculture 
in China, India, the Japanese iitopire, Indo-China, Siam, the butch East 
Indies, the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and Madagascar. About 97 per 
cent of the world's annual rice crop is produced in these eastern
3
regions.2 In past year a, the world rice crop has been estimated near 7 
billion bushels, of which Chinese and Indian production alone has ap­
proached 5 billion bushels* In these countries, rice is the principal 
food stuff, and per oapita consumption is very liigh.̂
The principal producing countries outside of the eastern regions 
are the United States, Italy, Spain, li&ypt, and Brazil* In none of these 
latter regions is rice as important as other staple crops from the nation­
al point of view* However, in restricted areas of these nations rice pro­
duction has become highly specialized, and to the residents of these 
specialised growing areas rice is the most important cash crop grown*
The annual United States rice production of 50 million bushels a year is 
the largest among western nations* Extreme concentration of production 
makes the crop of prime importance In limited areas of the United States*
There are only three important rice-producing sections in the 
United States, although the crop is important in four states* The princi­
pal producing region is the broad level prairie bordering the Gulf Coast 
of southwestern Louisiana and southeastern Texas* About 34 million 
bushels have been produced annually in this area in recent years, or 
about 65 per cent of the United States orop.^ The remaining production is 
split between the Grand Prairie section of eastern Arkansas, and the
^Jones, Jenkins, Wyche, and Nelson, Rice Culture in the Southern 
States, Farmer's Bulletin No* 1608, United States Department of Agricul­
ture, October, 1936, p* 1*
3ftice and wheat together constitute the major element in food sup­
plies for four-fifths of the world's population* For an adequate dis­
cussion of the world importance of rice, see V*D* tfiokizer, Rice and 'ffheat 
in World Agriculture and Consumption* Aheat studies of the Food Research 
Institute, Stanford University, Vol. XVII, Wo* 6, March, 1941#
4Agricultural Statistics. 1940* United States Department of Agri­
culture* Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1941$ p. 96.
4
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys of California* In the rice trade, a 
designation of only two rice-produc 1 ng areas is commonly used. These are 
the Southern area, including Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas; and Cali­
fornia, where production differs considerably in variety and market from 
the southern states*
A century ago rice was an important crop in South Carolina, Morth
Carolina, and Georgia, but these states dropped out of production when
5new areas in the southwest wore opened up after the Civil Car. Rela­
tively rigid physical requirements for profitable American rice culture 
make unlikely any future shift in the general locale of production areas* 
Louisiana has been the most important rice-producing state since 
production shifted from the South Atlantic States. The principal growth 
in production has come since lS90f shortly after rice was introduced on 
a largo scale in the southwestern prairies* Closely followed by Texas, 
production expanded steadily in Louisiana until it reached a peak in 
World War I* The present importance of rice in Louisiana is shown by the 
fact that 479 ,000 of the 4,193,OCX) acres harvested in 46 principal crops 
were in rice in 1939* The farm value of the 1939 rice crop was approxi­
mately 16 million dollars, or about 15 per cent of the total fam value 
of 105 million dollars for all crops in the state.^ In 1940 there were
10 parishes with more than 100 rice farms each, and 24 parish s of the
764 had an appreciable amount of rice production. Production is concen-
5The rise and fall of rice cultivation in the South Atlantic 
States is recorded by D.C. Heyward, Seod from kadapaacar. Chapel Hills 
University of North Carolina Press, 1937.
6Agricultural Statistics. 1940. 0£. cit, p. 96 and p. 546.
7From data made available by the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­
tration, Baton Rouge.
5
trated, however, in the five parishes of Acadia, Vo raillion, Jefferson 
Davis, Evangeline, and Calcasieu (see accompanying map). Here rice is 
the principal crop, and the economic structure of these parishes is built 
upon rice production. About 6,000 large farms in the five parishes 
specialise in rice. Rice milling as an associated industry furnishes 
considerable additional employment.
Additional areas along the Mississippi River between Now Orleans 
and Baton Rouge and along Bayou Teche on the border of the Atohafalaya 
swamp, are minor areas of specialisation in which rice production is 
olosely associated with sugar cane production. Cultivation practices are 
those of small-scale producers and differ greatly from those in the high­
ly specialised region of the southwest. The principal acreage is in St. 
James pariah, and the principal characteristics of the rice in this area 
are that it is early, has different growing problems, and is generally 
marketed promptly after harvest in contrast to storage practices in the 
southwest.
This study is an eoonomic analysis of the Louisiana rice industry, 
and is concerned principally with problems of marketing rough rice in the 
chief commercial area of Louisiana. The study thus concerns largely the 
structure of the marketing system and the problems of farmers in the five 
leading rice parishes of the state. The problems, however, are similar 
for all rice producers in both Louisiana and Texas, and in many respects 
the study must consider the entire national and world situation in regard
®According to the Census of Manufactures, 34 large rice mills in 
Louisiana employed an average of 1,024 workers in 1937, ranging seasonally 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to rice. The particular objective of the study, however, is the evalu­
ation of the economic situation from the point of view of the rice farmers 
in Louisiana.
Rice Investigations in Louisiana
Since rice is a highly localized crop in the United States, a 
great deal of research attention has not been focussed on either its pro­
duction or economic problems. Die four rice producing states, therefore, 
have a specialized problem in agricultural research. Since Louisiana is 
the leading state in rice production, much of the research in the United 
States has been centered here. Scientific investigations along the lines 
of seed improvement, soil fertility, Insect pests, noxious weeds, irriga­
tion requirements, idee diseases, crop rotation, and cultural methods were 
begun by the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station in 1396, shortly
after southwest Louisiana became the principal rice producing section.^
IQConsiderable work in variety development was done by leading farmers, 
and the United States Department of Agriculture supported a number of 
cooperative experiments on various farms.
In 1909, a Rice Experiment Station was established at Crowley, 
Louisiana, as a cooperative project between the United States Department 
of Agriculture and the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station. Since 
that date, the Louisiana station has been prominent in developing improved
^T.C. Quereau, Rice Investigations. Bulletin No. 172, Louisiana 
Agricultural Experiment Station, September, 1920.
•^Important varieties now in common use were developed by Sol 
Wright, a leading Louisiana rice faraer in the early days of the industry.
9
varieties of rioe and in improving the methods of rice culture* Other
work of considerable importance has been done in Arkansas, California,
and Texas* The field of American technical literature on rice, however,
is not large* Principal compilations of the technical aspects of rice pro-
11duction draw heavily on research conducted in India and the Far East*
In no field of agricultural production is research into production 
technique the entire answer to a faraer*® problems* The economic problems 
of f&xm management, price behavior, and marketing in many seasons are of 
more immediate concern to a faraer than production problems* Study of 
the economic problems of rioe farmers in Louisiana has been limited, con­
sidering the importance of the crop in the economy of the state* In 
1930* A* J* Saville published a bulletin describing the general economic 
problems of the Louisiana rioe farmer, and followed this with an eco­
nomic study of irrigation problems in the rice area*^ In 1933 & study 
was published describing the fans management problems on rice farms 
These three studies comprise the principal experiment station work on 
the economic problems faced by Louisiana rice fanners*
■^"Copeland, E*B*, Rice* Londons Macmillan and Company, 1924*
^Seville, ft.J*, Some Economic Problems in the Rice Farming Area. 
1929, Bulletin Mo* 217, Louisiana agricultural Experiment Station,
November, 1930*
^Seville, ft.J*, Rice Farm Irrigation Systems in Louisiana. 1929* 
Bulletin Mo* 216, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, November, 1930*
^^Saville, R*J..Factors in the Organization and Successful Oper­
ation of Louisiana Rice Fame. 1930. Bulletin No. 233, Louisiana Agri- 
oultural Experiment Station, January, 1933*
10
The principal Investigations into marketing problems have been 
conducted by the Division of Grain Investigations of the Bureau of Agri­
cultural iiconojnios (now the Agricultural Marketing Service). W. D. Smith 
pioneered in study concerning the handling and processing of rice, with 
the object of eliminating the marketing confusion caused by the absence 
of grades and lack of knowledge of rice quality. His studies, reported 
frequently between 1920 and 1930, produced a considerable volume of 
practical information which was used in the construction of government
grades, and later had considerable influence in the establishment of co~
15operative enterprise and government programs for rice farmers. '
The marketing of rough rice in Louisiana has several character­
istics which differentiate marketing problems from those of other staple 
commodities* All of the product must pass from the farms of a restricted 
area through the hands of a relatively few processors, the rice mills*
The market for rough rice as it comes from the farm is directly to the 
rice mills. Hough rice has no other domestic and a very small foreign 
market, for the commodity moves in trade channels only as clean rice* 
Bough rice demand is derived from demand for clean rice, and 
rough rice prices tend to reflect clean rice prices less costs of pro­
cessing. The relatively small size of the industry, both in producing 
and processing, has resulted in the absence of an organised market for 
either rough or clean rice in the United States. Marketing, particularly
^See abstracts and references, The Handling. Grades, and Uses 
of Bice, compiled by C* L. P. Corbett and E. G. Boemer, mimeograph, 
United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Eco­
nomics, Washington, March, 1937*
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of rough rice, is characterised by personal transactions and intimate 
knowledge between individual growers and processors. These conditions 
result in a market which lacks the impartial, impersonal elements im­
portant to both business men and students of economics whenever repre­
sentative price and economic data are desired.
Charact eristic s of the Louisiana Rice Area
Louisiana rice production is centered almost wholly on a flat 
prairie bordering the coastal marshes of the Gulf of Mexico. The popu­
lation is a mixture of Louisiana native stock, largely of French ex­
traction still maintaining the French language, and a considerable in­
filtration of farmers from the states of the Midwest. These northern 
farmers sett Led in Louisiana when rice production first became impor­
tant, and it was largely due to their experience and initiative that 
large-scale mechanised methods adapted rice as a profitable crop on 
the low poorly drained prairies, previously used only for cattle range.^
The farms of the area are in general large, with quarter section 
units being common. The 1935 average acreage per farm of 101 acres was 
the largest among Louisiana type-of-farming areas, and compared to a 
state average of 64 acres.17 Farm buildings differ notably from those 
generally found throughout the South, with substantial frame houses and 
ample outbuildings reflecting the midwestern background of many of the
■^Lauren C. Post, "The Rice Country of Southwestern Louisiana," 
The Geographical Review. 30:574-590, October, 1940.
17'Census of Agriculture, 1935, Bureau of the Census. Washington: 
Government Printing Office.
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farmers* Tractors are in ccranon use, and cultivating and harvesting 
machinery resembles closely the equipment used for sni; ll grains in other 
parts of the country.
Since the establishment of rice cultivation in the specialised 
area, rice prices have been favorable relative to most, other southern 
crops, particularly cotton, Except for a drastic decline in 1932, grow­
ers have not experienced any protracted period of acute price depression 
such as has affected the cotton growers of the 3outh, This fact, can>- 
bined with the large acreages in the area, reduced pressure of population 
on the available resources, and better educated oomnnnities, has enabled 
the farmers in the rice area to achieve an economic position superior to 
that in any other type-of-farming area in the South,
Although there is a considerable amount of tenancy, the simple 
sharecropper relation of the cotton areas is not generally found in rice 
production. Average capital investments in land and machinery per person
gainfully employed in agriculture are large, averaging £3*105 per worker
18as compared to §1,362 per worker in an upland cotton area. Wages paid
laborers on rice farms consistently average the highest in the state,
19indicating higher productivity per worker. 7
The farmers of the rice area, however, generally require con­
siderable credit advances in making a rice crop. In past years these 
advances were made largely by banks and local merchants, but in recent
Census of Agriculture, 1930*
^ W* g. He man, "Farm Wage Rate Differentials Between Areas of 
Louisiana," Louisiana Rural Economist, Vol, 3, Ho, 2, April, 1941,
13
years the Production Credit Association# have largely replaced the local 
institutions. Since a rice crop is unusually certain and rice fanners 
ordinarily have acceptable credit backing in real estate and machinery 
investment, improvement in credit facilities has been relatively easy to 
establish#^
There are a considerable number of large rice holdings operated 
by tenants in the specialised areas. The ownership of these large hold­
ings is vested in estates, irrigation companies, land companies, and in­
dividuals* Share rents are paid, and credit is generally advanced by 
the owners* A large volume of rice thus passes into the control of a re­
latively few companies or persons, which is sufficient to complicate 
marketing problems because the action of a few holders can affect the en­
tire market. This is particularly true for large irrigation companies,
which receive a one-fifth share of numerous rice crops as a water rent
21and thus control the sale of large rice stocks*
Rice Acreage and Production
Technical factors of rice production are outside the scope of 
this study, except for general background and necessary facts pertaining 
to marketing and the general situation for the industry. More important 
is a detailed analysis of changes In acreage and production of rice in
^R, L. Thompson, The Agricultural Credit Situation In Louisiana,
Bulletin Ho. 208, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, January, 1930.
^;Yater rents may be one-fourth of the rice on farm® where yields
are low or the irrigation company incurs high coats for watering.
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the United States, with particular reference to Louisiana.
The physical conditions controlling rice production arc tempera-
22ture, water supply, and soils. High mean temperatures during the grow­
ing season are necessary, and a dependable supply of fresh water for 
irrigation must be available. In Louisiana the soils especially suited 
to rice production are the Lake Charles anti Crowley series, which are 
rich, dark-colored alluvial soils with impervious subsoils capable of 
holding irrigation water over the surface for a considerable period, with 
good facilities for drainage, and with a solid footing for cultural ma­
chinery after removal of the water.
These limitations of soil, topography, temperature, and water sup­
ply for irrigation limit rather closely the extent of land available for 
rice production in the United States. In Louisiana, the rice area is 
definitely outlined by the prairie soils area of the southwestern parishes. 
Since 1379# land has been planted at some time to rice in practically 
every parish of the state outside of the hill parishes, but production 
gradually became restricted to the prarie soils area except for the 
limited Mississippi river and Teche acreage. In 1909, 32 of the 64
parishes had 100 or more acres in rice as compared to 22 parishes having
23100 or more acres in 1934*
The rice areas of Texas and Arkansas are similarly limited, al~
brief but adequate discussion of these factors is available 
in ’’The boll Requirements for Economic Plants,” Soils and Mon. United 
States Department of Agriculture Yearbook, 1938. Washingtons Government 
Printing Office, p. 759.
^Censuses 0f Agriculture, 1910 and 1935*
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though less than in Louisiana and by somewhat different factors* Ex­
pansion in Texas, where suitable land is available, is limited largely 
by the difficulty of securing an adequate water supply for irrigation, 
while soil and topography requirements limit Arkansas acreage. Both of 
these latter states, however, are capable of expanding rice acreage pro­
portionately more than in Louisiana, where rice production already has 
been attempted on all available acreage. Rice acreage in California is 
limited largely by the competition of other crops for water and land in 
the irrigated valleys where it is grown*
The acreage of rice harvested in each of the four producing 
states and in the United States since 1909 is shown in Figure 3. Although 
Louisiana has consistently been the largest rice producer among the four 
principal states of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and California, the acre­
age and production of Texas has been experiencing the most rapid growth 
in recent years* Rice acreage received an enormous stimulus by the de­
mand for foods, especially cereals, accompanying World War 1* Previous 
to 1913# changes in acreage such as the decline in the Carolina pro­
duction, and the rise in southern acreage, were brought about chiefly by 
shifts in natural comparative advantages and changes in techniques of pro­
duction* In other words, changes in supply conditions were relatively 
more important than demand changes prior to the World War*
Beginning in 1914, however, change In demand almost doubled the 
acreage of rice grown in the United States within six years. In 1914 
there were about 640,000 acres of rice in the United States; by 191S, 
almost 1,300,000 acres were harvested* Louisiana acreage more than 
doubled in this period, rising from 320,000 acres in 1914 to 676,000 acres
16
Table X. Acreage, yield, production and farm value of rough rioe in the
United States, 1909 to date*
Tear s Acreage : field 1 Production t Farm value
1.000 acres Bushels 1.000 bushel. 1.000 dollars
1909 662 3 5 .6 23,586 18,758
1910 666 3 7 .1 24,731 16,785
1911 636 3 5 .6 22,662 18,257
1912 643 3 6 .9 23,700 22,159
1913 722 3 3 .5 24,210 20,824
1914 646 3 6 .3 23,478 21,702
1915 740 3 5 .3 26,107 23,656
1916 843 46.9 39,544 35,162
1917 953 36.4 34,714 85,804
1918 1,101 36.3 39,998 76,696
1919 1,083 39.6 42,911 114,210
1920 1,299 39.8 51,648 61,006
1921 990 39.7 39,274 37,239
1922 1,053 39.6 41,663 38,686
1923 874 38.0 33,238 36,615
1924 838 39.0 32,643 43,934
1925 853 38.7 33,036 49,017
1926 1,016 41.4 42,025 47,513
1927 1,027 43.3 44,497 40,413
1928 972 45.1 43,834 39,950
1929 860 46.0 39,534 39,474
1930 966 46.5 44,929 35,214
1931 965 46.2 44,613 21,642
1932 874 47.6 41,619 17,416
1933 798 47.2 37,651 29,248
1934 812 48.1 39,047 30,854
1935 817 48.3 39,452 30,479
1936 981 50.8 49,820 41,567
1937 1,088 49.1 53,372 35,132
1938 1,076 48.8 52,506 33,714
1939 1,040 51.7 53,722 39,095
1940* 1.051 __ 50.2 .... ............. 37.052^Preliminary.
Source* Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Eco­
nomics by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
Southern Division.
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in 1920, thus accounting for about half of the national increase. The 
balance of the acreage was put into production in California, where rice 
production was just beginning when the war brought on unusually favorable 
conditions for expansion, and in Arkansas, where the acreage increased 
from 100,000 in 1913 to 180,000 in 1918* Acreage in Texas showed no ex­
panding tendency during the World War, which is in distinct contrast to 
recent years.
With the close of the war, rice acreage declined precipitously, 
but in spite of the decline the total United States acreage remained far 
above that which preceded the war. In 1914 the acreage was 646,000, while 
the lowest point since that year has been 798,000 acres in 1933* Although 
acreage contracted immediately following the war, the impulse of relative­
ly high prices in 1924 and 1925 caused a sharp expansion in 1926 and 1927*
Acreage soon dropped from its level of 1927, however, since prices 
for crops in that year were not such as to encourage rice production on 
land adapted to other crops, In 1929 acreage dropped temporarily to 
360,000, but i&aediately recovered to 965,000 in each of the following 
two years. Prices then declined so precipitously in 1930 and 1931 that 
acreage reacted sharply and by 1933 was 798,000 acres, the lowest point 
since before World War I.
Just as Louisiana acreage accounted for most of the war-time ex­
pansion, it also accounted for most of the post-war acreage reduction, 
and for most of the acreage fluctuations up to recent years. Since 1935 
the change in national acreage has become somewhat less closely associ­













































































































Table II. Acreage of rough rice harvested in the United States by States, 1909 to date.
Tear : N.G. t Mo. ■ s.c • t Ga. : Fla. t Arkansas s Louisiana s Texas j Calif. : U.S.
1.000 acres
1909 1 19 6 1 27 370 238 662
1910 19 6 1 60 360 220 666
1911 14 4 1 72 350 195 636
1912 12 3 1 91 315 220 1 643
1913 8 2 1 105 350 250 6 722
1914 12 5 1 . 93 320 200 15 640
1915 7 4 100 335 213 30 740
1916 7 4 1 125 435 212 59 843
1917 6 4 2 152 485 216 88 953
191S 9 5 2 170 565 230 120 1,101
1919 7 4 2 160 543 212 155 1,083
1920 180 676 261 162 1,299
1921 140 549 166 135 990
1922 163 555 195 140 1,053
1923 143 474 151 106 874
1924 1 166 430 151 90 838
1925 4 176 414 156 103 853
1926 10 196 492 169 149 1,016
1927 3 179 520 165 160 1,027
1928 10 173 495 162 132 972
1929 156 465 144 95 860
1930 173 491 192 110 966
1931 177 458 205 125 965
1932 163 a s 186 110 874
1933 147 395 148 108 798
1934 141 U 5 143 108 812
1935 138 412 167 100 817
1936 160 479 204 138 981
1937 189 517 250 132 1,088
1938 189 494 268 125 1,076
1939 171 480 269 120 1,040
1940* 191 _____ 4.5.1..... 291 118 1.051^Preliminary.
Sources Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.
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increasingly important, expanding from 148,000 in 1934 to 291,000 in 1940* 
This expansion in acreage since 1935 reversed a fifteen year post-war de­
cline in the American industry, and has had drastic effects on the econo** 
mic situation of rice farmers*
Figure 4 presents on ratio scales the relative growth of rice 
acreage in the principal producing regions of the United States. The close 
association in movement of the Louisiana and United States acreage is 
clearly shown here, together with the rapid early growth of the Arkansas 
and California industry, and the recent growth of the Texas producing 
area* Texas had a definite downward trend until 1933, when acreage ex­
perienced its sharpest upward movement since rice production began in the 
state* Qy 1940, however, the total acreage change in the United States 
appeared to have leveled off at a point below the maximum acreage of World 
War I days* Rioe production since that time has become more specialized, 
and future expansion of the specialized type is possible only in Texas* 
Arkansas and California production apparently rose to their maximum level 
at an early stage in their production, and have not showed the marked re­
cent growth characteristic of Texas production*
The principal contraction in Louisiana rice acreage has been on 
the periphery of the belt on farms where the production of other crops 
can be adapted to the land* The trend in the United States has been 
toward increased specialization and concentration of rice acreage, with 
the scattered production of minor areas gradually passing out of existence*
Production o£ Rios
The production of rough rice is probably more closely associated
21
Figure 4. Rate of change in rice acreage harvested in the United States and 
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with the acreage harvested than is the production of any other principal 
crop. Rice| in oonnon with other Irrigated crops, is little affected by 
weather and growing hazards beyond the farmer’s control. As a result, 
yields are relatively stable, and the total production is largely a re­
sult of acres planted and harvested.
The yields per acre in the United States and in each of the four 
producing states are presented in Figure 6. The most outstanding fact 
shown by these data is the general trend toward higher yields In the 
past 15 years, particularly in Texas and California. Louisiana yields 
have been uniformly the lowest of the four states, which of course heavi­
ly influences the average yield for the United States since Louisiana is 
the principal producer. In only one year, 1916, have yields in Louisiana 
been sharply above the average. In most years the yield per acre in 
Louisiana can be safely estimated as lying within much less than a five 
bushel limit from the preceding year.
In fact, since 1920 the standard deviation from the average yield 
of 33.2 bushels per acre in Louisiana has been only 3*2 bushels, which is 
remarkably stable for any large agricultural crop. This figure is derived 
without removing the trend in yields, which since 1920 has been constantly 
tending upward. Removing trend for the 19 years, 1920 through 1938, by 
fitting a least-squares straight line, the standard error of estimate is 
only 1.96 bushels. In other words, 69 out of 100 chances the yield of 
rice In any given year would be within 4 bushels of the average yield, 
allowing for the trend toward higher yields. In only one year of the 
past nineteen years, between 1926 and 1927, did the yields between years
23
change as much as 3 bushels*
The high yield of rice in Texas as contrasted to Louisiana rice 
is particularly significant when considered in relation to the increasing 
acreage in Texas shown in Figure 1. Louisiana and Texas form one contigu­
ous producing area, and the increase of yield combined with growing acre­
age affords serious competition to Louisiana, where there is no new land 
for future acreage expansion and rice yields have little prospect of 
further increase*
Since yields are stable, production and acreage, even with the 
rising trend of yields included, show statistically a remarkable associ­
ation* For the United States, the coefficient of correlation for the 
years 1920-1938 is *74* In other words, about 55 per cent of the annual 
variation in production can be directly attributed to variation in acre­
age. However, this figure does not allow for the observable trend in 
yields* tfith the trend in yields for the United States included in a 
multiple correlation by a least-squarea straight line, the relationship 
between acreage, production, and trend in yield is shown by a corrected 
coefficient of correlation of .87* and 76 per cent of the variation in 
production may therefore be said to be explained by changes in acreages 
and trend in yield* The significance of this fact in regard to the ea3e 
of establishing effective production and price control in the rice indus­
try is obvious.
Figure 5 shows the changes in United States rice production since 
1909* It will be noted that rice production has been at an all-time high 
since 1938, at more than 50,000,000 bushels each year. Only once before 




































































































Table III. Production of rough rice in the United States by states, 1909 to date.
Tear * N»C* : Mo. i s.c. : Ga. : Fla. $ Arkansas : Louisiana: Texas t Calif. : U.S.
1.000 bushels
1909 22 526 139 20 1,264 12,617 3,996 23,586
1910 522 139 21 2,700 13,320 8 ,0 3 0 24,731
1911 161 60 20 3*168 11,725 7 9 $06 22,662
1912 276 66 21 3,958 11,182 8,140 57 23,700
1913 176 44 20 4,410 11,200 8,000 360 24,210
1914 276 112 18 3,952 11,520 6,700 900 23,478
1915 147 86 18 4,600 12,898 6,496 1,860 26,107
1916 150 80 18 6,312 20,010 9,434 3,540 39,544
1917 123 68 36 6,916 16,005 6 ,2 6 4 5,280 34,714
1916 166 86 34 7,140 18,080 7,590 6,900 39,998
1919 131 58 33 7,600 19,005 6,784 9,300 42,911
1920 6,820 2 5 ,0 12 9,554 8,262 51,648
1921 7,490 18,501 5,993 7,290 39,274
1922 7,824 19,314 6,825 7,700 41,665
1923 5,646 15,879 6,040 5,671 33,238
1924 50 7,138 15,050 6,040 4,365 32,643
1925 300 7,568 14,159 6,209 4, 800 33,036
1926 610 10,349 16,236 6,844 7,986 42,025
1927 75 7,697 19,812 7,953 8,960 44,497
1926 400 8,287 18,860 8,116 3,171 43,834
1929 7,956 18,632 7.027 5,719 39,534
1930 3,216 19,149 10^291 7,271 44,929
1931 9,735 16,030 10,598 8,250 44,613
1932 8,313 16,392 9,114 7,800 a , 619
1933 7,203 16,195 7,3a 8,912 37,651
1934 6,655 16,766 7,370 8,256 39,047
1935 6,072 17,296 6,684 7,400 39,452
1936 8,752 21,076 10,608 9,384 49,820
1937 10,564 20,660 13,000 9,108 53,372
1936 9,715 20,748 13,668 8,375 52,506
1939 8,430 21,120 15,172 9,000 53,722
1940* ___l&JMl__^Preliminary •
Source: Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economica by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.
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to 51# 500,000 bushels under the impetus of high war prices prevalent for 
several years* Although production in recent years has exceeded th© 1920 
total, this production has been caused partly by th© prevailing upward 
trend of yields, since recent acreage has remained substantially below 
the 1920 peak*
The recent rise in total production took place in the face of a 
marketing and crop control program designed to stabilize both the pro­
duction and price of rice* Production of rice clearly decreased in re* 
sponse to lower prices after 1929, and the adjustment was pronounced 
until the government marketing program of 1933* The first marketing pro­
gram, effective in raising price but not in controlling acreage, abruptly 
halted a downward adjustment in acreage* In 1935, acreage control was 
established but was not effective* Production increased phenomenally 
in 1936, and until the present date has remained extremely high* The 
recent change of acreage in relation to government control programs is 
a matter of sufficient interest so that a large portion of this study 
will be devoted to its analysis*
Since acreage expanded in 1936, Louisiana has produced slightly 
more than 20,000,000 bushels of rioe each year, or approximately 5“1/2 
million barrels*^ The increase in Texas acreage has resulted in an 
annual Texas crop near 14,000,000 bushels, with Arkansas and California 
contributing about 9,000,000 bushels each to the United States total.
The Louisiana total therefore accounts for almost 40 per cent of all rice
bushel of rice weighs 45 pounds* In the Louisiana and Texas 
area rice is sold on the basis of a barrel of 162 pounds, which is equiva­




















































































produced domestically, which concentrates problems of the rioe industry 
in this state.
Production by Varieties
There are thousands of varieties of rice grown throughout the 
world* The principal distinguishing characteristics of the grain secured 
from the various varieties are in length and plumpness of the kernel*
The varieties are generally distinguished as long, medium, or short- 
grained varieties* These varieties vary considerably in appearance, in 
milling quality, and in appeal to the consumer* Considerable research 
has been done in the selection and improvement of rice varieties in the 
United States, the object being to combine a high yielding type in the 
field and at the mill with cooking qualities attractive to consumers*^ 
Medium and long-grain rices are generally preferred by American con­
sumers*
Varieties of rice grown in the southern states, however, are not 
altogether determined by consumer demand* The planning of farm operations 
requires that several varieties of rice requiring different length of
^"Perhaps the greatest problem in the breeding program is the 
difficulty encountered in combining high milling quality with flaky table 
quality. Cooking and milling tests indicate that the characteristics of 
the grain, principally vitreousness, which make it resistant to breakage 
in milling, probably are the same properties that cause it to be more or 
less pasty when cooked* Varieties in which large localized, chalky spots 
occur may not mill well but are often flaky when cooked* Flakiness is 
preferred, by most consumers, to pastiness* The replacement of varieties 
tending to have pasty cooking quality by flaky ones may help to increase 
the popularity of rice*” N. J£* Jodon, 11 Advances Toward New and Improved 
Rice Varieties," Biennial Report of the Rice Experiment Station* 1939- 
1940. Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1941, p* 22.
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growing period be planted* Harvest requirements bring a peak labor load, 
and total costs of production can be reduced if varieties are selected so 
that the harvest period for the entire crop will not coincide* Since 
such selection is generally practiced in the southern states, the rice 
harvest and marketing season is spread over two to three months— a rela­
tively long period for harvesting a grain in a compact geographical
Some rioe varieties have a fairly constant requirement in days be­
tween seeding and maturity, while other varieties vary in their require­
ments according to date of seeding* In addition, certain varieties have 
a short growing period regardless of date of seeding* When sown between
April 15 and May 15, the varieties may be classified as early, midseason, 
27and late* Early maturing varieties require about 120 to 129 days from 
seeding to maturity, midseason varieties about 130 to 139 days, and late 
maturing varieties li»0 days or more*
^See k. Nelson and C. Adair, Rioe Variety Experiments in Arkansas* 
Bulletin No* 403, Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1940, p. 3* 
"The rice grower is interested in raising two or three varieties that dif­
fer in maturity and grain type, the reasons for this being to get better 
distribution of labor, to be able to take advantage of such differential 
prices as may occur among varieties, and to be able to sell part or all 
of his early rice to finance the harvest of the later varieties* Th© labor 
of harvesting early, midaeason, and late varieties can be distributed over 
a month or 6 weeks* If a grower raised only one variety, h- s average net 
income over a period of years might be as high as if he grew tv/o or three 
varieties* But, because of the variation in price among varieties, the 
income of the one-variety farmer would probably fluctuate over a wider 
range than if he had for sale each year rice of two or three varieties."
^Farmers Bulletin No* 1808, op* clt.* pp. 10 ff.
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The following table, assembled from annual estimates of rice 
crops prepared by the Rice Millers Association, shows the approximate 
distribution by varieties of rough rice produced In Louisiana* By far 
the greatest proportion is Blue Rose, which has contributed about 70 per 
cent of the total production in recent years* This percentage has been 
declining in the last few years, largely because of a rapid rise in the 
production of Rexoro, a long-grain rice which contributed 13 per cent of 
the Louisiana crop in 1939 and surpassed Early Prolific in total pro­
duction* Other Varieties, including Fortuna, Hire, Lady Wright, Edith, 
and Japan, form only a very small part of the Louisiana crop* The pro­
duction of Rexoro has increased principally at the expense of Blue Rose 
and has displaced other varieties relatively little*
Varieties grown in Texas and Arkansas are the a m© as in Louisiana, 
but with a much different distribution* In 1938 and 1939$ only 31 per 
cent of the Texas crop was Blue Rose, with Rexoro holding a position of 
equal importance* Hie percentage of Early Prolific was also substantial­
ly higher in Texas in 1939, with 16 per cent of the total production*
In Arkansas, Early Prolific is unusually important and accounts for 37 
per cent of the crop partly because of the shorter growing period in that 
area* Blue Rose and Early Prolific together accounted for 65 per cent of 
the Arkansas crop, the remainder being principally Nlra and Japan*
The Blue Rose variety tends to mature at nearly the same date re­
gardless of the date of seeding* Generally harvest takes place at the 
same time each year, beginning in late September and early October*



















































































































































































































































































































































































































matures in about 189 days, but when sown May 15 it matures in about 135 
days*23
Early Prolific, if seeded on March 15, usually requires 141 days 
to nature* If seeding is delayed two months, this requirement is reduced 
only 19 days* Ordinarily Early Prolific is seeded at the same date as 
Blue Rose, and therefore natures about 40 days prior to Blue Rose. This 
enables the harvest to begin in late August and early September*
The principal long grain variety grown in Louisiana is Rexoro, 
followed by Fortune and l&ra. These varieties mature at about the same 
time as Blue Rose, and therefore are not grown to distribute harvest re­
quirements as is Early Prolific* In addition, these long grains require 
a long and relatively uniform growing period, so that they must be seeded 
early in the spring* Edith and lady Wright varieties were formerly grown 
as early maturing long grains, but because of susceptibility to disease 
and low yields on old land are being replaced by Rexoro*
Since Early Prolific is the best market variety with a short 
growing period, it is the variety most generally combined with Blue Rose 
in large rice acreages* Ordinarily the Early Prolific harvest is com­
pleted before the Blue Rose harvest is begun* This enables a more con­
tinuous use of harvesting labor and equipment, eases credit obligations, 
and reduces costs. Since Early Prolific brings lower prices than other 
varieties, a principal reason for its continued production is the harvest­
ing problem.
In southwestern Louisiana, the harvest season is practically the 
Îbld.
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same for all sections of the rice belt* For river rice between Baton 
Bouge and New Orleans and for the Teohe urea, the harvest season is 
considerably earlier, running from August through October. The crop is 
planted earlier in these areas, often in late February. Since a large 
proportion of the crop is Early Prolific, which has a relatively constant 
growing period, the crop matures several weeks before rioe in southwestern 
Louisiana* Rice in these minor areas is also cut while relatively green, 
and remains in the shook only a few days instead of several weeks. As a 
result, the growers along the Mississippi River are able to market their 
crop rapidly, since other new crop rice is not available to the mills.
Consumption of Rice
Rice is not a bread grain, and it is poorer than other cereals
in both fat and protein. These deficiencies, however, give it excellent
29keeping quality in hot, humid climates. 7 Because rice is expensive to 
produce, and since it must be supplemented in the diet by other foods, 
the fact that the poorest peoples of the world rely on rice most inten­
sively appears strange at first sight. This phenomenon is explained by 
the following characteristics of principal rice eating economiess 
(I) subsistence economy, (2) poor transportation facilities, (3) no al­
ternative occupation for labor, and (4) dietary habits are exceedingly 
30tenacious. Wheat, on both a pound and caloric basis, can be produced
C. Finch and 0. E. Baker, Geography of the Worlds Agriculture. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917# P* 46.
^E. W. Zimmerman, World Resources and Industries. New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1933# P« 234*
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more cheaply* and in larger quantities than rice, but will not respond to 
intensive cultivation as much as rice when high yields per acre are es­
sential regardless of labor costs.^ The residents of areas in which
32wheat is produced tend to consume little rice.
More than half of the 50 million or more bushels of rice produced 
annually in the United States are used to satisfy consumption needs within 
the 43 states. Average consumption per capita of rice is lower in the 
United States, however, than anywhere else in the world. Per capita con­
sumption in the United States varies between 5 end 6 pounds per year.*^ 
Nevertheless, the total volume of rice consumed in the United States has 
increased substantially during the past 20 years because of increasing 
population.
The continental market is protected by a 2-1/2 cent tariff duty 
on clean rice. This barrier is effective in preserving the market for 
American rice growers, although small quantities of rice for special pur­
poses are Imported each year. Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska also fall 
within the United States tariff walls, and furnish a fairly consistent 
market for /merican rice. Per capita consumption in Puerto Rico and 
Hawaii is very high, well over 100 pounds per capita, but total volume of 
sales is limited by relatively small populations. In recent years, rice
33-lhld.
^^Wloklz.r, o£, clt. Hie. is boat adapted of all cereals to a 
subsistence economy, since seed requirements are lowest and yields re­
spond most to intensive cultivation.
-^Agricultural Statistics, 1940, o£. clt. P. 98.
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consumption within the United States tariff boundaries has provided an 
outlet for three-fourths of the American crop.
The remaining fourth of the crop must find an export outlet. The 
difficulties faced in exporting a commodity whose production is at least 
partially sustained by tariff protection in the domestic market will be 
discussed in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient only to point out 
the fact that the domestic market is remarkably stable, while the export 
market is highly unstable because of foreign competition.
The low average per capita consumption in the United States is 
virtually meaningless for specific analysis, since there are wide dispari­
ties in rice consumption between areas. Although there are no definite 
figures available on consumption by states, some compilations have been 
made which indicate the various levels of consumption. ̂  These figures 
show that Maine, Idaho, Hew Mexico, and North Dakota each has a per capita 
consumption of only one pound; that In California and Alabama the per 
capita consumption is nine pounds each; that North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida have a per capita consumption of 21 pounds and that 
Louisiana has a per capita consumption of UO pounds. For all other states 
the per capita consumption is only about two pounds.
The South Atlantic market is thus the most important outlet for 
rice, since the population is accustomed to using rice as a cheap source 
of food energy. The negro population particularly have the habit of 
eating rice as an Important item in their diet.
^Bulletin No. 3, Home itoonomics Department of the Southern Rice 
Industry, New Orleans, 1932.
CHAPTER II
PRICE MOVEMENTS FOR ROUGH RICE
Previous to 1930, research workers in the field of price analysis 
made intensive studies of supply-pric© relationships, which, under condi­
tions of relatively uniform demand over a period of years, were extremely 
useful in price prediction. Since the advent of the depression, however, 
both the domestic and foreign demand situation have been subjected to un­
usual and sudden changes, complicated by monetary manipulation and an un­
usual psychology of price expectation. At the same time, government 
control of farm production has limited normal responses of supply to price 
changes. In this situation, emphasis has swung from supply-price relation­
ships to dem&nd-price relationships. Adequate statistical, psychological, 
and political tools are lacking for analysis and prediction of demand, so 
that quantitative analysis of price does not ordinarily contribute more to 
price understanding than purely descriptive analysis of a price situation.
For these reasons, this chapter attempts little more than a quali­
tative analysis of price movements for rough rice. There has been one 
quantitative study made of rice prices, by Carlos Campbell of the United 
States Department of Agriculture. The specific relationships analyzed in 
this statistical study are applicable to the present rice industry only if
^Carlos E. Campbell, Factors Affecting the Price of Rice. Technical 
Bulletin No. 297, United States Department of Agriculture, April, 1932*
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government price and production control programs should be abolished, and 
if the export situation should revert to the situation of the 1920 decade* 
Since these events are not probable, the relationships are useful only as 
general principles furnishing a base point for further interpolation*
The Trend of Prioes
There is no central market quotation or generally accepted trade 
quotation on the price of rough rice, since each sale of rough rice is in 
the nature of an individual bargain between the producer and the processor* 
Clean rice price quotations are available from brokers handling rice sales 
in the New Orleans and New fork markets, although there is again no uni­
form trading price beyond scattered reports indicating the general level 
at which sales are being made in the wholesale trade* The most reliable 
indication of annual price movements for rough rice is the monthly aver­
age price received for rice by farmers as reported by the Agricultural 
Marketing Service. Although this average is based on a small sample of 
actual sales and makes no allowance for highly important factors of va­
riety and quality, various tests indicate that it describes the actual 
trend very closely.
The chart presents the annual average farm prices in Louisiana 
2since 1909* The southern rice industry had just become well established 
by 19H* when the World War inflation sent prices skyward* The crash in 
1920 brought rice prices back to their pre-war levels, but small crops 
and export demand resulted in a pronounced upward movement from 1922 to
2Prior to 1924# the annual averages are taken as the Deoember 1
price*
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1925* Froa that point, prices began a precipitous decline, which, al­
though checked In 1926 and turning into a slight rise in 1929, continued 
without interruption until 1932. The sharp rise in 1933 was caused 
largely by the establishment of minimum price regulations under a market­
ing agreement sponsored by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
and by a distinct upward movement of the general price level. After 
1936, however, price again slumped with the cessation of export demand 
until the outbreak of war in 1939 disrupted the shipping situation, 
whereupon the dependence of Cuba on United States rice caused a sharp 
rise in prices.
Small differences in average prices are evident between the four 
producing states. California rice is almost wholly of the Japan variety, 
enters a different market than southern rice, and is marketed under less 
competitive conditions, therefore prices do not always move closely with 
prices in the southern states. Prices move in very close relation in 
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. According to the trade, Texas rice is 
on the average somewhat superior in quality to Louisiana rice, and higher 
milling yields of clean rice and a greater proportion of long-grain rice 
results in a higher average price. Arkansas rice tends to average the 
lowest of the three states, which can be attributed at least partially to 
the greater proportion of Early Prolific rice in that area. In addition, 
claims have been made that Arkansas prices are lower than in Louisiana 
and Texas because of fewer mills and less competitive bidding, and be­





















































































Table V. Averags annual pries received by farmers for riee in Louisiana, 
Texas, Arkansas, California, and United States, 1909 to date*
Tear Louisiana Texas Arkansas California United States
bu* bbl. bu. bbl. bu. bbl. bu* bbl. bu. bbl.
i ♦ J L _ _ ♦ ♦ _ ,* 1. . .
1909 79 2.84 78 2.81 90 3.24 79 2.84
191D 67 2.41 68 2.45 70 2.52 65 2.34 66 2.45
1911 79 2.84 80 2.88 82 2.95 75 2.70 80 2.83
1912 93 3*35 94 3.38 94 3-38 91 3.28 94 3.38
1913 84 3.02 86 3.10 90 3.24 100 3.60 86 3.10
1914 93 3.35 92 3.31 90 3.24 100 3.60 92 3.31
1915 90 3.24 89 3.20 95 3.42 90 3.24 91 3.28
1916 90 3.24 86 3.10 96 3.47 78 2.81 89 3.20
1917 190 6.84 200 7.20 190 6.84 175 6.30 190 6.84
1918 195 7.02 197 7.09 180 6.48 190 6.84 192 6.91
1919 271 9.76 280 10.08 240 8.64 267 9.61 267 9.61
1920 110 3.96 125 4.50 131 4.72 121 4.36 119 4.28
1921 86 3.10 101 3.64 92 3.31 115 4.14 95 3.42
1922 89 3.20 90 3.24 88 3.17 H O 3.96 93 3.35
1923 107 3.85 H 5 4.14 112 4.39 112 4.03 110 3.96
1924 136 4.90 125 4.50 138 4.97 166 5.98 139 5.00
1925 153 5.51 149 5.36 150 5.40 170 6.12 154 5.54
1926 105 3.78 110 3.96 100 3.60 031 4.75 110 3.96
1927 87 3.13 86 3.10 90 3.24 115 4.14 93 3.35
1928 90 3.24 88 3.17 86 3.10 88 3.17 89 3.20
1929 100 3.60 103 3.71 94 3.38 105 3.78 100 3.60
1930 76 2.74 79 2.84 78 2.81 83 2.99 78 2.81
1931 53 1.91 54 1.94 44 1.58 44 1.58 50 1.80
1932 43 1.55 44 1.58 38 1.37 41 1.48 42 1.51
1933 78 2.81 81 2.92 80 2.88 71 2.56 78 2.81
1934 82 2.95 83 2.99 82 2.95 67 2.41 79 2.34
1935 71 2.56 76 2.74 85 3.06 87 3.13 77 2.79
1936 90 3.24 87 3.13 82 2.95 66 2.38 84 3.02
1937 69 2.43 71 2.56 60 2.16 58 2.09 66 2.38
1938 60 2.16 63 2.27 56 2.02 54 1.94 59 2.12
1939 74 2.66 78 2.81 75 2.70 59 2.12 73 2.63
1940 80 2.88 8 5 3.06 71 2.56 70 2.52 78 2.SISource: Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural £&onamica
as presented in the annual Issues of Agricultural Statistics*
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the farmer.3 ftj® average United States price, of course, follows the 
Louisiana average closely since it is heavily weighted by Louisiana pro­
duction.
The price movements in Figure 7 show the aGtual average annual 
price reported by farmers, with no adjustments for the pronounced changes 
in the general price level which have taken place since 1909. The general 
trend of rice prices, as for other farm product prices, is closely related 
to movements in the general price level, with greater fluctuations than 
the general price level itself. When deflated by the Bureau of Labor Sta­
tistics index of wholesale prices, rough rice prices show less violent 
fluctuations, but the major peaks and trends remain about the same. In 
terns of purchasing power, the secular trend of rough rice prices has been 
downward, with major peaks occurring in 1919, 1925* 1933* and 1940.
Since the general price level has such a strong influence on the 
fluctuations of rice price, price analysts often utilize purchasing power 
series rather than actual price series. The objective of this method is 
to eliminate the effect of changes in the general price level. In recent 
years, however, serious defects have be n recognized in this method of 
price analysis. Adjustments in acreage and production are rarely based on 
purchasing power expectations, but rather on expectations concerning actual 
dollar prices. This is true because of the relationship of past prices and 
debt structure to current prices, and the feeling that past prices repre-
^These claims are difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate 
with empirical evidence. A discussion of factors entering into the Arkansas 
price situation is available In Arkansas Rice Traffic Bureau vs. Aberdeen 
and Rockfish Railroad Company* et al., Interstate Commerce Commission Docket 
26430 et al*> Transcript of Hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commis­












































































































































sent a "normal" to which prices will return. Changes in both demand and 
supply may also be initiated by changes in actual prices and by the gener­
al price lerel itself, with no relation whatsoever to the relative pur­
chasing power of a commodity. A changing general price level affects the 
psychology of demand and supply for a commodity irrespective of the fact 
that the commodity price itself is rising, falling, or remaining constant 
in relative purchasing power. To farmers who base their expectations on 
past and present price levels, a change in actual prices is of chief con­
cern, since it affects production adjustments more directly than purchas­
ing power relationships.^
The average animal price is often of less significance to a rice 
grower, of course, than the fluctuations of price during the course of a 
marketing year. The most pronounced fluctuations which occur during a 
year are usually a reflection of the general price level trend, but there 
are numerous erratic movements often countering the trend of prices in 
general. The marketing year begins in August, and rice can be sold at any 
time during the following winter. Sharp fluctuations away from the gener­
al price level occur, but there is a strong tendency toward regaining the 
previous position. Thus, the principal value of general price level com­
parisons is the demonstration of an inherent tendency of the price of rice 
to move in accord with the general price level.
^This reasoning applies to relationships between demand and price 
as well as bet sen supp ly and price. "Elimination" of changes in the 
value of money has no effect on demand if all prices change proportionate­
ly, except through expectations developed by the changing price level it­
self* See G. J. Stigler, "The Limitations of Statistical Demand Curves," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. 34:472-473, September, 
1939*
uu
The relationship of rice prices to prices in general is clearly 
illustrated by a comparison of prices received by United States farmers 
for rice and vrheat since 1909• Both products sell in the long run at 
practically the same price per bushel, and their fluctuations have been 
remarkably similar. In only on© year, 1927* has there been a distinct 
opposing trend in movement* In fact, the relationship has been so close 
that rice price movement over a period of several years could accurately 
be measured by indexes of wheat price change, although wheat and rice are 
limited as substitute goods and do not compete for land in production.
Both are highly susceptible to changes in domestic purchasing power and 
export demands, however, and respond to similar demand factors in almost 
identical fashion.
Rough and Glean Rice Prices
The priae a fanner receives for rough rice is a direct reflection 
of clean rice prices in the wholesale market, Pdce milling in Louisiana 
and Texas is highly competitive, and the price paid by a miller for rough 
rice is determined by the price he receives for clean rice less processing 
costs. Any unusual spread that appears between clean and rough riae 
prices offers an immediate opportunity for mills with excess capacity to 
profit by bidding higher on rough rice. Temporarily, of course, spreads 
may increase when clean rice price advances during a period when mills 
are holding large inventory stocks of rough rice bought at lower prices, 
or may decrease when mills are bidding up rough rice in expectation of 
higher clean rice prices in the future.




































































































at Mew Orleans anti the average prioe received by Louisiana farmers for 
rough rice indicates that there were only two periods in which rough rice 
prices failed to reflect changes in clean rice prices* The first period 
was from 1933 to 1935, when an Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
marketing agreement gave the mills monopolistic power to establish a con­
version charge obviously well above the competitive level. The second 
period was in 1935, when a processing tax of one cent a pound caused an 
unusual spread between rough and clean prices which was not totally dis­
pelled until the crop of 1936 was harvested, even though the processing 
tax was declared unconstitutional in January, 1936*
In general, it appears that rough rice prices under competitive 
conditions satisfactorily reflect prices paid in the wholesale market for 
the clean product* Hough rice price fluctuations tend to be more abrupt 
and more frequent, however, since the influence of prices expected one or 
two months in the future reacts on current relationships* In addition, 
clean rice quotations are often nominal and therefore more stable in a 
declining market when few sales are being made, since the leading price 
trend then appears in rough rice*
Price spreads between rough and clean rice are usually greatest 
on a declining market, or when prices are high, because of the greater 
risk attached to buying and milling the rice* On an advancing market, 
these spr.ada grow smaller because of the reduced risk in holding rice 
stocks* These relationships are clearly evident in the chart showing index 
numbers for rough and clean rice* Fluctuations in the value of by-products 























































































comparison relates only to clean head rice, whereas broken rice, bran, 
and polish are also obtained from rough rice*
The relationship between prices can be emphasised by comparison 
of rough and clean rice prices converted to cents per pound* Since 1931 
the average monthly price of clean Fancy Blue Rose at Mew Orleans has 
varied from a low of 1*8 cents per pound in February, 1933, to a high of 
4*7 cents per pound in December, 1935* During the same years, the aver* 
age farm price of rough rice in Louisiana has varied from 0*8 cents per 
pound in February, 1933, to 2*2 cents per pound in early 1937* The net 
spread has varied from 1*0 cents in 1932 to 3*1 cents under the proces­
sing tax of 1935, to 2*1 cents without a processing tax in 1939* In 
recent years the monthly spread has tended to fluctuate around 1*5 cents 
a pound when clean rice wholesale price was at 3 cents a pound, narrowing 
whenever clean rice was lower than 3 cents and Increasing when clean rice 
rose above this level*
This indicates that the price of rough rice per pound tends to 
average about 50 per cent of the price of clean rice per pound on the 
wholesale market* Roughly, about 62 per cent of a pound of rough rice is 
equivalent to a pound of clean rice, with the remaining 38 per cent going 
into by-products, hulls, and invisible loss* On the basis of 1*62 pounds 
of rough rice equivalent to one pound of dean rice, the farmer receives 
2*43 cents for each pound of wholesale dean rice sold at 3 cents per 
pound* The remainder, *57 cents per pound plus the vaiue of by-products, 
accrues to the mills as a processing and selling margin* In other words,
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farmers receive about 81 per cent of the wholesale price of clean rice.'*
During the years 1933-1936, the spread between clean and rough 
rice prices advanced substantially, A marketing agreement program regu­
lating both rough and clean prices in October, 1934, fixed a greatly In­
creased conversion charge over low margins pzevailing in 1932. Average 
dean rice prices in Mew Orleans in the winter of 1933-34 rose to 3.9 
cents, more than doubling the 1,3 cent quotation of February, 1933*
Rough rice rose a full cent to 1,3 cents a pound, or roughly the same per­
centage rise. This was a substantial increase in the milling spread, how­
ever, raising it to 2,1 cents, or practically double that of early 1933*
Great difficulties were experienced in the maintenance of this 
spread in the highly competitive market structure, A reduction in the 
margin failed to save the marketing agreement program, and it was dis­
carded in favor of a processing tax. In marketing the 1933 crop, this 
tax was apparently shifted largely to the farmer. The mills were able 
to increase their own margins simultaneously with the tax, for a 2 cent 
spread appeared even after deduction of the tax.
When the processing tax was invalidated in January, 1936, clean 
rice prices fell by less than the one cent tax, while rough prices, rose. 
This fact even more clearly indicates the extent to which the processing 
tax was passed back to the farmers. However, clean prices soon recovered 
without corresponding further rises in rough rice prices, and the highest
^Retail margins are greater and much more rigid. In 1939 it was 
estimated that rice fanners received only 30 per cent of the retail price 
of clean rice in the United States. Seo Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Agricultural 
price Analysis. Ames: The Iowa State College Press, 1941, p, io9.
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spread of the past decade, 2*5 cents, appeared in August, 193&» before 
the new crop was harvested.
After the effects of the early government oontrol programs were 
obliterated, the price spread tended to be relatively stable at 1.5 cents, 
as previously described, Evidently the government programs were more ef­
fective in raising clean rice prices than rough rice prices. The fact 
that high conversion margins could not be sustained when government con* 
trol was withdrawn is evidence of the advantage to the farmer of a com­
petitive industrial structure wherein consumer prices are directly re- 
fleeted in farm prices.
Factors Affecting the Prioe of Rice
The general conclusion drawn by all investigators into market out­
lets for United States rice is that domestic demand is relatively ine-
7lastic. This conclusion is readily substantiated by examination of 
relevant data. Per capita consumption in the United States has ranged 
consistently between five and six pounds per year, regardless of the ex­
treme price fluctuations of the past twenty years. Increases in the 
total domestic consumption are best explained by population growth and 
increased purchasing power, not by the effect of price reductions in in­
creasing consumption, large supplies of rice in the United States have
^3ee Chapter 71 for a complete discussion of government programs 
in the rice industry•
^Saville, op. clt. Campbell, op. cit.
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been accompanied by drastic price declines.®
The difficulties of constructing statistical demand curves have 
become increasingly evident in recent years. Adequate methods have not 
been developed to allow for shifts in demand over a period of years* such 
as are caused by annual changes in consumer's incomes* long-time demand 
curves are likely to be misleading as to the true slope of the short-run 
curve* On the other hand, there are no sources of information concerning 
immediate consumer response to changes in price such as would be neces­
sary to construct an instantaneous demand curve. For these reasons, the 
inelastic nature of the doaand for rice can best be assumed from the re­
latively stable domestic consumption* This is also true when rice is
sold on a quality basis in European markets, although not true when It
9is sold on a competitive price basis in Latin American markets*
Froea. similar facts, Campbell concludes that "the demand for rice 
in both continental United States and Puerto die o is relatively inelastic.*, 
price increases or decreases within fairly wide limits have little effect 
upon the amount of rice consumed. • .foreign demand for southern type rice
^Foreign demand for rice on a price basis tends to be elastic, 
since vast quantities enter the export market and American rice could 
find a ready outlet if its price were competitive with Asiatic rices.
In 1940-Al, when costs of shipping made the Asiatic rice prices com­
petitive with American rice in Cuban markets, foreign demand became 
highly elastic for American rice. In normal times, however, American 
rice is priced out of the competitive market. In the quality market, de­
mand is relatively inelastic, since American rice has distinct quality 
characteristics differentiating it from other rice*
^Wickizer, in his study of world rice consumption, concludes that 
United States and European consumers pay highest prices for the highest 
quality rice, and that the quantity of high quality rice consumed in the 
world is little influenced by price. Wickizer, op, cit., p. 297.
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is more elastic than the domestic demand, but the quantity exported has 
not been sufficiently large to provide a good measure of this elasticity.*^
Findings concerning elasticity of demand are frequently derived
11from supply-price relationships. From 1921 to 1929 demand was relative­
ly stable, therefore the relationship of price to supply yielded a fair 
indication of the nature of demand, without constructing a mathematical 
curve, it is clear from the graph that these years present a remarkably 
consistent relationship. Large production was uniformly associated with 
low price, and low production with high price. Seville, in a statistical
analysis of these nine years, found that a crop 60 per cent of the average
12indicated a price 22 per cent above the average for the period. This 
indicates that farmers tend to receive more for a small crop than for a 
large crop of rice, since price increases more than proportionately with 
decreases in production.
It is also evident from the graph that 3upply-price relationships 
cannot be clearly defined for any other period than 1921-29. From 1930 
to 1938 there has been a tendency toward inverse movement between price 
and production; however, the effect of the depression in 1930 and price- 
fixing programs in 1933 and 1934 makes this relationship of little value
^Campbell, o£. cit.. p. 6.
^Technically there is a distinction between a demand curve and a 
supply-price relationship, although they have often been used interchangea­
ble. A demand curve relates price and consumption, and therefore may pro­
duce slightly different results than a curve expressing the relationship 
between supply and price for a farm crop.






























































































































Figure 12, Relationship between price and production of 
rough rice in the United States, expressed as 
percentages of average price and production for 










in economic analysis. The addition of the years 1930 through 1938 to a 
supply-price analysis does not invalidate, however, the conclusion that 
price changes proportionately more than supply. It will be noted that 
the curve is affected principally by the 1921-29 data, and that the 1930- 
39 data if taken alone do not describe a similar relationship.
When demand for any commodity is relatively inelastic, the prin­
cipal factor affecting price is supply. That this is true for rice has 
been demonstrated by Campbell in his statistical correlation analysis of 
the 1920-1930 period.̂ 3 The second major factor is the general price 
level of a similar index reflecting changes in demand, the effect of which 
has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter. The third factor is the 
supply of American rice that has to be disposed of in the foreign price 
market in relation to the price and supply of surplus Asiatic rice. Analy­
sis of these three factors yields a complete explanation of the fluctu­
ations of rice price in the United States, except for the brief period of 
price fixing and price maintenance from 1933 to 1935*^
Campbell*s analysis of factors affecting rice prices deals with 
these three factors with multiple correlation techniques. His data, how­
ever, are manipulated with so many devices that their quantitative aspect 
is highly obscured. In present situations where the third factor, change 
in the export situation has become dominant in influencing rice prices, 
further experiment with statistical techniques is inferior to reliance on 
qualitative analysis.
13Campbell, o£. cjt. 
^Campbell, op. clt.
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In recent calculations, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
found that most of the fluctuations in the retail price of rice in the 
United States can be explained by annual supply and the income of indus­
trial workers.^ The export situation does not influence retail price 
as much as wholesale price, since retail margins are a large proportion
of the price paid by consumers and domestic sales are protected by a
16tariff wall against cheap rice*
Rice Acreage and Prices
As previously discussed, the production of rice depends largely 
on the acreage harvested, since yields are unusually stable. For most 
crops, there is a strong tendency for fanners to expand acreage when the 
price per unit of that crop has advanced the preceding year, or was high 
relative to the price of other crops. These acreage changes are not al­
ways reflected in production changes because of fluctuations in yields. 
Acreage, supply, and price of lice, however, afford a relatively clear 
example of farmers* response to price*
^These conclusions are presented by the methods of graphic 
multiple correlation in An Analysis of the Effects of the Processing 
Taxes Levied Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, United States Treasury 
Department, 1937* p. 58,
^Retail demand for farm products is mol's elastic than demand in 
the wholesale market or at the fam, since the rigid retail margin results 
in a difference in the proportionate changes in quantity and price. The 
demand curve is always more inelastic in the lower priced market. An 
arithmetic proof of this proposition is given by Geoffrey S, Shepherd, 
op. cit,, p. 205—206.
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The response of acreage to price Is illustrated in the graph of 
the preceding section* Years of high prices have almost invariably been 
followed by increased production in the next year, while low prices have 
been followed by declines in acreage and production. In 18 years between 
1920 and 1938, this adjustment in acreage occurred in 13 years in the 
United States. The five years for which there are exceptions can be ex­
plained by temporary lags and by the effect of government control programs* 
In Louisiana, this adjustment in acreage is not as closely defined, since 
acreage is more stable in a specialized producing area* However, here 
also the expected response to price took place in 11 out of the 18 years, 
demonstrating the strong tendency of rice acreage to adjust itself to 
changing price conditions.
There are certain peculiarities of ric© acreage which affect the 
immediate response of acreage to price in the preceding year. The situ­
ation has been well described by Carlos Campbell, who saysi
"Growing rice under irrigation requires a large amount of capital 
in addition to land and labor* Before rice can be grown profit­
ably on most of the rice land, wells must be dug, canals built, 
or seme other source of water provided, and expensive pumping 
machinery installed. As nearly as is practicable, the watering 
equipment is adjusted to the Yarn acreage so that the optimum 
watering capacity of the equipment can be used each year* That 
is, a farm on which 160 acres of land were prepared for rice 
growing probably would have a plant capable of supplying water 
to 120 acres*"™
Thus, a rice farm in Louisiana is not a readily elastic unit in 
o far as rice acreage is concerned* Additional acreage can be put into 
cultivation only if irrigation facilities are readily available, and
•^Qampbell, op, cit.. p* 2*
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ordinarily the expensive water facilities will not b® expanded under the 
impetus of one year’s high price. The chief source of additional acreage 
in a year following high price is the retention in cultivation of acreage 
which ordinarily would be fallowed or dry-famed in other crops the second 
year, as is customary in the rice belt rotation. Other sources are the re­
turn of rice cultivation to land on which irrigation facilities are avail­
able but which has been planted to other crops because of low rice prices, 
and the renting of additional water from irrigation companies which are 
favorably located in relation to available new rice land*
The chief point is that rice acreage expansion is limited in short 
period fluctuation by water and capital requirements* Over a long period 
of prolonged high prices, of course, additional investment in irrigation 
facilities can bring more acres into cultivation* VJritlng in 1932, Camp­
bell reasoned that one year of high pricea would cause an increase in 
acreage by keeping land in rice an extra year, but that more than on© 
year would maintain acreage at too great an expense of rice yield and 
quality. Therefore, two years of high prices will result in stability or 
even an actual decrease of acreage when the land must lie out a year. 
However, three years of high prices are likely to result in the instal­
lation of new watering equipment and a general expansion of available rice 
acreage* Tne resulting increase in acreage and production would be so 
large a- to make a fourth year of high prices improbable. As prices fall 
the acreage would again be contracted, both by a return to regular ro­
tation practices and by the contraction of the acreage recently brought 
into production.
Campbell thus reasons that there is a tendency toward a six-year
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cycle in rice prices— three years up and three down* The chief fault in 
his reasoning as to such a cycle is his failure to explain the three year 
downswing of the cycle• Once prices start downward, there is no particu­
lar reason why acreage should contract over a three-year period, consider­
ing the fixed investment in land find water facilities* LYen if acreage 
should contract in three years with falling prices, the acreage from the 
previous expansion would be immediately available whenever price was high 
for a year, thereby destroying Campbell's argument &o to the necessity of 
three years of high prices to cause any considerable expansion of rice 
acreage* Unless there were a rather sharply rising secular trend in rice
acreage, Campbell’s reasoning concerning a rice price and acreage cycle
ISof six years does not appear altogether logical* analysis based on 
the 1921 to 1929 period in which Campbell was working has led to frequent 
conclusions concerning price and production cycles which are apparent for 
no other years than that period.
Prioes by Varieties
At times the price range between the different varieties of rice 
grown in the southern states may be more than one dollar per pocket of 
one huixir^d pounds of extra fancy clean rice in the wholesale market, 
garly Prolific rice brings the lowest price of popular Louisiana varie­
ties, generally selling on the 'wholesale market at 20 to 30 cents per
^Conditions necessary for cycles in acreage are similar movements 
both up and down the supply curve, with the violent adjustments explained 
by Aordeeai Lzekiel in his development of the "cobweb” theorem, Recently 
economists have recognized that many supply curves are ’’one-way” curves, 
and that acreage does not contract in a manner similar to its expansion in 
response to price changes. See Geoffrey Shepherd, op. cit., Ch. 15.
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pocket under Blue Rose* Early Prolific and Blue Hose prices are the basis 
of the price structure, and define the trend of rice price in general.
The prices of long grain rices such as Rexoro and Fortuna do not always 
bear a constant relationship to Blue Rose prices, since they appeal to a 
more limited quality market with a more rigidly inelastic demand. When 
rice prices are low or declining, the long-grain quality rices are sold at 
substantially higher levels, but do not rise as much when the market is 
high or advancing. The spread between the price of quality long-grain 
rices and Blue Rose is thus greatest when the market is low, and relative­
ly small when the rice market is high. In addition, a period of sus­
tained low price results in an increase of long-grain production, which 
narrows the price advantage of these varieties. The more pronounced price 
fluctuation for Rexoro is probably due to the limited market which it 
enters, and the absence of real quotations in some months.
About 70 per cent of the rice produced in Louisiana is Blue Rose,
19and. about 10 per cent is Early Prolific, 7 The average prices received 
by farmers in Louisiana, as analyzed in preceding sections, are thus based 
largely on Blue Rose and Early Prolific prices. Rexoro and Nira bring the 
highest prices, but form only a small percentage of the crop. The extent 
to which rough rice prices reflect the variety price differentials of the 
clean rice market cannot be definitely ascertained, since rough prices of 
varieties other than Blue Rose and Early Prolific are difficult to obtain 
in sufficient numbers to be representative. The Early Prolific-Blue Rose










































































































FaBle TI. Average price per pound of ex tra  fancy clean r ic e  a t  H e w  Orleans, fcy varieties, 1935 to  19*1.
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price spread is well reflected in rough rice prices, but it is probable 
that the price spreads for the other varieties are not as great as in 
clean rice prices. The long-grain rices often have a smaller yield of 
head rice per barrel of rough rice than Blue Rose and more care is neces­
sary in the milling process, so that processing costs cut more heavily in­
to the clean price quotation.
Wholesale price quotations for clean rice are often nominal, since 
there is no organised exchange on which constant sales are being made* At 
times there are lengthy periods during which few sales are made, with con­
siderable indefiniteness In the trade as to what the true market price is. 
The quotations reported above are gathered from brokers and mills trading 
in rice in New Orleans, and are a good indication of clean rice market 
prices only for periods when the market was active.
Prices by Grade
In 1923 the United States Department of Agriculture devised a 
system of rough rice grades in an attempt to remedy certain market de­
fects discussed in Chapter III. Jixcept for a brief experience with com­
pulsory grading in 1934, rough rice grades have never come into general 
use in the marketing structure. Consequently, there is little informa­
tion available concerning the extent to which a farmer secures a premium 
or discount for various qualities of rice. The single source of data is 
the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, which has followed a 
practice of obtaining a certificate showing the grade of each lot of rice 
sold for its members. When sales are made, the grades and prices are cir­
culated among the members in the cooperative's weekly market report.
6h
These grade and price data form, the basis for this analysis of prices by 
grade.
In general, the level of prices received for sales through the 
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association follows very closely the 
fluctuations in price shown by the Agricultural Marketing Service in its 
monthly price series. This comparison is shown in the accompanying chart. 
Ho comparative data are available for months during which no sales were 
made by the cooperative, which usually occurred in periods of sharp ad­
vances or declines in the rough rice market.
Although the general level of prices received by members of the 
cooperative averages slightly higher than the Louisiana farm price, the 
differences are not sufficient to warrant any conclusions regarding dif­
ferences in prices received by members and non-members of the association. 
There is some presumption that prices obtained through the cooperative 
tend to be higher, since the cooperative members sell in an organized 
manner and know the quality and market conditions when the rice is sold.
In addition, members of the cooperative are located principally in the 
western part of the rice belt where the rice is generally considered of 
superior milling quality and top market prices are paid.
The rough rice grades used by the cooperative association range 
from one to six. The grade is based largely on the estimate of clean 
head rice and total rice products, excluding hulls and waste, which will 
be obtained from a barrel of 162 pounds of rough rice. This estimate is 
commonly expressed in terms such as 90-112, which means 90 pounds of head 
rice and n ?  pounds of total rice products. The second important factor 

























































































































































Finally the milling quality is estimated, which relates to general ap­
pearance, quality, and ability to withstand the milling process* This 
milling quality is influenced by the percentage of red rice, chalk 
kernels, seeds, and damaged kernels in the rice* As a general rule, the 
red rice content is perhaps the most important single factor influencing
quality, although damaged or dirty rice may sometimes be of greater impor~ 
20tanee.
The analysis of the prices and grades of numerous lots of Early 
Prolific and Blue Rose rice sold through the American Rice Growers Associ­
ation since 1930 revealed that premiums and discounts for varying quali­
ties of rice may range more than 10 per cent from the average price paid 
for rice* When the market is stable, however, the majority of rice of the 
same variety is sold within a 25 cent price interval* In 1938, the only 
recent year during which prices did not experience a severe fluctuation 
which complicates the study by introducing a market change, 113 out of 
sales of Early Prolific were made between $2.01 and §2.25 a barrel, 
and 200 of the 221 sales were made between $1*76 and $2.2$ a barrel* In 
the year, out of 257 lots of Blue Rose sold, 135 lots were sold be­
tween $2*26 and $2*50, and 237 lots were sold between 12.01 and $2*50.
Analysis of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association 
price data during most years is prohibited by constant market changes, 
with insufficient data available at any given price level to permit ade­
quate analysis. Obviously, market changes obscure grade premiums when
^°For a more adequate discussion of rough rice grades, see Chapter
III*
67
all sales are compared without regard to date, and there have been very 
few periods other than 1938 when rough rice prices were sufficiently 
stable to warrant any valid comparison of grade and price*
Further analysis of the 1938 grade and price data reveal the rela­
tionships tabulated in the following table* For both Early Prolific and 
Blue Rose rice, high prices were uniformly obtained by the best rice, indi­
cating that the mills paid premiums to secure the best quality rice and 
that farmers marketing poor rice were penalized by lower prices* Eighteen 
lots of Early Prolific rice with an average yield of head rice of 84 
pounds, with low milling quality and clean grade estimates, and relatively 
high percentages of red and damaged kernels, was graded by the cooperative 
at an average of 1*5 and sold at prices ranging between $1*51 and #1*75 a 
barrel. Rice receiving the top prices between #2*01 and #2*50 a barrel 
had an average milling yield estimate of 91 pounds, high milling quality 
and clean grade, and was classed on the average near grade on© for the 
rough lice*
Similar associations are found for Blue Rose rice. Fifty-two lots 
selling between $2*01 and $2*25 a barrel had a low milling estimate of 93 
pounds, and were graded low in milling quality, clean grade, and rough rice 
grade because of red rice and damaged kernels. The highest prices of 
$2.51 to $3*00 were brought by rice with materially higher milling yields, 
higher milling quality, and high clean rice and rough rice grades*
The following three tables attempt to distinguish grade and price 
relationships by smaller price divisions within a short period of time*
For this analysis, three months were chosen during which sufficient sales 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Hay, 1931* the cooperative association sold 133 lots of Blue 
Rose within a 56 cent prlae range, from $2.63 to $3.21 a barrel, with 70 
of these lots sold between #2.96 and $3.10. Rice bringing the lowest 
price during this month had the lowest average milling yield estimates, 
the lowest milling quality, and the lowest rough rice grade. Rice that 
brought higher prices, tabulated in five cent intervals, advanced fairly 
consistently in milling yield, quality, and grade. Red, chalky, and 
damaged kernels percentages were necessarily lower as grade improved.
The same general conclusions are Indicated in the tabulation of 
price and grade for 102 lots of Blue Rose sold in March, 1933* In gener­
al, high milling yields, quality, and grade were associated with high 
prices relevant to the general market level at which rice was being sold.
The month of February, 1935, when 340 lots of Blue Rose were sold 
on a relatively stable market, presents the best data available for tabu* 
latlng price and grade relationships. Milling yields of head rice on all 
these lots were variously estimated from 36 pounds to 99 pounds. The 
lowest price of $2.51 was obtained for the 36 pound rice, the highest 
price of $3.50 for the 99 pound rice. Milling quality ranged from three 
on the lowest priced riee to one on the highest priced rice. Similarly, 
rough rice grade advanced from low to high in accordance with higher rice 
prices. Red rice, chalky kernels, and damaged kernels were again corre­
lated with the grade factor.
ufln operators, in a survey in 1941, were almost unanimous in 
saying that they paid no attention to the grade certificate when buying 
rice from members of the cooperative, and many operators expressed doubt 
that the grade certificates presented an accurate description of the rice 
because of bias in favor of the seller. It is apparent from these tabu*
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Table VIII* Halation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose 













2*56-2*60 1 4.0 0.0 14.7 25.0 3.0 89-112
2.61-2*65 5 3.2 12.0 13.5 37.6 1.8
2*66-2*70 5 2.6 10.6 14*1 41.8 2.8 89-110
2.71-2.75 15 1.9 6.0 13.5 27.2 2.3 91-112
2*76-2.80 13 1.6 2.4 13.7 23.6 2.3 91-112
2.81-2.85 7 2.0 3.6 14*1 28.3 1.7 93-112
2.86-2*90 4 2.0 4.5 13.8 29.8 2.5 91-111
2.91-2.95 4 1.8 0.8 13.5 27.8 1.5 94-112
2.96-3.00 46 1.7 2.0 13.4 24.9 1.6 94-113
3.01-3.05 4 2.0 4.5 13.5 25.5 2.0 94-112
3.06-3.10 20 2.0 1.8 13.8 30.8 1.4 95-112
3.11-3.15 5 1.2 4.0 13.6 13.2 1.6 95-113
3.16-3.20 4 1.5 2.0 13.5 16.0 1.0 99-114
3.21-3.25 5 1.4 0.6 13.3 21.0 1.2 96-113
Average of
all 138 1.8 20...— .131.6.. 26.6 1.8 93-112
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Table IX. Relation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose rice 













1.31-1.35 19 2.3 7.7 12.7 32.6 1.9 93-112
1.36-1.40 14 1.4 0.9 13.0 21.2 1.4 96-113
1.41-1.45 10 2.1 0.8 12.9 21.3 1.3 96-112
1.46-1.50 16 1.8 2.5 12.5 20.0 1.4 97-113
1.51-1.55 11 2.3 1.5 12.7 25.7 1.1 96-112
1.56-1.60 15 1.9 4.0 12.8 29.4 1.5 96-112
1.61-1.65 1 1.0 0.0 13.5 n.o 1.0 98-116
1.66-1.70 5 1.4 0.0 13.8 18.0 2.0 92-112
1.71-1.75 11 1.4 0.2 13.1 1 4 .5 1.2 98—113
Average of
all 102 1.9 .,4-3 12.8 .,._S2s?... ...iSdlft.
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Table X* Relation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose 













2.51-2.55 2 3.5 5.3 12.2 31.5 3.0 86-1082.56-2,60 2 3.5 2.0 13,6 69.5 3.0 88-110
2.61-2.6$ 2 5.0 1.3 12.6 14.5 3.5 85-109
2.66-2.70 7 2.7 4.0 14.1 46.7 2.9 88-111
2.71-2.75 6 3.8 5.6 12.9 28.2 2.7 90-112
2.76-2.80 5 2.8 1.2 13,8 31.2 2.6 90-111
2.81-2.85 12 3.1 3.5 13.5 34.6 2.4 90-111
2.86-2.90 17 2.8 1.8 13.2 34.2 2.4 90-111
2.91-2.95 9 2.4 9.1 13.5 37.1 2.6 90- i n
2.96-3.00 15 1.7 4.4 13.7 24.3 2.2 92-111
3.01-3.05 32 2.1 5.8 13.5 29.3 2.0 92-112
3.06-3.10 34 1.9 7.2 13.4 22.6 1.9 92-112
3*11-3.15 a 1.6 6.5 13.3 19.3 1.7 93-112
3.16-3.20 30 1.7 5.3 13.6 20.8 1.4 94-112
3.21-3.25 28 1.6 5.0 13.3 16.8 1.4 96-113
3.26-3.30 37 1.3 2.5 13.3 15.7 1.1 96-113
3.31-3.35 33 1.2 2.1 13.1 14.6 1.0 96-113
3.36-3.AO 12 1.2 1.2 13.1 16.1 1.0 98-114
3.41-3*45 12 1.0 1.2 13.4 15.4 1.2 97-U4
3.46-3.50 4 1.2 2.8 13.4 12.8 1.0 99-114
Average of
all 1.8 -JkL..ISA. , , 1.7 94-112
Source; Weekly market releases of the American Rice Growers Cooperative 
Association.
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lations that the mills usually agree with the grade certificate placed on 
the rice by the cooperative, and that the grade i s  an accurate guide to 
premiums and discounts on rough rice.
The data also indicate that mills pay the farmers premiums for 
better rice, and that a fanner producing poor or damaged rice is severely 
penalised when selling his rice* Prices for low grade rice may be 25 to 
50 cents a barrel below top grades when prices are near 13 a barrel, and 
still more for extremely bad rice* It is likely that farmers in general 
tend to receive these premiums and disoounts for rice because of the com­
petitive nature of rice buying* It is doubtful, however, if these premi­
ums and discounts are as marked as those of cooperative members, for 
without a grade certificate certain advantages accrue to an experienced 
rice buyer with which a farmer can never hope to contend*
Seasonal Variation
Rice in Louisiana is harvested in September, October, and Novem­
ber* The farmer faces a choice of selling his crop at harvest timp, or 
storing his rice and selling later in the following winter or spring. 
Ordinarily, supply and demand conditions remaining the same, there would 
be a normal tendency toward a mild seasonal variation in rice prices* 
Price would have a normal tendency to rise from the time of harvest by 
an amount roughtly equivalent to the costs of storage and interest* This 
rise would be greatest in the first three months, since the chief costs 
of storage are traditionally paid in these months in Louisiana, and later 
carrying charges are small* There would likely be some Improvement in 
the grade of rice due to moisture loss and shrinkage which would offset
74
a portion of the coat of storage.
The coats of storing rice from October 15 to March 15, over much 
of the rice belt, would average about 15 cents a barrel for storage, plus 
about 5 cents for insurance and about 7 cents for interest (on $3 rice)* 
The total coat of carrying rice for five months, therefore, approximates 
25 cents a barrel, allowing for same increase in grade because of moisture 
loss* A normal seasonal price variation would thus follow a tendency to 
rise by 25 cents a barrel from October 15 to Larch 15* This rise in five 
months would be approximately 8 per cent of an October 15 price of $3 a 
barrel for rice* In other words, March 15 price should tend to be about 
108 per cent of the October 15 price*
For commodities whose price is highly unstable, tendencies on the 
supply side toward seasonal price variation are generally obscured by 
changes in demand* This is particularly true for rice* The problem of 
whether to sell or store rice at harvest can be answered only by specu­
lation as to future demand in relation to the supply that is coming on 
the market. Almost invariably the effect of changes in demand is greater 
than the tendency toward a seasonal rise equal to car tying costs on rice* 
In addition, speculative operation by large mills anticipating future 
changes in rice prices tends to modify the normal tendency of rice price 
to be lowest at time of harvest when a large volume of rice is moving to 
the mills* On the other hand, the fact that mills cannot absorb the 
entire crop at the time of harvest forces farmers to hold the crop until 
a later date or sacrifice it at a lower price.
The average seasonal variation of Louisiana rice prices at the 












































































































Figure 16. Price received by Louisiana farmers for rough rice expressed as a 






















Table XX. F l i M i  reoeiYed by Lou isiana fa ra e ra  fo r  r ic e  expressed as a per­
centage o f O ctober p ric e , 1920-41.
leer O at. Doe. Sea. Jan . Feb. liaroh  A p ril way June July Aug. S ep t.
1920-21 100.0 100.0 78.1 63.3 61.7 64.0 39.4 65.5 61.0 58.6 75.0 76.6
1921-22 100.0 90.7 90.7 114.4 99.9 111.3 93.6 39.7 102.1 111.3 103.2 83.51922-23 100.0 128.6 115.5 U5.5 110.7 129.6 130.9 104.3 128.6 144.0 122.6 128.6
1923-24 100.0 96.4 95.5 99.1 100.0 97.3 100.9 117.1 121..6 123.4 118.9 116.21924-25 100.0 102.3 110.2 112.5 110.2 108.5 107.8 110.9 116.4 117.2 114.1 111.71925-26 100.0 105.5 106.2 106.9 104.2 99.3 90.9 95.1 97.9 101.4 85.4 81.91926-27 100.0 99.1 98.2 99.1 96.4 97.3 93.7 92.9 91.1 92.9 80.4 81.21927-28 100.0 96.8 97.9 98.9 94.7 95.7 97.8 102.1 104.3 98.9 97.3 97.8
1928-29 100.0 103.3 104.4 107.7 105.5 105.5 106.6 102.2 103.3 103.3 109.9 108.31929-30 100.0 100.0 93.9 101.0 108.1 104.0 108.1 107.1 105.1 100.0 88.3 79.8
1938-31 100.0 95.0 91.3 93.6 97.5 95.0 96.3 92.5 92.5 91.3 70.0 58.81931-32 100.0 117.6 115.7 109.3 103.9 101.9 96.1 96.1 94.1 90.2 92.2 86.31932-33 100.0 97.6 97.6 90.5 85.7 95.2 107.1 133.3 142.6 145.2 3fi,7 178.61933-34 100.0 102.6 96.2 99.9 101.3 102.5 103.4 99.9 96.7 96.2 101.3 99.91934-35 100.0 102.4 93.9 92.7 96.8 102.4 103.6 104.3 108.4 106.0 39.2 66.3
1935-36 100.0 107.7 113.8 127.7 130.8 127.7 129.2 136.9 136.9 138.5 139.9 152.31936-37 100.0 96.6 94.3 105.7 1U.3 112.6 114.9 109.2 102.3 97.7 87.4 74.71937-38 100.0 109.1 103.0 106.1 99.9 95.4 90.9 37.8 95.4 96.9 96.9 83-31938-39 100.0 106.6 103.3 108.2 113.1 106.6 104.9 104.9 104.9 103.3 95.1 145.91939-40 100.0 102.6 97.4 96.7 90.8 85.5 85.5 98.7 98.7 103.9 103.9 80.31940-41 100.0 U5.4 121.5 141.5 153.8 155.4 131.5 134.6 180.0
Source: Agricultural Statistics, United States Department of Agriculture.
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chart* Daring these years* prices have generally been lowest it'iinediately 
preceding the new crop movement in September, and have usually* been 
highest in November when the mills are most active in buying* Price nor­
mally declines in December because the mills have filled their storage 
space and the market is inactive during the holiday season* After a price 
recovery in January* prices do not show any significant pattern of move­
ment during the remainder of the season.
This usual pattern of movement, however, is subject to drastic
shifts when changes in demand and changes in the general price level over­
come the influence of supply foroes* Figure 16 shows the pattern of price 
movements for each crop year between 1921 and 1939* expressed as a per­
centage of the October price* In no single year does the pattern of 
seasonal movement conf ora very closely to the average seasonal index il­
lustrated above, since almost always changes in demand or general price 
level have a significant influence* However, several general tendencies 
are still apparent* There is a strong tendency in almost every year for 
prices to rise in November, with the advances being greater than the oc­
casional declines* In the 19 years shown* a farmer would, have received
in November as high or higher prices in 13 years as in October, but in
U  years the prices would have been lower in December than in October* 
During the remainder of the year* the chances are better than 50 per cent 
that price will be higher than in October until the month of August, when 
prices usually decline on the old crop rice*
General conclusions from these data are that October and December 
are the weakest price periods during the active marketing year* and that 
November is usually a favorable month in which to sell* Price changes
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after October, however, are extremely variable and the seasonal pattern 
is by no means fixed* However, during the past 19 years price increases 
after October have generally been greater than declines in prices, and a 
farmer who stored rioe each year would have sold at a higher average price 
during the period than a farmer selling in October. This higher average 
price would probably do little more than cover storage costs except in 
years when abrupt changes in demand or in the general price level permit­
ted speculative profits.
As a general rule, prices are as favorable in November as can be 
expected at any time during the year* Active buying by the mills in this 
month, since the peak of the harvest is passed and supplies are known, is 
the chief factor supporting price at this time* Favorable years for 
longer storage are those when the general price level is rising, or when 
a change in demand is forcing a rise in prices* Unfavorable years for 
further storage are those when the general price level is declining, or 
when domestic or foreign demand prospects are poor. It is difficult to 
forecast these forces, and therefore storage of rice is normally a specu­
lative operation. However, the general practice among rice farmers of 
storing their rice is largely responsible for the November peak, since 
the mills sust bid up the price in order to encourage farmers to sell 
immediately and forego speculation*
CHAFTiiE XIX 
STORAGE ANb MRKOTNG
In Louisiana, rice is harvested from late August into November* 
Early Prolific is the variety first to mature, and by late September the 
bulk of this variety has been harvested* Harvest begins earliest in the 
minor Mississippi river and Teche regions where the rice is cut green by 
hand labor and threshed immediately in order to avoid losses due to storms 
or inability to secure sufficient labor later in the season* Since the 
first rice of the new Early Prolific crop comes frcm this area, mills In 
both Louisiana and Texas buy here so that milling operations may begin. 
Mills at Baton Rouge and New Orleans have a decided advantage in buying 
most of the river crop, however, because of favorable location and custom­
ary credit relationships with the fanners.
Blue Rose, which forms the bulk of the Louisiana crop, is harvested 
from late September through October* Rice in the principal growing area 
of southwest Louisiana is out by a binder, cured in the shock from ten 
days to two weeks, and then hauled to the separator and threshed* At the 
thresher the rice is placed in bags with capacities ranging from 150 to 
250 pounds, with a four-bushel bag averaging above 180 pounds the most 
casnon weight* Rough rice then moves into the marketing process, either 
moving directly to the mill or going into storage for later sale*
Rice is sold by Louisiana fanners on the basis of a barrel of 162
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pounds• The price includes the sacks, with slightly less than an average 
of .9 of a sack in a barrel. In Arkansas, rice is sold in bulk by the 
bushel of 45 pounds, and in Texas both methods of sale, by barrel and by 
bushel, are found. Clean rice is sold by the mills in bags, termed pockets, 
of 100 pounds each.
Marketing Procedures^
One of the most striking characteristics of rough rice marketing 
is the scarcity of middlemen. Hice moves from the farmer direct to the 
mills, and from the processor through brokers to wholesale or export markets* 
The trade is an excellent illustration of a marketing process with a mini­
mum of middlemen, a procedure which has frequently been advanced as a de­
sirable reform in agricultural commodity marketing. The problems raised 
by direct marketing, however, are unusually evident in the rice trade. Al­
though the presence of middlemen in a market spreads the farmer and consumer 
farther apart, ordinarily this factor results in distribution of speculative 
risks among the various middlemen. In rough rice marketing, the absence of 
middlemen means that rice growers must carry all speculative risks not as­
sumed by the mills. Since the rice milling concerns ordinarily are better 
acquainted with market conditions, this means that the farmers are forced 
to carry speculative risks when these risks are most dangerous, since there 
is no other speculative element in the market to relieve the pressure.
In recent years retail outlets have tended more and more to main-
^The material in this chapter is bftsed on a survey of rice storage 
facilities and marketing practices made by the writer in the spring of 
1941*
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tain their stocks of rice on a narrow basis, relying on the mills to make 
replacements qtiiokly available. This increases still further the specu­
lative risks on the mills and on the fanners* Rough rice buying by mills 
from fanners is often affected by these speculative risks, with occasional 
periods in which no rough rice at all is sold* Mills are often reluctant 
to buy or farmers to sell in face of future price expectations, even 
though the current market appears to Justify sales at going prices.
Rough rice marketing therefore is largely a "higgling" transaction 
between the farmer and salaried or commission buyers representing the rice 
mills* There is no official market price quotation on rough rice available 
to serve as a guide, nor have objective standards been generally adopted to 
serve as a basis for price bargaining* Each lot of rice raised by & far­
mer is sold on sample, so that direct comparisons of individual prices are 
difficult* Each sale, within narrow limits of substitution, must be re­
garded as a special commodity on which special factors operate in regard 
to price establishment.
A lot of rough rice may include all of a farmer * s rice of one 
variety, or, if there are distinct differences in the quality of rice be­
tween different fields, the rice from one farm may be divided into several 
lots* The couaon practice among all rough rice buyers is to draw a repre­
sentative sample from the bags in a lot of rough rice* A portion of this 
sample is "rubbed" or "shelled" in order to remove the huUs, This opera­
tion is carried out more or less thoroughly depending on the attitude of 
the buyer and the difficulty of evaluating the rice. The operation may 
be carried out on a rough board or stone, the rice being rubbed with a 
block* Methods frequently differ, the object being to apply sufficient
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pressure and friction to Judge the effect of milling machinery on the 
rice* The rubbing process removes the hulls and part of the bran, and 
the proportion of whole and broken rice kernels in the sample provides 
a basis for an estimate of the yield of head rice and total yield of rice 
products in a barrel of rough rice* For example, after rubbing a sample 
of Blue Bosef a buyer may estimate that 94 pounds of head rice and 110 
pounds of total rice products will be secured from 162 pounds of rough 
rice* This yield is the most important factor in evaluating a lot of 
rlee.
An estimate of the moisture content, which is important In influ­
encing both the quality and yield of rice, is obtained during the rubbing 
process by observing the general properties of the hulled rice. If the 
bran curls, a relatively high moisture content is indicated, which lowers 
the value of the rice, A portion of the rice is also weighed in a small 
cup to determine the weight per bushel. Other factors being equal, the 
total yield of clean rice products will be greatest for heavy rice, since 
less of the volume will be hulls and invisible loss in milling.
The principal additional factor scrutinized by the buyer is the 
general appearance and quality of the rioe, Including such factors as red 
rice, weed seed, and foreign materials. This is the basis for an estimate 
of the grade of clean rice to be obtained from the lot, whether it will be 
choice, fancy, or extra fancy.
After this examination, the buyer makes a bid based upon his cal­
culation of current value, or upon instructions from the mill concerning 
the particular sample. The price is based upon the value of the dean 
rice yield, and by-product prices are generally disregarded. The terms 
of sale may be f,o,b, farm, warehouse, or mill, depending on the bargain
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between the producer end buyer* Caah is paid immediately upon grading and 
weighing the rloe at the f.o.b. point. If the rice is stored in a bonded 
warehouse* the warehouse receipts are transferred by the farmer to the mill.
The mill reserves the right to reject any rice which does not equal 
the sample* although usually such rloe la accepted with a price adjustment 
in favor of the mill. In the absence of objective grades* these rejections 
lead to frequent controversies.2 Occasionally rice may be bought uround”, 
that is, a price quoted per barrel regardless of discrepancies in grade and 
value between different bags in the lot. A source of frequent difficulty 
is the taking of the weights. Ordinarily the weight is taken at the f.o.b. 
point at time of sale, with the buyer and seller, or their representatives* 
checking the accuracy of the weights.
Attempts at Rice Marketing Improvement
This system of rice marketing naturally results in considerable
controversy* and complaint is frequently expressed concerning the need for
a more orderly marketing system to replace the traditional procedure whioh
has grown with the industry in Louisiana. Between 1920 and 1930* numerous
reforms in marketing were urged by government workers and by members of the
industry. The journals of the rice industry were filled with suggestions
for improvement of marketing* particularly in regard to cooperatives*
3grading service* and market news service. In the past eight years agi-
23ee case reported in Chapter IV.
%ice Journal, monthly issues, 1920 to 1930.
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tation for marketing improvements has subside*, largely because ninor re­
folds have been accomplished while major reforms were discredited by their 
relation to ill-advised compulsory regulation of the rice industry in 1933 
and 1934.
W. D. Smith, in charge of rice investigations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture, may be credited with the origination of practi­
cally all suggestions for Improvement in rough rice marketing* Beginning 
his work with rice in 1917, Smith immediately proceeded with a series of 
research studies related to the improvement of rice marketing* From the re­
sults of these studies he made numerous recommendations, and established an 
action program to bring adoption of improved practices. Projects which re­
ceived his particular attention included improvement of grade by elimination 
of red rice and selection of better seed, improvement in threshing, recom­
mendations for bulk handling, development of rice dryers to permit bulk 
handling, warehouse improvement, cooperative marketing, market news service, 
and objective grading standards for rough rice, A rice standardization 
laboratory established shortly after 1920 was the center of the research 
work of Smith and his associates, literature relating to rico marketing 
in the South is almost totally dominated by the work of Lr. Smith. ̂
^Numerous short articles in the Rice Journal. 1920-1934, and miscel­
laneous government sources report on Smith's work in rice marketing. Con­
cise summaries of his research projects are available in the following mime­
ographed publications of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics! Col aerolal 
Drying of Rough Rice in the Southern States, August, 1928; Official Federal- 
State Rough Rice Grading in the South, May, 1929 5 The Handling, Grading, and 
Uses of Rice, February, 1929, and March, 1937; Seed Rice Survey in Louisiana  ̂
Texas, and Arkansas. March, 1930.
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Since the evaluation of the quality of rice always hi s been the 
most controversial issue in rough rice marketing, Smith concentrated his 
most intensive work on the development of rough and clean rice grades* As
previously described, the chief factor in rough rice evaluation is the
milling quality, or yield, of the rough rice sample. In order to remove 
the subjective element in the rubbing test, Smith, in 192A, invented a me­
chanical device for removing the hulls in a uniform manner. A public ser­
vice patent on this device was granted in 1925# and it has been used in
rice grading laboratories since that time. In this device, a weighted 
rubbing block automatically passes to and fro ever the sample of rice.
The rubbing (or shelling) operation removes the hulls and breaks the weaker 
kernels with effects roughly similar to that of rice mill machinery.
After the rice has been shelled, and the loose hulls and bran re­
moved by a Bates aspirator, the percentage of red rice, damaged kernels, 
heat damage, and chalky kernels can be ascertained by counting a portion 
of the sample. The milling yields of head rice and total yield of head and 
broken rice is readily obtained from their respective weights in the sample, 
koisture content is determined readily from the rough rice by use of the 
electrical resistance moisture tester. On the basis of these determinations, 
standards have been established to correspond as closely as possible to ac­
cepted practices in the rice industry.
Present Grades Used for Hough Hice
With few changes, the present system used for grading rough rice 
is essentially that established in 1927* All rough rice is divided into
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classes according to variety. For each class, xaaximum limits are pre- 
scribed for moisture content, red rice, total damaged kernels (pecky rice), 
mud lumps, weed seeds, heat damage, and foreign material. Milling quality 
is determined from the yield of head rice and the total yield of rice pro­
ducts as estimated from yields on the Smith shelling device*
5The designation that is applied to rough rice is as follows:
(1) Designation of milling quality by the estimated yield of head rice per 
barrel of rough rice, as Prime, Good, Medium, Fine, Ordinary, and Low. For 
Blue Hose, the required pounds of head rice per barrel of rough rice to 
meet each of these designations is 95, 90, 85# 80, 75# and leas than 75 
pounds.
(2) Designation of milling quality according to total yield of 
milled rice per barrel, as A, B, C, D, K, and F. For Blue Rose, the re­
quired total yields are 110, 108, 106, 104# 102, and less than 102 pounds, 
respectively.
(3) Designation of grade according to percentage of red rice, dam­
aged kernels, and foreign materials, according to United States grades No,
1* 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. * codjKura limits are prescribed for each relevant
factor within each grade.
The description of a lot of rough rice is given by a plir̂ so such 
as Blue Rose Prime A No. 1, which indicates that the estimated milling yield 
of head rice is 95 pounds or better, total yield 110 pounds or bettor, with
^See mimeographed United States Standards for Hough Rice, as amended 
effective August 1, 1939, Washington, Agricultural Marketing Service, July 
1939.
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a veijr low percentage of red rice, damaged kernels, and foreign material. 
Standards were also established for Glean rice so that the highest rough 
rice grades correspond to the highest clean rice grades. Thus Prime A No,
1 rough rice should produce Extra Fancy cleai rice.
Utilisation of Rough Rice Grades
For several years, the rice laboratory undertook to grade rough 
rice on an experimental basis until the grades were believed satisfactory 
for use in the rice trade. Official United States standards for class, 
quality, and condition for milled, brown, and rough rice were also estab­
lished by the Secretary of Agriculture and became effective September 15, 
1927* In general, the trade was hostile toward the use of grades for rough 
rice, and on an independent basis there was little possibility for their 
general uae,^ The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, however, 
was actively seeking to improve the bargaining status of its members through 
their local district selling officers. The determination of the quality of 
rice independent of the valuation of mill buyers would do much to aid the 
cooperative managers in bargaining for a satisfactory price. In addition, 
the marketing news service being developed between the various cooperative 
selling points could not become fully effective unless definite standards 
relating quality and price could be ascertained.
^In 1924, Dudley J. LeBlanc introduced a bill in the Louisiana 
legislature for public graders at public rice warehouses for protection of 
farmers, along with a provision requiring a public warehouse bond and re­
ceipts showing grades. This legislation was opposed by rice mills, and 
failed to pass. See Rice Journal. June, 1924*
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The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, therefore,
undertook to utilize the grading standards developed by the United
7States Department of Agriculture. The Texas Department of Agriculture 
and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department 
of Agriculture established a Federal-State grading ssrvioe at Beaumont, 
Texas. The laboratory here was equipped with sampling devices, moisture 
testers, shelling devices, aspirators, sieving machines, scales, and 
other necessary apparatus for determining the milling value of the rice, 
licensed graders were employed to ascertain the official Federal grades 
and to issue rough rice grade certificates.
Beginning with the 1923-29 marketing season, the American Rice 
Growers Cooperative Association undertook to secure a grade certificate 
for each lot of rice handled for its members. These grade certificates 
were used for bargaining in making sales, and also served as a basis for 
the daily reports from the central office of the association on the
prices of rice sold in the various districts. The moisture content ana­
lysis was also useful in determining the practicality of storing rice.
The balance of the trade, however, showed no particular inter*- 
est in rough rice grades. Non-members of the cooperative made no efforts 
to secure grades, and mill buyers continued to buy rice on their own 
methods, The principal use of the rough rice grades by the cooperative 
was simply as a basis for their own operations.
^Compiled from mimeographed abstracts and references on The
Handling. Grading, and Uses of Rice, by C. L. Corbett and E. G. Boerner,
March 1937, and One Season1a Record of Official Federal-State Rough Rice 
Grading in the South, by D. Smith, May 1929*
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From th e  1928-29 marketing season until the present time the 
Am erican R ice Growers Cooperative Assooiation has continued to grade the 
rioe of i t s  members • In the early years the grading was done by the 
Federal—State laboratory at Beaumont, Texas* In reoent years, however, the 
cooperative has hired its own graders and done its own work* Since official 
government rough rice grades have found no acceptance in the trade, this 
method of utilising the grading standards Is probably as satisfactory as 
obtaining an official certificate*
Compulsory Rough Rice Grading
The government standards for rough rice received their most wide­
spread use under the price-fixing provisions of the marketing agreements 
in 1933 and 1934* At first, the agreements provided that disputes as to 
premiums and discounts on rough rice should be settled by obtaining an of­
ficial certificate of grade* This system, however, was not sufficient to 
establish uniformity in rice purchases* Under authority given him in the 
marketing agreement, the Secretary of Agriculture on August 20, 1934, made 
compulsory the grading of all rough rice purchased by the mills* Numerous 
grading offices were hastily established, since the expansion in the work 
was enormous* Haste and confusion was the principal characteristic of 
this short-lived attempt to establish the use of rough rice grades*
It is little wonder that rough rice grades offered no solution to 
the problem of more elderly marketing when they were utilized for four 
months in the 1934 marketing season. Reasons for their failure may be 
summed up as follows i (l) the customary buying practices in the rice belt 
could not be radically changed in the course of one season, (2) the hastily
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established grading offices could not be expected to operate efficiently 
at once, and (3) the institution of rough rloe grades as a basis for fixing 
prices gave every incentive to both growers and processors to criticize and 
manipulate the grades in order to gain a price advantage*
It is unfortunate that the rice industry has experienced price-fix­
ing along with rough rice standards, for the association of the two programs 
has left a bitter memory* A gradual utilization of rough rice grades would 
likely have benefitted both growers and processors, and contributed more 
than any other one factor to the improvement of rice marketing* The experi­
ence of 1934, however, has greatly retarded the utilization of rough rice 
grades, and many years will pass before conditions are again favorable for 
their promotion.
Grade standards for clean rice, however, have come into widespread 
use* Most clean rice is sold on government certificates of grade or on 
equal-to-type certificates* This is particularly true of clean rice for ex­
port, where the establishment of clean rice grades has undoubtedly been a 
major benefit to the Louisiana rice industry*
Other Marketing Improvements
Although rough rice grading has not been adopted in the rice indus­
try, some suggestions for marketing improvement have been taken into general 
use* One of the most important was the establishment of a market news ser­
vice in 1928, at present Issued as a weekly mimeographed release of the Agri­
cultural Marketing Service, called the Weekly Rice Market Review* This re­
lease contains a description of the behavior of the Southern and Californian
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clean rice markets during the preceding week* Hie rang© of clean rice 
prices by varieties classified as to Extra Fancy and Fancy is given for 
rice markets at Houston, New Orleans, Stuttgart, New York, and San Fran­
cisco. The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association issues a dupli­
cate of this report to its members, except that it substitutes for the 
dean rloe price quotations a grade and price report on its own rough rice 
sales.
Cooperative marketing, unsuccessfully launched at various times, 
became permanently established with a venture begun in 1929# so organized 
as to avoid the causes of failure of earlier associations of rice growers. 
Hie campaigns to improve the grade of rice by control of red rice, elimi­
nation of foreign materials, and seed improvement also resulted in a better 
marketing system. Farmers throughout the area are more and more having 
their seed cleaned by fanning or Carter disc equipment, apparently recog­
nising the premiums and discounts which are paid for different grades and 
qualities of rough rice.
Other proposals for marketing improvement, however, have fared 
little better than rough rice grading. Chief among these suggestions were 
bulk handling to reduce sacking and handling costs, improvement in ware­
house facilities, and encouragement to farmers to sell on sealed bids 
through bonded warehousemen in place of individual bargaining. Except for 
the establishment of bonded warehouses, which has reduced the dangers of 
irresponsible storage, there has been little development in these facili­
ties since the establishment of the rice industry*
Rice has always been handled in sacks in Louisiana, and stored 
by stacking in flat warehouses. This method developed when rice was grown
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on a small seal©, and parallels handling methods for typo® of grains grovm 
on a small seals. Arguments for continuing sack handling of rice in Loui­
siana have been, and still are, identical to those raised by wheat growers 
when the government undertook to encourage bulk handling of wheat in order 
to improve marketing. These arguments are (1) sacked grain brings enough 
more than bulk grain to cover oosts of sacks, (2) large investments have 
been made in flat warehouses, (3) insurance oosts are higher on bulk grain,
(4) sacking is the only economical way of handling large numbers of varie­
ties and grades, (3) flat warehouses have a low construction cost compared 
to elevators, (6) millers prefer the preservation of the identity of grain, 
and (7) bulk handling requires dry grain. These same arguments have been 
sufficiently strong in Louisiana to prevent any change in the method of 
handling and storing rice. In recent years, however, there have been a few
indications that the system of bulk handling of rice in Arkansas and Texas
ohas begun infiltration Into Louisiana.
A low moisture content not only improves the milling quality of 
rice, but is an important factor in methods of handling rice. Many indi­
viduals believe that the high moisture content of Louisiana rice is the 
principal factor prohibiting the development of bulk storage. A longer 
curing period in the shock does not appear feasible in Louisiana because 
of climate limitations. Rice in bags can be stacked to permit free circu-
^Federal Trade Commission, Grain Trade Report. Vol. 1, 1920, p. 26.
l'-rge private warehouse near Holmwood handles rice in bulk in
bins, and the Louisiana State Rice Milling Company plant at Lake Charles
has added equipment to handle rice in bulk. Other large mills can be a-
dapted to bulk storage of rloe, although small mills would experience 
difficulty in doing so.
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lation of air, can be restacked to permit drying, or can be shoveled and 
re sacked if very wet* In bulk handling, of course, grain can be re-ele­
vated and run through various bins in order to dry it* Commercial dryers 
for grain are on the market, and considerable research has been done to 
adapt a grain dryer to Louisiana rice. 10
Since drying results in Improved yields of head rice and fewer 
broken kernels, several large mills in Louisiana have long boon equipped 
with rice dryers which are used when damp or wet rice is purchased* Such 
facilities are not available to farmers, however, since initial cost and 
the traditional method of sacking rice prevents their installation in 
warehouses* Dryers now on the market are not pen©rally considered very 
efficient by rice growers or millers, moreover, which retards their gener­
al adoption*
All of these factors have maintained the traditional method of 
handling rice in Louisiana* Present indications are that sack handling 
of rice will continue for many years, except in the western part of the 
rice belt where larger lots and drier rice make economies of bulk hand­
ling more obvious to the growers*
The improvement of warehouse facilities already existing In the 
Louisiana rice belt, therefore, has drawn chief attention In Improvement 
of the storage of rice* The public storage of agricultural products was 
at one time In the United States in a very chaotic condition, due to lack 
of regulation and the irresponsibility of warehouse operators for products
10W. D* Smith, Commercial Prying of Rough Rice in the Southern 
States. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, mimeographed, Washington,
August, 1928*
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placed in trust with thorn, A chief objective of the United State® 'Vare-
house Act of 1916 was to aid producers and merchandisers of agricultural
produet® to obtain responsible public storage so that the stored products
11would be acceptable collateral for bank loans* Because of inadequate 
storage facilities on the fam and frequent Inability to move the products 
to market when desirable, farmers all through the nation store their pro­
ducts in public warehouses* The poor financial standing of many warehouse­
men, variety of buildings used, methods of storage, and character of the 
warehouse receipt often are such .as to damage the product and limit the 
value of the product for collateral on loans. The federal warehouse act 
aimed to correct these conditions by providing federal licensed warehouses 
under strict regulations.
In the rice belt of Louisiana, however, few warehouses secured a 
federal bond. Conditions after 1916 were not improved in regard to the 
problems of rice storage described above. As a result, the state of 
Louisiana established warehouse regulations, which, although applicable 
to all warehousing, were designed principally to improve rice marketing.
In 1926, the Louisiana State Market and Warehouse Commission began opera­
tions, although its early efforts were directed largely to commodity in-
12spection services and not to warehousing.
In 1934, the state of Louisiana passed an act providing, among 
other things, a system of state bonded warehouses for storing farm pro­
ducts.^ All warehouses offering public storage and issuing warehouse
^Report of the Chief, Bureau of iigricultural Economics, 1923, p. 1 3,
Progress Report, Louisiana State Market and Warehouse Commission 
Bulletin No. 5, May, 1939, '
^Act No. 223, State of Louisiana, 1934.
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receipts were to bo licensed and bonded as "State Regulated Fanners' Ware­
houses," and it was made unlawful for anyone to operate a public warehouse 
or issue negotiable receipts unless licensed under the federal or state 
law. According to the Commission, the duties of the state under this act 
included the supervision of warehousemen, furnishing plans and encouraging 
warehouse construction, encouraging proper storage of agricultural products,
eliminating unsound or evil practices, developing uniformity in methods and
14receipts, and making easier the financing and marketing of f a m  products. 
Since January, 1935, all negotiable receipts on stored rice in Louisiana 
have been issued only by state bonded warehouses, except for a few federal 
bonded warehouses. These warehouses are required to report monthly their 
movement of rice, periodic inspections are made, and an annual audit is 
made in the summer to check on the total movement for the year. For these 
services, the warehouses pay a license fee, post a bond, and are assessed 
X/Ut for each bag of rice entering storage. In 1940, the warehouse regu­
lations were simplified and strengthened by a revision of the warehouse
commission organisation, and improvements were made in licensing and in- 
15speotion.
Most of the rice marketed in Louisiana passes through the state 
bonded warehouses. Because these warehouses levy a considerable annual 
toll on the rloe crop, and are the only marketing service intervening be­
tween the farmer and the mills, their position is peculiarly important
^Official Regulations and Resolutions. Louisiana State Market and 
Warehouse Commission, Bulletin No. 4, December, 1936, p. 10.
^Act No. 218, State of Louisiana, 1940.
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in an analysis of rough rloe marketing. The remainder of this chapter 
will be devoted largely to problems of riee storage and warehousing in 
the state.
Movement of Rough Rloe
About half of the rice crop in the southern states moves to the 
mills in the months of harvest, August through A%vember. In the four 
years from 1935 through 1938 > when crop movements were not unduly dis­
turbed by unusual incidents, 36 per cent of the annual reaeipts of rough 
riee by southern rioe mills was received during this four-month period. 
Hie peak movement was in October, with an average of 24*4 per cent of the 
year* 8 annual receipts, while 29 per cent was split between September and 
November.
Rough rice receipts at the mills generally decline during Decem­
ber, but rise again in January. Several iactors account for this fluctu­
ation. First, the harvest season has passed and farmers who have stored 
tend to retain possession for a month or more; second, the mills reach 
their financial and physical capacity in rough riee during the harvest 
season and are not disposed to buy until their stocks are reduced; and 
third, the holiday season has a retarding effect on activity in the rice 
market.
Although a farmer as an individual has a choice between storing 
and selling at harvest, rice farmers as a group do not have this choice. 
The mills have neither the financial nor physical capacity to buy the 
whole crop during harvest, nor can they afford the speculative risk. 
Storing of at least half of the crop by farmers, therefore, is necessary.
9a
If all farmers attempted to sell during harvest there would not be a suf­
ficient market at that time to absorb the supplies* since there are no 
speculative elements operating in rough rloe except the fanners and the 
mills*
Much of the rloe marketed direct from the thresher also passes 
through the public warehouses* and may be stored several weeks* large 
growers frequently haul their rice directly out of the field to a public 
warehouse in order to assemble a large lot* even though they have no in­
tention of holding the rice* In such cases* the warehouse does not stack 
the rice* but furnishes shelter and weighs the lot* for which it charges 
a small fee* usually five cents a bag.
Location of Rice Warehouses
Public bonded warehouses specialising In rice storage are distri­
buted rather uniformly through the southwest Louisiana producing area* 
Public storage is available at practically every trading center* usually 
at points where rail facilities and good roads are available* The dis­
tribution is such that very few rloe farms are more than ten miles from 
public storage* and most hauls are considerably less than ten miles*
If rice moves a greater distance* special influences are usually in­
volved* such as loans on the crop* advance of farm supplies during the 
season* or business or personal relationships*
The map shows the location of Independent public rice warehouses 
in the rice area in which storage Is available to the farmer. The map 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bonded warehouses used principally by irrigation companies for their own 
rice storage* More than one warehouse building operated by the same com­
pany in one town is also shown as a single warehouse*
Milling centers are indicated by the crosses* Public storage at 
milling points is dominated by the policies of mills in regard to storing 
farmers1 rice* Generally, storage charges in mill warehouses are waived 
when the storing mill buys the riee* The operation of large mill ware- 
* houses in Vermilion parish explains the scarcity of public warehouses in­
dicated for that area. Large Irrigation company warehouses are also lo­
cated in Vermilion parish, and store a great deal of their tenants' rice 
in addition to their own large rice stocks*
Services Rendered by Public Warehouses
The services performed by a public rice warehouse are fairly 
standardised throughout southwest Louisiana, although performed with con­
siderable difference in efficiency at various points* The grower hauls 
the rice to the warehouse loading platforms* Warehouse employees unload 
the rice, marie, and stack it. The stack of rice is given a lot number, 
and the grower receives negotiable warehouse receipts for the number of 
bags of rough riee checked in* State warehouse regulations do not re­
quire that incoming rice be weighed, as is necessary under federal ware- 
house regulation.
When the grower wishes to sell, he may or may not use the services 
of the warehouseman* Usually warehousemen furnish whatever aid the farmer 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ations. The grower commonly notifies th© warehouseman when he wishes 
to sell, and the warehouseman calls the buyers of mills with whom the 
famer wishes to deal, or buyers whom the warehouseman prefers* These 
buyers call, at the warehouse, obtain samples, and make bids*
Occasionally more than one grower may plan to sell at the same 
time, and several lots are put up for sale* Bids may be made direct to 
the farmer, or by sealed bids through the warehouseman* iihen state 
banded warehouses were first established, it was hoped that farmers would 
sell through a responsible warehouseman acting as agent. After limited 
experience with this selling method, however, growers have returned to 
the method of direct bargaining, apparently because of distrust in the 
warehouse operators* Frequent charges have been made that warehousemen 
favor certain buyers at the expense of growers, that they fail to en­
courage competition, and occasionally accept commissions in obtaining 
riee for preferred mills* In exceptional cases a farmer may request a 
warehouseman to sell his riGe for him, nmnlng a minimum price, but ware­
housemen generally confine their duties to assembling buyers at the 
grower's request*
After a lot of rice is sold and the warehouse receipts trans­
ferred, the lot is graded by the buyer and weighed by the warehouseman* 
The warehouseman's duty in these functions is to insure that the rice 
is properly sampled and graded, and that the weights are accurate*
Broken bags are resacked, and labor furnished for moving the rice out 
of the warehouse to the buyer's truck or freight car* In case the mill 
Is not in a position to receive the rloe immediately after grading and 
weighing# the warehouse makes a charge to the mill for its actual costs
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in restacking and handling the rice.
Storage Sagacity in the Sloe Area
According to th© records of th© State Warehouse Commission* there 
aero 101 different bonds Issued to warehouse® which specialized in storing 
rice in 1940-41* Since several companies had more than one warehouse 
bonded, the actual number of warehouses was greater* Six of th© state 
bonded rice warehouses, however, were located in Hew Orleans outside of 
the producing area, where four of them were controlled by on© large com­
mercial warehouse company. In addition, one of the warehouses on th© 
state records was destroyed by fir© in the summer of 1940, another had 
ceased operations, one had dropped its bond, two others wore; duplicates, 
and one vas located outside the producing area at the Baton Rouge mill. 
This left 09 state bonded warehouses inside the southwest Louisiana rice 
producing area which stored rice in 1940-41* Of these 09# 16 were oper­
ated in connection with rice mills or were under the direct control of 
rice mill interests, leaving 73 warehouses bonded by the state and storing 
rough rice primarily for producers.
In addition, there was some rice storage available to farmers 
that was controlled by rice mills under federal bond* Most notable was 
the Faroers "arehous© Company controlled by the Louisiana State liioe 
Milling Company, which operated eight warehouse facilities for the com­
pany in Louisiana* Three other mills also had storage facilities under 
federal bond* In addition, several mill warehouses that were not bonded 
received rice from farmers and stored until the mill bought th© rice at
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a later data.
Total atata bonded warehouse storage capacity in the southwest 
producing area in 1940-41, according to the state records, was approxi­
mately 3*740,000 bags of rice* In addition, the federal bonded rice 
mill warehouses could handle 675,000 bags. A surrey of the rice ware­
houses and mills in the spring of 1941 indicated that the state records 
showed upper limits of warehouse capacity, as in several instances old 
warehouses could not be used to their full capacity because of weak 
floors or other troubles with building maintenance. Effective state 
bonded warehouse capacity appeared close to 3,500,000 bags of rice. 
These figures on total capacity included both rough and clean rice ca­
pacity at the 16 mill warehouses. All storage at Baton Rouge and Hew 
Orleans was omitted.
In recent years a nomal Louisiana rice crop has ranged between 
5 and 6 million bags of rough rice. There are approximately 4,400,00 
bags of public warehouse and mill storage under state or federal bond 
in the producing area of the state. Another 500,000 bags is probably 
stored on the farm or in private warehouses at several points. The re­
maining portion of the crop proceeds immediately into the milling pro­
cess and to market, or enters storage after purchase by a mill whoso 
facilities do not include public bonded warehouse storage. Early ma­
turing varieties are often milled by the time the late varieties are 
threshed and stored. Total storage facilities for rice in the state, 
therefore, are approximately equal to the needs of the annual crop.
The capacities of individual warehouses ranged all the way from 
6,OCX) bags to more than 100,000 bags. Of 88 bonded rice warehouse
106
buildings studied in Louisiana, 57 had capacities between 20,000 and 
X660.000 bags* The larger capacities wore generally controlled by mills 
and irrigation companies, with the independent public storage available 
to farmers averaging near 30,000 bags per warehouse*
The isilling centers are by far the most important points for the 
storage of rough rice, largely because of the warehouses associated with 
the mills* The mill warehouse space, although needed for storing clean 
rice, is often sufficiently flexible so that it can be used for rough 
riee storage when necessary*
Crowley, the chief milling center, had almost a fifth of the storage 
capacity available in 1940-41* Its 623, OCX) bag capacity was principally 
mill storage, much of which was available to farmers* Space for only
195.000 bags was available independent of mills and irrigation companies* 
Kaplan, another important milling center, was second in storage capacity, 
but only 160,000 out of its 520,000 bag capacity were operated for fanners 
independently of mills*
Next in order came Gueyd&n, Lake Charles, and Eunice* Less impor­
tant were Rayne, Welsh, Jennings, Abbeville, and Elton* Storage at other 
points exceeded 100,000 bags only at Iota and Mermentau*
In regard to independent storage outside of the control of mills 
and Irrigation companies, Eunice with 205,000 bags led all storage points,
^ I n  this discussion, the exact number of warehouses is difficult 
to determine. Seme operators had more than one warehouse in the same lo­
cality, others rented additional space when needed, other© had buildings 
lying idle* For these reasons, the number of warehouses presented in dif­
ferent parts of this discussion may differ* Although a complete tabulation 
was attempted, it was useless to reconcile all the figures so that no dis­
crepancies would appear*
107
Table XXXI* Storage capacity and ownership of 88 bonded rice warehouses 
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41*





All types of 
ownership
6— 20*000 9 7 1 17
21— 40*000 16 16 5 37
41— 60*000 6 12 2 20
61— 80*000 1 2 0 3
80*000 and 
over
1 10 0 11
Total 33 47 8 88
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followed by Crowley with 195#000 bags. Welsh was high in famor storage 
with 190,000 bags available, followed by Kaplan, Jennings, Iota, and 
Rayne with over 100,000 bags available at each point. It is at these 
points where bidding for rough rice stocks is most active, since the mills 
must deal with each farmer and lack the control over bidding they have in 
their own warehouses.
Control of Rice Warehouses
Of 95 rice warehouses in southwest Louisiana for which data was 
available during 1940-41, only 23 were concerned primarily with general 
warehouse and farm supply business. The remaining 72 were associated with 
other business enterprises, usually closely associated with the rice in­
dustry. Twenty-six warehouses were operated by rice millers, and 14 each 
by irrigation companies and merchandising concerns* Rice farmers owned 
13 of the remaining IS. Individual proprietorships were the chief fora 
of business organization for the warehouse and fara supply enterprises, 
while the warehouses controlled by large interests were organized as 
corporations.
As mentioned above, there were public bonded storage facilities 
within the southwest Louisiana producing area for about 4,400,000 bags 
of rice in 1940-41, including a small proportion of clean pockets in 
this figure. Of this total, rice mills controlled over 1,600,000 bags 
capacity, and irrigation companies another 600,000 bags* In other words, 
haif of the public storage capacity was controlled by business enter­
prises to which xlce storage was only a related service to their princi­
pal rice enterprise. Local store operators controlled 536,000 bags in
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Table X IV . T o ta l bonded warehouse and mill storage capacities for rice 
a t lead in g  rice centers in southwestern Louisiana, in bags. 
1940-41.
Location
C o n tro l
Independent
Ir r ig a tio n
company M ill T o ta l
Crowley 195,000 90 ,0 0 0 538,000 8 23 ,0 0 0
160 ,000 100 ,000 260 ,000 520 ,000
Queydan 2 5 ,0 0 0 100 ,000 160 ,000 285 ,000
lake  C harles 45,000 200 ,000 245,000
Sunlce 205 ,000 40,000 245,000
Bayne 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 80,000 195,000
Welsh 190 ,00 0 190 ,00 0
Jennings 135,000 45,000 180,000
A b b e v ille 4 1 ,0 0 0 15,000 100 ,000 136 ,00 0
E lto n 155 ,000 155,000
Io ta 120 ,00 0 25,000 145 ,000
Men&entau 30.000 100 .000 130.000
T o ta l 12 lead in g 1,4 16 ,00 0 330 ,000 1,523,000 3,269 ,000
r ic e  een ters
A ll o th e r 681.000 aHUpqo 207.000 1,141 .000
T o ta l 2,0 9 7 ,0 0 0 583 ,000 1,730 ,000 4,410 ,000
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Table IV. Associated business enterprise and type of oimership for 95 





Warehouse & farm supply 15 6 2 23
Rice mills 2 22 2 26
Retail 6 wholesale mdse. 7 6 1 14
Irrigation company 14 14
Rice farmers a 2 3 13
Miscellaneous 2 _____ 3._ ?,
Total ....,3fc..... ___52___ 8 n
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connection with their mercantile enterprises, which often included fi­
nancing, principally through merchandise advances on rice crops. Men 
whose principal business was rice farming controlled another 400,000 
bags of space, principally through individual ownership but also in two 
corporations in which local fanners were the principal stockholders.
tiiis left approximately 1,000,000 bags of capacity in the con­
trol of local independent warehouse operators, which included a number 
of operators dependent on other enterprises such as a profession, or 
selling farm supplies* This demonstrates the extent to which Louisiana 
rice farmers depend on rice storage controlled by large enterprises in 
the rice industry. Any consideration of rice storage costs in general, 
therefore, must reckon not with the situation as one controlled by the 
actual costs of independent warehouse operation, but with the entire 
structure of enterprises controlling storage facilities, and the pur­
poses and nature of such control.
In one sense, the independently operated storage is more impor­
tant than appears from the above figures. Much of the mill and irri­
gation ccxapany capacity is not really public storage since a large 
portion of the rice is owned by the warehouse operators— 50 per cent 
would be a conservative estimate* In addition, much rice passes through 
the independent warehouses in the early part of the season without uti­
lizing permanent storage space, so that effective independent capacity 
in handling rough rice is greater than absolute capacity.
Charges for Rice Storage
Rates charged farmers for storage vary greatly, and the facili­
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ties available at similar rates also vary considerably. This situation 
is the result of several factors s (1) the Influence of custom in setting 
the rates generally accepted in the cccinunity, (2) the forcing davm of 
rates by new warehouse companies attempting to get rice for storage , (3) 
the fact that most independent warehouses tie up the rice with crop ad­
vances so that they secure it for storage regardless of their charges, 
and (4) the practice of mills in waiving storage charges for rice pur­
chased in mill-controlled warehouses.
Some warehouses also perform miscellaneous services which cause 
rates to differ from the announced schedules. Special rates are some­
times given on large quantities, special services such as turning and re­
stocking to dry rice are performed for an additional fee, and rice may be 
handled through the warehouse at the beginning of the season without 
stacking* for a usual fee of five cents a bag.
A number of the warehouses cany a blanket fire insurance policy 
on all rice and include the charges in their storage fee. The reasons 
given for this practice are that the growers do not ordinarily care to 
take out their own insurance, or will omit doing so and therefore incur 
an unreasonable hazard, and that insurance can be furnished somewhat 
more cheaply by a blanket policy. The more common practice, however, is 
for the grower to take out his ovm insurance. Rico is insured for its 
stated market value, vdth a premium based on $100 of valuation. The in­
surance company reserves the privilege of replacing the rice instead of 
paying a loss in cash. In general, costs of insurance are estimated at 
one cent a bag per month, and several warehouses furnish optional blanket 
insurance at this fee.
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The most common charge for rice storage made by bonded ware­
houses in 1940-41 was 7 cents per bag the first month, 5 cents the second, 
and 3 cents the third month or fraction thereof, with 15 cents a bag being 
the maximum charge for the season* Twenty warehouses out of 79 made this 
charge, eight of them including insurance in the fee* Kext in general use 
was a rate of 10 cents flat without insurance, although this rate was con­
fined largely to a number of warehouses in one locality* Other rates were 
varied, ranging from a flat rate of 3 cents in one warehouse to various 
combinations reaching over periods of five months of storage* (Table XVI) 
Several warehouses offered optional insurance at one cent per bag above 
the stated storage charge*
The highest rate charged by any public warehouse in the producing 
area was 8-6-4-2-2, which adds to a total of 22 cents a bag for storage of 
five months or longer* This rate included insurance* The lowest rate in 
the area with insurance was 5-5* or a total of 10 cents for the season* 
Without insurance, the highest rate charged a grower was 7-5-3-2, or a 
total of 17 cents for the season* The lowest rate without insurance was 
a flat 6 cents, but this was established because of an unusual fire hazard 
and consequent high insurance costs* Tor warehouses in general, the low­
est rates without insurance were the 10 oents flat rates, although in one 
case an 8-2 division was found*
The lowest charges for public rice storage in the entire rice
belt were maintained at Crowley, with a usual rate of 5-4-3 oents and a
12 cents M-rimim for the season, including insurance* Hie force deter­
mining this low rate has been the activity of leading irrigation and
banking interests expanding warehouse operation . nd cutting storage rates.
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Table XVI. Hates charged for storage in 79 public bonded rice warehouses 
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41, per large bag.
Months jointsper bag)
Number warehouses One Two three Four Five Season
Without insurance ($1)
u 10 10
12 7 5 3 15
10 8 4 3 15
3 6 4 2 12
2 8 5 3 16
2 8 4 12
2 7 5 3 2 17
1 10 3 2 15
1 8 2 2 12
1 10 2 2 1 15




8 7 5 3 15
3 8 5 3 2 2 20
2 6 6 3 2 1 20
2 io i 3& 16J
2 8 6 4 2 20
1 8 6 4 2 2 22
1 8 4 3 2 1 18
1 8 5 3 16
1 8 4 2 U
1 15 15
1 7 4 3 U
1 6 4 2 12
1 5 4 3 12
1 6 6 12
1 10 10
1 5 5 10
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and tbs existence of large mill capacities which waive storage on rice at 
their warehouses • All independent warehousemen agreed that they could 
not operate at this low charge, and that rates must be raised in the future 
if they are to remain in business*
Highest rates were charged in Vermilion parish, with the town of 
Gueydan being the most expensive storage point in the rice belt. Practi- 
cally all of the rice stored at Gueydan was controlled by mills or irri­
gation companies, however, and little storage was actually paid by the 
farmers. Throughout Vermilion parish the bulk of the rice is stored in 
mill warehouses, which partially explains the high established rates of 
the few public warehouses in the area.
The lowest rates for a broad area were those prevailing throughout 
Jefferson Davis parish. Most of the storage facilities here are indepen­
dently operated, rates are established without insurance, and a 7-5-3 cent 
basis appears to be satisfactory to both farmers and warehouseman. 
Throughout Calcasieu parish the rates were 8-4-3 without insurance. This 
is the same season charge as 7-5-3 cents but is slightly higher for rice 
which leaves within the first month of storage.
Condition of Warehouses
The principal equipment essential in storing rice is a dry, airy 
building raised above the damp ground and having a solid floor sufficient 
to bear the weight of rice stacked to the ceiling* A scale is needed to 
weigh the outgoing rice, and ordinarily a platform scale built into the 
floor is most suitable for this purpose. In federal bonded warehouses 
where rice must be weighed into the warehouse as well as out, a truck 3cale
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Table XVII. Usual storage rates a t most im portan t rioe storage cen ters  
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41#





storage ra te  (c e r ts )
T o ta l fo r  
season
S t. Xan&xsr:
3udo« 6 10 10
A cadia:
Crowlear 10 5-4-3: 12"
Hayne 7 7-5-3 15
Io ta 4 10 10
k e ra e rta u 3 8—4—3 15
V e rm ilio n :
A b b e v ille 5 8—6—4—2 20
Kaplan 6 8-5-3-2-2 20*
Guegrdan 4 8—6—3—2—2—1** 22
Je ffe rs o n  D avis :
Jennings 4 7-5-3-2 17
W elsh 3 7-5-3 15
E lto n 4 8—4 12
Country p o in ts 7-5-3 15
C alcas ieu :
Lake C harles 5 7-5-3 15
V in to n 2 1 0 -2 -2 -1 15
O ther p o in ts 8-4-3 15
A lle n :
K inder 1 7-5-3 15
x In clu d es m ill warehouses. 
*W lth  insurance.
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saves considerable labor and time.
No mechanical equipment is used in handling the bags of rice, so 
that all handling costs are labor costs. At the peak of the threshing 
season, a 30,000 bag capacity warehouse may require 10 or more laborers 
to handle and stack the rice as it comes from the farms.
kany of the public warehouses storing rice in Louisiana are old, 
wood frame buildings with walls and floors in poor condition. The aver­
age of all warehouse structures in 1941 was 20 years. Only five new 
warehouses had been built for public rice storage in the preceding five 
years, and only nine since 1930, out of a total of almost 100 warehouse 
structures. Uodern warehouse construction utilizes concrete piers, a 
wood frame structure with a heavy plank floor, and sides and roof covered 
by galvanised iron shooting.
The recently constructed warehouses are designed principally for 
truck traffic and have a ramp on widLch trucks can enter the warehouse for 
unloading. The older warehouses were designed chiefly for rail movement, 
since rough rice formerly entered and left the warehouses by rail. Rail 
facilities are still necessary for all warehouses, since a considerable 
portion of outgoing rice moves by rail. Mills located close to a ware­
house, if crowded for storage space, occasionally ship rice by rail and 
use the car for storage during the demurrage period, as well as using 
railroads for long hauls from warehouse to mill.
As recently as 1938 a modem warehouse with a capacity of 30,000 
bags could be erected for about £10,000, including land, building, and 
necessary equipment. Costs have undoubtedly risen since that time, par­
ticularly for galvanized iron sheeting, so that present cost would be
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considerably higher. Cost figures lor warehouses built before 1925 are 
difficult to estimate. Several of these older warehouses wore originally 
constructed as parts of mills, others have changed hands so often that 
cost figures have disappeared, and others were constructed of wood ma­
terials with labor for which direct costs could not be ascertained. The 
average appraisal of the value of rice warehouses in 1941 with less than
60,000 bags capacities ranged between $5*000 and $10,000, according to 
survey data.
Costs of Warehouse Operation
The total costs for warehouse operation include maintenance and 
depreciation, labor, warehouseman1 s salary, insurance, and expenses for 
licenses, torn bags, and office operations. A reasonable depreciation 
charge on a $10,000 warehouse would be five per cent, although few ware­
house operators make this charge. Maintenance, If the warehouse were 
kept in proper repair, would average about $250 a year. Labor costs are 
variable frcta year to year, but an average of 10 laborers employed for 
40 days at $2 a day would amount to at least eoGO for labor costs. An 
ordinary v/arehouseiixiinJ s salary would be somewhat less than $1,000 a year, 
while insurance costs and taxes would be about $500 annually. A state 
warehouse commission inspection fee of 1/4 cent a bag must also be paid.
The sum of these various charges borders on costs of $3,000 
annually. If 30,000 bags were stored and an average of 10 cents a bag 
were received for storage during the season, the gross storage income of 
$3,000 a year would be practically equivalent to the total costs. In 
this situation, a warehouse operated independently of other business
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ventures could not return large earning® to its owner. In years when 
the warehouse is not filled to capacity, or less than 10 cent a bag 
average price is received, a warehouse is not likely to show a profit if 
all costs are considered.
Most warehouses in the area ignore depreciation and maintenance 
charges, and therefore appear to have a better earning record than this 
analysis portrays* Analysis of actual costs, however, is virtually i®~ 
possible since few warehouses operate independently of other business 
enterprises, j&ther public rice warehouses are operated as sidelines to 
other enterprises or the warehousemen themselves operate various side­
lines in addition to public storage* Actual out-of-pocket costs are 
only labor, insurance, and supplies, which are readily covered by a low 
storage charge.
Practically every individually owned public rice warehouse sells 
fertilizer, bags, twine, and occasionally feed. The Liinismm amount sold 
is that sufficient for the needs of the farmers storing at the warehouse, 
but in several cases the business extends into general farm supply and 
farm implement agencies. The farm supply business is frequently carried 
on by a mercantile store owning the warehouse. The supplies are sold on 
credit, the rice is stored at the warehouse, and payment is made when 
the rice is sold. About half of the warehouse operators also make cash 
advances on rice crops, ither directly or through associated enter­
prises. As a result, the cost aspects of warehouse operation are sub­
merged in the general business enterprises of the operators.
Irrigation companies, watering rice for 1/5 or 1/4 shares of 
the crop, maintain large warehouses to handle their own rice* Frequently,
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excess storage space is available to their water tenants as public 
storage. Rice mills also make their excess storage space available to 
farmers, waiving storage charges if the mill buys the rice, which it
almost invariably does. Local financiers who own land or advance on
crops also operate warehouses. All of these operators hire a low-paid 
warehouseman to supervise handling the rice, and are able to furnish 
storage at low rates.
Only a few individuals rely un large rice storage business enter­
prises for a living, and these few depend on farm supply sales, advances
on crops, or rice farming to maintain their operations. Any evaluation of 
reasonable charges for rice storage must consider these facts. Storage 
charges in Louisiana under present competitive conditions are likely to 
be reasonable except where credit influences are powerful enough to permit 
unduly high rates. The best means of insuring reasonable storage charges 
in Louisiana would be to free the farmers of dependence on warehouse oper­
ators for credit, although this might raise rates by eliminating credit 
earnings now applied to warehouse costs.
In general, rice storage rates in Louisiana appear to have been 
forced down to actual costs by competition, so that there is little possi­
bility of further reduction by ary means. If additional services should 
be offered at the warehouses, charges would have to be increased in order 
to cover additional costs, since present receipts cover only minimum 
services.
Miscellaneous Services
Rice warehouses In Louisiana assume no liability for damage or
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losses to rice other than that due to deficiencies in the warehouse, 
such as a leaking roof. Wet rice is accepted and if heat-damaged the 
farmer suffers the loss. However, the warehouseman, if aware of the con­
dition, will turn and restack the rice. If this task involves much labor, 
the fanner is charged for the cost of the services.
In state bonded warehouses rice is weighed only when sold. Such 
shrinkage as occurs does not beoome evident, therefore, and the loss is 
carried by the farmer. Sacks of rice which are cut in handling or by 
rats are resacked by the warehouse, with any loss of rice being carried 
by the farmer. In some cases the farmer is charged for the sacks used in 
resacking the rice, although the sweepings are fanned and sold by the 
warehouse operator.
Rice in public warehouses receives relatively little protection 
from rats and insects. Most warehouse operators poison for rats at regu­
lar intervals, but rats are difficult to control and usually damage a 
number of bags. Several warehouses are so constructed as to make rat con­
trol practically impossible. Few warehouses make any effort at control­
ling insects, although there is evidence that such efforts were more 
generally made some years ago when whitewash and creosote were used. Ac­
cording to the warehouse operators, raost buildings are too loose to do 
much of anything. In addition, the public warehouses usually are empty 
when the inseot season is at its peak in the summer. The general senti­
ment is that more efficient rat and insect control costs more than the 
saved rice is worth.
Seed rice is stored by most warehouses at the usual season charge. 
Thirteen warehouses in the rice area have Carter disc equipment for
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olean in g  seed rice, with a uniform charge of fifteen cents a bag* Another 
two warehouses are equipped for fanning seed rice at a lower charge of ten 
oents a bag* Other cleaning facilities are available at huller and feed 
mills at scattered locations*
The average number of years which the present warehouse owners 
have been operating their enterprises was eleven years in 1941* Warehouses 
apparently change hands frequently, since twelve had changed ownership in 
the preceding five years*
The number of farmers storing at each warehouse averages about 20, 
but ranged from 15 to 200 depending on the size of farms in the locality 
and the capacity of the warehouse*
Problems in  Rough R ice Storage
The wide variance in operation and control of rice warehouses 
makes them difficult to analyze* So many of them are run for purposes 
other than profit out of rice storage that a cost analysis is of rela­
tively little value* There is an apparent trend, however, toward the 
crowding out of independent storage operations by large financial in­
terests in the rice industry, particularly the large rice mills and the 
irrigation companies*
The structure of the rice storage system rests largely on custom, 
and on methods of financing the crop* Farmers are in the habit of running 
their rice into a public warehouse as soon as it is threshed, even though 
they may Intend to sell almost immediately. In addition, crop liens 
generally require bonded storage, and the majority of Louisiana rice is
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Table X7IXI. Age of 31 individually owned public rioe warehouses in 







1—  5 5 12
6— 10 4 $
11— 15 1 316— 20 9 2
21— 25 4 5
26— 30 3 1
31— 35 3 0
36—“40 2 0
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subject to crop liens* To some extent this customary practice is being 
broken down by provision of storage facilities on the farm, and by 
easier credit which permits some farmers to finance their crop without 
offering a crop Hen.
Mills which waive storage charges contend that they do not take 
the storage charge out of the price of rice paid to farmers* This is 
probably true in the early part of the season, for the famer has hauled 
the rice to the mill warehouse, and therefore the mill can pay more for 
rice in its warehouse because of its saving in dray age. Also, a mill 
incurs relatively little additional cost in storing rioe for farmers*
The mills usually buy all the rice stored, and would use the space any­
way if they were buying heavily* Before they buy the rice, it merely 
occupies the same space as when the mill owns it, and the farmer has 
saved the mill the expense of hauling* Overhead costs are low, since the 
regular mill staff furnishes most of the supervision* As a result, the 
independent warehouses must meet very sharp competition when they are lo­
cated near extensive mill storage facilities.
The chief argument against use of mill storage is that the farmer 
loses control over his rice, since the storing mill has the advantage in 
bidding, and usually other mill buyers do net bid on the rice (although 
the famer has the nominal privilege of selling elsewhere if he pays 
storage charges). In several oases, warehouses are operated independently 
but are in reality controlled by a mill* This allows the warehouse to 
advance farm supplies and affords ioore freedom to other buyers, but also 
leaves the controlling mill in a strong position to obtain the rice.
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The location of a farmer's rioe probably has some effect on price 
bide for the rioe, but this effect is likely small when there is compe­
tition between mills. The cost of drayage to a mill may have some effect, 
but the fact that rioe is often sold to a mill far distant when nearby 
mi ls are bidding demonstrates that drayage charges are not particularly 
significant in influencing price. A famer has an advantage if he stores 
his rice at nearby points in order to save on his own hauling costs*
Naturally, no information that is definite can be obtained con­
cerning practices of warehousemen injurious to farmers* Common gossip 
gives clues to such abuses, however, among the most serious of which is 
the failure of the warehouseman to give proper aid in selling rice* This 
may include favoritism in notifying certain buyers of a rice sale, or 
failure to assemble an adequate number of buyers. Also, there are rumors 
that some warehousemen occasionally sell rice to a mill at a higher price 
than a grower had named as acceptable, and pocket the difference* The 
latter hap ening is probably rare, but there are numerous opportunities 
for the previously described practices*
There also appears to be some question of proper weights, which 
may favor either the buyer or seller of the rice* Proper weights are a 
highly important part of the warehouseman's function, and should be 
scrupulously accurate* Care is also necessary that proper samples are 
obtained for grading* The warehouseman's negligence in any one of these 
factors leads to abuse of the grower or of the mill*
Warehousemen in Louisiana have done little thinking toward the 
possibility of bulk storage, or toward any changes in the customary 
storage of rice. The general attitude toward bulk storage, where ware-
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housemen are acquainted with it, is that it is impractical because 
Louisiana rioe is too wet and needs to be sacked and stacked to dry, and 
because Louisiana lots are so small that bin handling would be too cost­
ly, since sacks are more convenient*
In general, independent warehousemen favor cooperative marketing, 
for the present association relieves them of oil duties in connection 
with the sale of rice. It reduces the function of warehousemen to one 
strictly of storage, and relieves him of all selling responsibilities.
Bad debt losses in the warehouse business are negligible. The 
warehousemen secure payment when the rice is sold. Often the check Is 
written to the warehouse operator, who distributes the proceeds to the 
various parties concerned.
Storage on Farms
County agents in the rice producing areas estimate that less 
than five per cent of the rice fanners own facilities for storing rice 
on their farms, although the requirements are simple and the necessary 
investment is snail* The tradition of public storage, practices estab­
lished when farm to market roads were poor, general neglect of out­
buildings on southern farms, storage requirements for rice under Hen, 
and warehouse control of rice because of crop advances have prevented 
extensive development of storage on fari;us* Such storage is feasible in 
the area, however, particularly with good roads, nearness of rioe pro­
duction to market, and the ease of storing rice in sacks. In recent 
years there has been a tendency toward expansion of storage facilities 
on the larger rice fame.
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A surrey of 38 fanners storing rioe on their farms in 1940*41 re­
vealed that an average of 288 acres was planted to rice each year on 
these farms# Total acres available for rice on these; farms were approxi­
mately double this acreage, so that the average farm had almost 600 acres* 
The average capacity of ell farm storage facilities studied was 3,360 bags. 
There was a considerable range in capacities, however, from 1,575 bags on 
farms with 250 to 350 total rioe aores, to a 5,112 bag average on eight 
farms with more than 80C rice acres#
The average size of a warehouse of 3,360 bags was about 2,400 
square feet, or about 60 by 40 linear feet. Of 40 different structures,
21 were built of wood frame covered more or less completely with galva­
nized iron sheeting, particularly for roofing; 18 were frame with galva­
nized iron sheet siding and roofs; and one was a complete wood structure# 
Six of the structures were barns converted for storage by construction of 
suitable floors and roofs,
lor 30 rice ware houses constructed in recent years, the average 
cost to the farmer was $827* This coat varied with capacity, ranging 
from $223 for four very small warehouses to $1,340 for five warehouses 
with capacities over 5,000 bags# Usually the farmer furnished most of 
the labor himself, so that costs were principally for materials.
The peak of construction was reached about 1933, whan large 
carryovers accumulated in farmors hands, construction costs were low, 
and storage charges wore higher than at present. Of 30 warehouses con­
structed specific? lly for farm storage, 25 had been constructed after 
1930. Their owners estimated that the average life of a farm warehouse 
was 29 years, and that average outlays for maintenance per year were
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Table 1X1* Capacity of farm warehouses related to total rioe acres in 
farm, 38 fame in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41 •
T o ta l rice Number of Storage capacity on
acres in farm farms____ t___________ farms in bags
250- 350 6 1,575
351- 450 6 2,050
451- 600 10 3,465
601- 800 8 3,800
801-2,000 8 5,112
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very low, probably leas than ten dollars* Thus, the average cost of 
storage on the farms would be about $33 depreciation and mainte­
nance, plus the famer1 s labor and interest on the investment* Inter­
est at five per cent would be slightly more than $40, giving an average 
cost near $75 a year for a storage capacity of 3#360 bags* Sinoe an 
average of 10 cents a bag storage cost on 3,000 bags of rioe would be 
$3^0, the farmer apparently can obtain a return in excess of $200 a year 
for labor used in building and caring for a farm warehouse of this ca­
pacity* Insurance costs are about the same on the farm as at the public 
warehouses*
There is, of ccurse, a cost for hiring labor to stack the rice 
in the farm warehouse* Most farmers, however, estimated that the savings 
in costs of hauling to public storage are equivalent to the cost of hir­
ing labor for stacking and loading rice* The average distance of the 
farmers having storage facilities from a public warehouse was 4*7 miles*
Estimates of the farmers as to their annual savings in storage 
charges averaged v342* This figure is biased upward by failure to in­
clude interest cost, personal labor, and perhaps additional labor costs 
at harvest* However, the evidenos is clear that the materials invested 
in a farm warehouse for storing rice easily pay for themselves in the 
course of five years* The famer receives a substantial retuin on his 
labor invested in construction of such a building*
Fanners who own storage facilities are unanimous in their o~ 
pinion that a farm warehouse Is a profitable investment, even at the 
high construction costs and low public storage rates of 1941* Several 
famers estimated that storage savings paid for the warehouse in three
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Table XX, Type of building used Tor rioe storage on 40 farms in south** 
west Louisiana, 1940-41.
Tsroe of structure Number
Galvanised Iron ^ id
Wood— iron combination 21
Wood frsae 1
Total 40
g>Includes 6 converted barns.
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Table XXX. Average capacity and coat of 30 recently constructed rice 






Under— 1,000 4 $ 223
1,000— 2,000 3 700
2,000— 3,000 9 809
3,000— 4,000 7 821
4,000— 5,000 2 1,050
5,000 & over J l
Total 30 % 827
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years* In addition* the buildings are commonly used for storing farm 
implements* fertiliser, and seed, and savings are realized from more 
adequate shelter for these supplies* Fire insurance on rice at the 
farm was carried by 36 of the AO farmers, and the rice was usually better 
protected from rats, Insects, and other damage than rice in public storage*
The farmers interviewed did not feel that there was any disad­
vantage in marketing rice stored on the farm* In fact, several farmers 
contended that there was an advantage in that no buyers could b® discrimi­
nated against by a warehouseman. Buyers are willing to visit large farms 
and bid on rice, and sales to mills are generally made f.o.b. aarm, al­
though occasionally a fanner may contract to deliver his rice at the mill* 
Responsible farmers are able to borrow money on the security of their 
stored rice even though negotiable bonded warehouse receipts are not 
available*
Although storage on the farm apparently has very few disadvantages, 
it is unlikely that the practice will have more than limited expansion in 
the future* Three principal factors act as retarding influences* Small 
farms producing less than 1,000 bags are most numerous In the Louisiana 
rice area, and the amount of saving is not highly attractive when com* 
blned with possible difficulties in marketing small lots at the farm. 
Further, credit arrangements for most rice fanners draw the rice into 
public warehouses, either through credit advances from the warehouse 
operator or by the need for securing negotiable warehouse receipts in 
order to borrow funds* Finally, present low storage rates at public ware­
houses and the mill practice of waiving storage charges cause most farmers 
to follow customary practices in handling their rice.
CHAPTER 17 
ECONOMICS OF THE RICE MILLING INDUSTRY
Rough rice, in its unhusked Iona, is similar to barley and oats 
in that the hulls must be removed before the grain Is ready for human 
consumption. All rice for human consumption therefore is processed with 
rice milling machinery before it reaches the consumer. The prim© object 
in milling rice is to remove the hull while preserving as many as possi­
ble of the kernels as whole grains. In addition, the trad© demands that 
the bran layers be thoroughly removed, and that the rice kernels be 
polished to a glossy appearance. Certain markets also require that the 
finished product be coated with glucose and talc. These operations are 
accomplished by a series of processes on specially designed rice milling 
machinery. ̂
Before actual milling is begun, the rough rice is fanned and 
screened to remove dust, stubble, seeds, and other foreign material.
The rice then proceeds into the initial and most fundamental operation, 
which is the shelling of the rice between stones to remove the hulls. 
This operation requires considerable care, as the kernels in each lot of 
rioe may require different speed and pressure in order to avoid undue
M. Reid, The American Rice Industry, mimeographed address 
at Lafayette, Louisiana, October 17# 193o. See also Abstracts and 
References on the Handling. Grading, and Uses of Rioe, United States 
Department of Agriculture, o£. cit.
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breakage* The product out-turned Is brown rice retaining the g e m  and 
all of the seven br&n layers* The hulls are immediately separated out 
and disposed of as fuel; sold at a low price for by-product uses, or 
dumped and burned in the vicinity as cheaply as possible*
Brown rice is distributed on a limited seal®, but has no general 
demand nor is its keeping quality very good, as it becomes rancid. The 
brown rice is therefore processed in order to scour the g e m  and layers 
of bran from the rice* Again, breakage of the kernels from speed and 
pressure must be avoided, although a certain amount of breakage is in­
evitable. After the rice has been scoured practically free from bran, 
it is brushed to remove the remaining traces of bran end to polish the 
kernel* The final product is the clean white rice, with a by-product of 
rice polish also resulting from this operation* As a last step, the rice 
often receives a coating of glucose and talc* The coating material plus 
the friction process produces a bright luster on the kernels*
The rice products, after the milling process, include whole ker­
nels, broken kernels, bran, polish, and hulls* Regardless of the care 
and efficiency in milling there is always a considerable percentage of 
grains broken, particularly the damaged kernels* This broken rice is 
separated according to size into three classes. The largest of the 
broken particles are called second head rice; the next largest particles, 
screenings rice; arc! the smallest particles, brewers rice. All of these 
broken rices are completely milled to remove germs and bran, but are con­
sidered inferior to head rice because of appearance, small particles, 
and numerous damaged kernels* At regular stages in the regular milling 
process the rice is sifted, screened, and air-washed by fans and aspira-
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tors to separate the various products.
Hice can he prepared for human consumption with less complicated 
machinery by simple hulling devices which do not clean the grain 
thoroughly and break more kernels in the process. These "huller" mills 
clean the rough rice and run the grain through several "breaks" which 
shell the rice and rub off most of the bran. The rice is not polished 
or coated, and more broken rice results from this simple process, Huller 
mills require only a small investment, and operate in the rice area in a 
fashion similar to the familiar country grist mill, Rice is hulled on a 
toll basis for use by farm families, or is distributed and sold locally. 
Several large huller mills have become relatively efficient and distri­
bute their product widely throughout Louisiana.
Although mills differ somewhat in the amount of each of the vari­
ous products obtained from rough rice, in general about 68 per cent of 
the weight of rough rice is recovered in whole and broken rice, about JO 
per cent as by-products, and the remainder disappears as debris and in­
visible waste. According to figures prepared by W. M, Held, former 
Chairman of the Millers Committee of the Southern Rice Industry, the pro­
portion of each of the various products for the industry as a whole is 
approximately that shown in Table XXII*
In weight, milled rice products are only 68,5 per cent of the 
rough rice processed, but these products are 94.5 per cent of the total 
value. Head rice alone generally contributes about 83 per cent of the 
total value of the rice products, although the proportion may vary 
slightly according to fluctuations in the demand and price of by-products. 
Screenings are the second most important miUed rice product, with almost
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6 per cent of the total value.
Hy-products, with 30*5 per cent of the weight of rough rice, 
yield only 5*5 per cent of the value. Bran la the most important by* 
product, with 2.6 per cent of the total value* Hulls comprise 20 per 
cent of the volume of rough rice, but only 2.1 per cent of the value.
This value ie derived chiefly from their use as fuel in the rice mill, 
although they are sometimes sold as a source of cellulose or used for 
packing and filling material. The bran and polish are sold chiefly as 
stock feed, and poorer grades of brewers rice are frequently sold as 
chicken feed.
Marketing Clean Rio.
Most of the rice milled in the South is packed in 100 pound bags 
termed "pockets", and is distributed as bulk rice* The usual method of 
selling clean rice is through brokers direct to wholesalers in the con­
suming markets. A mill establishes its brokerage connections, and sends 
the broker a line of type samples designated by numbers or names. These 
types represent various qualities or mixtures available at the mill.
The broker canvasses the tr de in his area, submitting the list price 
per pocket and forwarding counter offers to the mill. The list prices 
are seldcrc obtained, since competitive bargaining dominates the whole­
sale market, ihen a sale is established and confirmed, the rice Is 
shipped on the delivery date under uniform sales terms, with a bank draft 
and bill of lading attached. According to testimony in rice hearings be­
fore the Interstate Comnerce Commission, between 70 and 80 per cent of
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Table XXII. Proportion of various products out-turned from rough rlc© 








Second head 3.5 4.0
Screenings 6.0 5.9
Brewers 2.0 1.8





Total by-products 30.5 5.5
Tfaste (trash, debris) 1.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: From data furnished by the Rice Millers Association.
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2the southern crop is distributed in this fashion* Export sales are like-
else handled through brokers, except that deliveries are commonly made on
a sight draft with the ocean bill of lading, or shipment may be made only
after receipt of a letter of credit certifying the funds available for
payment in the importer's bank*
Two large rice milling companies controlling large outputs of
clean rice maintain their own selling offices in large markets such as
3New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia* These companies, the Louisiana 
State Rice Milling Company and the Standard Rice Milling Company, have 
representatives canvassing the trade, and place their packaged brands of 
rice on the market* Consignment stocks are also shipped to principal 
markets by these large operators. The majority of Louisiana mills, how­
ever, rely altogether on brokerage connections* Generally the brokers 
are exclusive agents for one mill*
The type samples submitted are packed in blue boxes in order to 
emphasise the color of the rice, since whiteness is highly important*
The samples are assembled in a blue and white grading room at the mill* 
Varying proportions of head and broken rices are sometimes mixed to make 
the various samples* This practice of mixing rice has frequently led to 
charges that the mills put inferior rices on the market, and therefore 
depress rice prices* The practice, however, represents the attempt of 
the mills to make rice available at prices consuming markets will pay.
Sens markets demand high quality head rice, other markets demand any
Interstate Commerce Commission Docket Ho. 26430, at al., op. 
eit.. p. 1374.
3Ibid.. p. 1374 and pp. 211 ff.
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rlo* that has a low price* The preparation of various sample types by 
glaring ia an effort of the mills to satisfy the demand for various 
types, qualities, and prices*
During the 1940*41 season, 34 fully equipped plants ware engaged 
in milling riee in Louisiana*^* In addition, three large huller mills 
doing business on a broad scale were in operation* Five mills which were 
fully equipped for operations were idle, either shut down temporarily for 
repairs or out of business because of financial difficulties* Small 
huller mills also operated in most of the towns scattered throughout the 
rice area, numbering probably 20, but their operations and output are not 
significant except in producing dean riee for local use*
The location of the rice mills active in 1940*41 in Louisiana is 
shown on the accompanying map* Of the 34 mills, 26 were located within 
the southwest Louisiana rice producing area* Two mills were operating 
at New Iberia in the Teehe rice area, one at Baton Rouge and five at New 
Orleans* The Baton Rouge mill is closest to the Mississippi river rice 
area, although the New Orleans mills are also favorably situated in re* 
gard to this region*
Crowley is the principal rice milling point in the state, and in 
the nation as a whole* Ten mills were operating there in 1940*41, and 
another large mill wae temporarily Idle* The total capacity of the 10 
active mills, measured in barrels of rough rice milled per hour, was 
900 barrels, or 28*5 per cent of the total active capacity of 3,160
^Two additional large mills, one newly constructed, began oper* 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table XXXII* Number of active mills and their milling capacity by milling 





Per cent of 
total capacity
Crowley 10 900 23.5
Sew Orleans 5 550 17.4
Kaplan 3 340 10.8
Lake Charles 2 320 10.1
Rayne 2 250 7.9
Abbeville 1 150 4.7
Jennings 1 125 4*0
Mermentau 2 120 3*8
Gueydan 1 90 2*9
Mew Iberia 2 85 2.7
Baton Rouge 1 80 2.5
Lake Arthur 1 50 1.6
Sunice 1 40 1.3
Sstherwood 1 30 0.9
Hayes 1 .SSL. 0.9
All mills 34 3,160 100.0
*&eludes three large holler mills processing and distributing rice in 
intranstate trade* Three important mills did not operate during 1940-41, 
and one new mill was constructed during the summer of 1941*
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barrels per hour in Louisiana* New Orleans is the second most important 
milling center, with live mills and a capacity in 1940-41 of 550 barrels 
per hour, or 17*4 per cent of the total capacity. Together these two 
oities had 45*9 per cent of the milling capacity active in 1940-41,
The most important of the other milling points and their capaci­
ties in 1940-41 were Kaplan, 340 barrels per hour, Lake Charles, 320 
barrels; and Bayne, 250 barrels. The total of these capacities added to 
Crowley and New Orleans centered 75 per cent of the milling capacity of 
the state in five cities, of which four are in the rice area and one out­
side at New Orleans, The remaining 25 per cent of capacity was scattered 
among ten different milling points, eight witliin the southwest area and 
two at farther removed towns.
The total of 3,160 barrels per hour in the 34 large mills, which 
excludes large huller mills, small huller mills, and idle mills, demon­
strates a large excess capacity existing in the rice milling industry.
The 34 mills, operating only 3 hours a day, could mill a 5,000,000 barrel 
Louisiana rice crop in 198 days, or about seven months. Since the mills 
ordinarily work longer hours or double shifts during the harvest season 
and whenever the rice market is active, the effective capacity greatly
reduces this period during which all mills can operate on the Louisiana 
5crop.
This condition of excess capacity is highly important in studying
5This excess capacity is not peculiar to Louisiana, but is found 
also in Texas and Arkansas, Hall and Douglas, in Arkansas Bulletin No, 
355, Storage and Transportation of Arkansas Rice, estimate that the 
Arkansas mills could process the Arkansas crop in less than 100 24-hour 
days. Louisiana mills, on the 24-hour basis, could mill the Louisiana 
crop in less than 100 days.
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the economic situation surrounding rough rice marketing. Most mills at­
tempt to milX as large a volume as possible in order to reduce overhead 
costs, and competition In securing rough rice and in selling dean riee 
is very bitter. Louisiana mills also are anxious to secure rough rice 
from Arkansas, Texas, and California, and to distribute clean rice in 
territories dominated by other mills. This struggle for utilization of 
excess capacity tends to assure Louisiana farmers a competitive market 
for rough rice, and also leads to continuous litigation by Louisiana rice 
mills to secure more favorable rough and clean rice freight rates to en­
able them to utilise their capacities more effectively.
According to data compiled by the Agricultural Marketing Service, 
the large Louisiana rice mills receive and mill approximately 90 per cent 
of all rice grown in the state. During 1940-41, an even distribution of 
the statefs 5,900,000 barrel rice crop among the 34 mills would have meant 
that scc&ewh&t less than 3 per cent, or about 150,000 barrels of the avail­
able rough rice, would have passed through each mill. In practice, of 
course, the large mills secure a much larger proportion of the total rice 
silled. In some seasons a single large mill may process between five and 
ten per cent of the Louisiana crop.
An additional one per cent of the Louisiana rice crop is processed 
by "huller" mills, of which there were three large units and numerous 
small units operating in Louisiana in 1940-41* Only about two per cent of 
the Louisiana crop is received by Texas mills, and a very small quantity 
by Tennessee mills.
Total receipts of rough rice by all mills and hullers account for
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about 93 par cent of the Louisiana rice crop, with the remaining seven 
per cent used for feed and seed on the farm, or carried over for sals in 
the following crop years.
Physical Characteristica of Louisiana Rice Mills
The first rice mills in Louisiana were built in New Orleans during 
and shortly after the Civil War, when the river rice area was becoming im̂ * 
portent in rice production.^ Until the decade of 1900-1910, New Orleans 
was the principal rice milling center of the nation. 3/ 1900, a rice 
boom in southwest Louisiana caused rapid investment In rice mills as the 
profit to be realised from rice production on the prairies became evident. 
During this boom period, numerous rice mills wer« constructed, many of 
them developed by promoters inexperienced in the rice business. By 1910 
there were 35 to 40 mills in southwest Louisiana, most of them poorly fi-
7nanced and managed. Many went into bankruptcy soon after construction, 
creating considerable trouble among faimers who had subscribed to much of 
the stock. Large nurabera of these early mills have by now been dismantled, 
and practically every mill has gom. through frequent reorganisation.
For the United States as a whole, the construction of rice mills 
followed in this chronological orders first, in the Carolinati and Georgia; 
second, in New Orleans; third, at Lake Charles and Beaumont; fourth, in 
interior southwest Louisiana; fifth, in Texas and Arkansas; sixth, in




Table HIV. Milling capacities of 34 wills operating in Louisiana 
during 1940-41.
Capacity in Per cent of
barrels Number total total
nor hoar of mills capacity capacity
20- 40 9 310 9.8
41- 60 6 325 10.361- 00 2 150 4.7
81-100 6 560 17.7
101-120 0
121-140 4 505 16.0
1U-160 3 450 14.2
161-180 0
181-200 2 400 12.?
201-over a AjO 14.6
All milla 34 3,1^0 100.0
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Memphis| and finally, in California.8
eighteen of the 34 large active rice mills in Louisiana have been 
established or reorganized in the past ten years. In that period, 11 new 
■Ills have been built. The remaining mills were built principally be* 
tween 1910 and 1923# except for several mills whose plants date back to 
1396, Since 1930# only small mills have been built# with 30 to 30 barrels 
capacity. In addition# the expansion of small huller mills d.th capaci­
ties near 10 barrels an hour has been notable. These small mills have 
all been located within the southwest Louisiana producing area* The nuro- 
ber of active large mills and the number of mills at dew Orleans has been 
steadily diminishing.
The distribution of the capacities of 34 idee mills operating in 
1940-41 is shown in the table. Only a third of the mills had capacities 
greater than 100 barrels of rough rice per hour. About half of the total 
number fall between 20 and 60 barrels capacity# especially if the three 
large huller mills are included. The fact that small mills are most 
numerous# and that units built in the past 10 years have been generally 
«nan mills# indicates a decided trend toward smaller operating units in 
the rice milling industry. Several large mills have been dismantled at 
the same time mills were beginning operations.
In spite of this trend, however, a few large mills ar*> the domi­
nant influence in the Louisiana rice industry. The four largest mills 
have 27 per cent of the hourly capacity in the state, and the 11 largest
®Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No* 26430# et al.. p, 756.
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■ill* have 57 par cent of the total. The Louisiana State Rice Milling 
Company has five mills in Louisiana ranging in capacity from 125 to 250 
barrels an hour* The 825 barrel an hour combined capacity of these mills 
gave this single company control over 26 per cent of the active milling 
capacity in 1940-41.
Buying Rouffh Rice
The rice mills in Louisiana purchase rice from the growers through 
both salaried buyers and commission buyers, i&oh mill usually has one or 
mere salaried buyers paid on a year round salary basis. These salaried 
buyers make a practice of keeping in close touch with the rice growers and 
with rough rice stocks in their territory. During the fall and winter 
monthsj the buyers are active in purchasing riee. In late spring and 
summer, their duties are confined largely to keeping in touch with the new 
riee crop*
Most of the mills also purchase rough rice through commission 
buyers in order to reach rice outside the territory covered by the sala­
ried buyer or buyers. This is particularly true of mills located in the 
growing area, which depend principally on salaried buyers. Commission 
buyers are used only when rice is bought at a distance, and the buyers 
have no dose attachment to one individual mill. The New Orleans mills 
are exceptions, as four of the five mills there buy exclusively through 
commission buyers who are attached to the particular rill and buy very 
little for other mills• The fifth mill in Hew Orleans, however, buys 
through salaried buyers in Louisiana.
Commission buyers are generally paid six cents per barrel for
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rice bought for mills located in the rios growing area. The Now Orleans 
mills, however, pay eight cents per barrel commission. As mentioned, 
commission buyers for New Orleans mills depend principally on one mill 
for a livelihood, while the commission buyers for the southwestern 
Louisiana mills may buy for four or more mills.
In some of the small mills, the operator or manager may buy rough 
rice on occasion, Also, a buyer may use assistants to get in touch with 
a farmer and take samples for the buyer to cheek. This makes it diffi­
cult to establish any definite figures concerning the number of rough 
rice buyers operating in Louisiana for Louisiana rice mills. However,
there are likely about eighty salaried buyers operating in the rice area,
9as a general estimate. In addition, from thirty to forty commission 
buyers also buy rice in Louisiana for Louisiana mills. Finally, there 
are outlets for small lots of rough rice to local huller mills which 
maintain no regular buying connections.
The Louisiana State Rice Milling Company, operating five mills 
in Louisiana, combines its buying staff in Louisiana with its buying 
staff in Texas, Rice is bought and shipped where needed. As a result, 
its buying operations cover both states, and it is difficult to segre­
gate the number of buyers according to Louisiana.
Only the large mills with capacities of 150 barrels or more per 
hour buy in a wide enough territory to assign buyers to definite areas. 
For many buy***s, the Meraentau river forms a boundary dividing the
^The results of the survey are verified by testimony of Mr. 
Riekert In Interstate Commerce Commission Docket 26430, ©t* al. > >
pp. 807 ff.
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general areas of activity, Rico buyers in general do not buy in widely 
diverse areas, since they become familiar with certain regions and rice 
end are most proficient In buying within these areas. In fact, a buyer 
experiences difficulty in making an accurate yield estimate for rice 
from a growing area with which he Is not familiar.
All of the millers stated that they would buy rice in any size 
lot offered. However, the large operators with 150 barrel or more ca­
pacity per hour preferred large lots, and would ordinarily be willing to 
pay slightly higher prices to obtain large lots. This is only natural, 
since small lots require relatively more labor in buying and handling 
and also require mixing with other lots in order to satisfy sales re­
quirements* Ordinarily, the size of lots bought by mills in Louisiana 
appears to average 300 to $00 bags* Small mills uniformly reported 
that they would pay as much for small as large lots*
In purchasing local rice, Louisiana mills do not face serious 
competition from out-of-state mills. The freight-rate structure tends 
to keep Arkansas and Texas mills in their own locality. In addition, 
the milling quality of the Texas crop is considered higher than the 
Louisiana crop and Texas mills buy in Louisiana only if purchases are 
more difficult to make in Texas.
Rice «rn«» in southwest Louisiana receive practically all of 
their rough riee by truck. As a general rule, the millers contract 
with truckers for drayage from the warehouse, although several millers 
operate their own trucks. Hail receipts in the growing area are not 
great, except for mills operated by the Louisiana State Rice Milling 
Company, which often receive rice bought at a distance, as in Texas,
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by rail. Occasionally one of the other mills may receive a rail ship­
ment from a distant point, but most purchases are local and rail re­
ceipts for interior mills have become comparatively rare,
hills at New Orleans receive moat of their rough rice by rail, 
with also some barge movement for Arkansas rice. The relatively minor 
receipts of rioe by truck are principally for Mississippi river rice.
The Baton Rouge mill receives river rice by truck, but all other river 
riee moves to mills by rail.
Areas in Which Mills Buy
Louisiana rice mills located within the growing areas generally 
buy the bulk of their rough rice requirements in the area immediately 
surrounding the milling point. However, in order to secure desirable 
riee they may purchase at distances of 60 to 70 miles, which for most 
mills means that they will buy if necessary anywhere in the growing area. 
Rice mills east of the Mennentau river rarely buy at points west 
of Welsh and Elton, Apparently Lake Charles and Texas mill buyers have 
seme advantage in buying rice west of these points. The mills concen­
trated about Crowley and Kaplan buy principally in the immediate vi­
cinity, Of course, when rice supplies are unusually low in certain 
areas, as in 1940-41 as a consequence of the August, 1940 flood, mills 
may buy at greater distances than usual.
Normally, however, Louisiana rioe mills depend on local growers* 
This is not altogether true for such large organizations as the Louisiana 
State Rioe Milling Company and the New Orleans mills. The Louisiana
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State has a far-flung buying and milling organization, which operate® 
throughout Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas* Rioe is purchased in all 
states, and shipped to mills which are in the best position to handle 
it* Ordinarily the nearest mill processes the rice, but frequently cir­
cumstances may cause Texas rice to be shipped to a Louisiana mill*
The Baton Rouge mill and the five New Orleans mills buy rough 
rice In both Texas and Arkansas as well as in Louisiana* These mills are 
located outside the growing areas, and except for the small supplies of 
hiseissippi river rice nearby, oust purchase all rice at a distance* As 
a result, substantial quantities of Texas and Arkansas rice are milled 
in Sew Orleans* Rice moves from Arkansas partly by barge and must be 
sacked, but much of it moves in bulk in freight cars*
Examination of Rough Ripe
Buyers for all mills in Louisiana follow the practice of obtain­
ing a cup weight and rubbing the sample of rough lice in order to esti­
mate its value. In addition, seven mills use moisture testing devices, 
and three mills use the Smith shelling device in order to estimate the 
milling yield. An additional ten mills reported that their buyers oc­
casionally checked their estimates of moisture, grade, and milling yields 
by taking a sample to the federal-state rice grading office for a mois­
ture test and yield test on the Smith shelling device. Certificates are 
not given on these tests, most frequently made at the beginning of a new 
crop harvest, since the grading offices consider these checks as a ser­
vice to the industry and no charges are made.
The mills using the Smith shelling device reported great satis-
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faction from its use, saying that it enabled them to estimate a lot of 
rough rice more accurately. However, all mill operators, even those 
whose buyers never checked their estimates with government grades, stated 
that their buyers1 estimates of milling yields and moisture were very ac­
curate, and that estimated yields were seldom more than two pounds off 
actual milling results. Occasionally lots of unusual rice, from a strange 
growing area or resulting from unusual growing conditions, may confuse a 
buyer, and in these cases a standardized government grade check is most 
useful.
The smaller a mill, the more It tends to buy on an unchecked 
buyer's sample of rice, with a great amount of personal judgment entering 
into the evaluation. All mills trust the buyer's estimates to a great 
extent, although some ndlls require that a head buyer inspect all samples 
at the mill before a lot is purchased. Naturally, the larger mills and 
buying organizations lack personal relationship, and find that government 
grades and grading devices are more essential in order to judge the buyer's 
accuracy.
Making Payment for Rice
Rough rice is customarily bought on a cash basis, f.o.b. ware­
house or storage point. If rice is purchased direct from a farmer, the 
buyer draws a draft on the rice mill immediately after the rice is 
graded and weighed. This draft is payable to the farmer, or, if there 
is a lien on the crop, jointly to the farmer and the lien holder. For 
rice purchased at a bonded warehouse in which bids are made through 
the warehouseman, the draft is usually made payable to the warehouseman,
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who deducts storage charges and distributes the proceeds to the fanner 
and lien holder.
Most mills report that they are always able to take up rice irrt- 
mediately after purchase and seldom leave rice in country warehouses and 
pay storage. However, a few mills reported occasional storage charges at 
country warehouses because of lack of storage capacity at the mill.
In the early part of the season a considerable volume of rough 
riee is purchased with delivery at the mill by the farmer. Several mills 
reported they made an allowance to the farmer for drayagc when buying the 
lice on this basis, but other mills reported that competition forced them 
to buy rioe according to quality on the same basis regardless of delivery 
point. Since mill delivery of rice is most prevalent at isolated milling 
points where there is only one mill, it is difficult to evaluate this 
situation. It appears that any price bid on rice must ordinarily consider 
drayage cost to the mill. As a result, drayage allowances may be made for 
mi'll delivery. A few mills reported that they occasionally bought a lot 
of rice at the farm and allowed the farmer to earn the drayage they ordi­
narily would pay to commercial truck operators *
Several mills with large storage capacities store rice for the 
farmers and waive storage and insurance charges when the mill purchases 
the rice. The Louisiana State Milling Company, with federal bonded ware­
houses at its five milling points and at three other centers in Louisiana, 
stores a large volume of rough rice. Mills at Kaplan and Crowley also 
follow this practice. The farmer has the privilege of withdrawing his 
rioe from these warehouses upon payment of the storage charges if he wishes
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to a*ll to another mill* In practice, however, the rice is invariably 
sold to the storing mill. To what extent the storage charges are de­
ducted when a lot of rice is bought is impossible to say. The mills re­
port that they will pay just as much for a lot of rice in their ware­
house as in another, maintaining that they ignore the fact that they waive 
storage. To some extent this is doubtless true, since the mill noist pay 
drayage on distant rice which partially replaces the waived storage charge 
in its own warehouse, and idle warehouse space may as well be utilized, 
nevertheless, it appears that the practice of mill storage, and the 
waiving of storage charges, puts a mill in a position where it can fre­
quently use its strong bargaining power to good advantage.
About a third of the mills operating in Louisiana store large 
quantities of rough riee for farmers. The remaining mills object to the 
practice, since it ordinarily ties up a considerable volume of rice on 
which they cannot bid successfully. In fact, mills rarely will attempt 
to place a bid on rice stored in the warehouse of a competing mill.
Distribution of Bice Billing Costs
Data concerning the costs of rice milling are difficult to se­
cure. The industry is highly competitive, and the millers have had un­
pleasant experiences with cost investigations under the government 
marketing agreement which collapsed in 1935. As a result, a comparison 
of cost data between various mills is impossible to present.
When questioned as to their usual cost of milling a barrel of 
rice, practically all large millers replied that it bordered on 60 cents 
plus the value of by-products, for each barrel of rough rioe processed.
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Swill will* tended to give lower cost estimates, principally because 
costs of supervision and labor were lower* Huller mills usually had 
very low costs, estimated at around 40 cents a barrel. These small 
sills do not mill the rice thoroughly, have little investment in ma­
chinery, and overhead costs are low since the huller mill is usually a 
side line to another business enterprise.
In order to analyse the normal distribution of milling costs, 
complete cost data were secured from one mill which in capacity, lo­
cation, efficiency, and age Is rather typical of mills in southwest 
Louisiana* This mill has a capacity of 60 barrels of rough rice per 
hour, has efficient management, and has been operating since 1915* Its 
cost distribution, compared with confidential reports from other mills, 
appeared typical, except for the absence of depreciation* The mill in­
vestment had been fully depreciated and repairs were the only capital 
costs shown on the books* This situation is frequently found in the 
older rice mills*
This pdll processed 125,363 barrels of rough rice between August 
1# 1939 and July 31, 1940* Its total direct and indirect costs for that 
year were £73,997.12, or 59 cents per barrel. Direct milling costs ac­
counted for 41*4 per cent of the 59 cents, and overhead and selling costs 
for 58.6 per cent* The importance of the indirect coats is particularly 
significant in evaluating the situation regarding excess capacity and 
small huller «dll competition in the rioe milling industry.
Labor, with 20*9 per cent of the total costs, was the most impor­
tant, of *11 direct and indirect costs* dacks and twine for clean rioe 
was the second most important direct cost, with an average of seven cents
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a barrel, or 11.7 per cent of the total cost* All other direct costs 
were vexy small, particularly those for operating the plant*
The principal indirect costs were for selling, since brokerage
10and a amissions were 19*1 per cent of all costs* Other important in­
direct costs were salaries, with 12*3 per cent of the total, and inter­
est and discount, with 10*6 per cent of the total* Altogether, direct 
costs for labor and sacks, and indirect costs for brokerage, salaries, 
and interest, accounted for 44 cents of the $9 cents in total costs*
For mill s charging depreciation, the value of by-products is 
estimated to cover depreciation charges, so that the usual cost estimate 
of 60 cents plus the value of by-products appears well described by the 
cost data of this mill.
The 125,363 barrels of rough rice produced a total value of riee 
products of *4 64,4 37.71, or $3.70 a barrel. Clean rioe sales, including 
head rice, second heads, screenings, and brewers rice, accounted for 94 
per cent of this amount, and bran sales made up most of the remainder* 
Total costs per barrel vrere only 16 per cent of the total value of the 
rice products sold, leaving 84 per cent, or $3*11 per barrel, available 
to the mill for the purchase of rough rice and for profits.^-
The value of the rough rice is so large a proportion of the 
value of the final rice products that the success of the mill in obtaih-
^°Members of the Rice Jlillers Association pay uniform brokerage 
fees of 8 cents per 100 pounds of head rice, 5 cents per 100 pounds for 
screenings and brewer1 s rice, and 50 cents per ton for bran and polish.
^This estimate is remarkably close to the rough and clean rice 
price relationship on the Hew Orleans wholesale market, as described in 
Chapter II*
157
Table XXV. D is tr ib u tio n  o f Income and costs for milling 12$, 363 barrels 
o f rough r ic e  in a medium capacity mill In Louisiana, year 




Per cent of 
total costs ft Income
Income:
Sales of clean rice 436,449.70 3.48149 94.0
Sales of bran 24,549.17 .19582 5.3Sales of chicken feed 15.30
Sales of polish ,3,423.54 .03424 0.7Total income 464,437.71 3.70474 J6 0.O
Direct milling costs:
Labor 15,430.22 .12308 20.9Mill supplies 2,443.94 .01949 3.3Fuel-engine 324.19 .00259 0.4light ft fuel-mill 1 8 4 .0 1 .00147 0 .2
Car ft travel expense 283.37 .00226 0.4
Repairs (power plant) 563.96 .00450 0 .6
Sacks ft twine (net) 8,651.65 .06901 11.7Glucose ft talc (net) ?4 2 L U L . *921,73. MTotal direct afg. costs 30,605.49 .24413 41.4
Overhead ft selling costs:
Rice Millers Association 1,806.05 •01441 2.4
Salaries 9,075.00 .07239 12.3
Office supplies 608.91 .00486 0 .8
Audit ft attorney fees 2 7 1 .0 0 .00216 0.4
Insurance 3,063.93 .02444 4.1
Old age ft Unemployment In. 1,324.14 .01056 1 .8
Advertising 100 .50 .00080 0 .1
Taxes ft licenses 1,865.92 .01489 2.5
Uhse. supplies ft repairs 444.16 .00354 o .6
Feed stamps 1 9 2 .2 2 .00153 0 .3
Telephone ft telegraph 1,890.52 .01508 2 .6
Interest ft discount 7,892.99 .06296 1 0 .6
Stamps 657.90 .00525 0 .9
Bad debts 83.44 .00067 0 .1
Brokerage ft commissions 14.114,95 .. .11259 19.1
43,391.63 . 346x3 58.6
Total costs 73.997.12 .59026 100.0
Available for rough rice ft
profits 390,440.59 3.1144S 34.1 of clean
.. - ..-gfilflff
la g  a p r o f it  u s u a lly  re s ts  on i t s  purchasing and s e llin g  e ffic ie n c y  
ra th e r  than  on i t s  K il l in g  e ffic ie n c y . S ince a s lig h t d e c lin e  in  r ic e  
p ric e  q u ic k ly  w ipes out any p r o f it  m argin a v a ila b le  on rough r ic e  in  
sto ck, th e  accum ulation o f  an in ven to ry  o f e ith e r  rough o r c lean  r ic e  is  
a h ig h ly  s p e cu la tive  o p e ra tio n . When th e re  is  a r is in g  tre n d  in  th e  
m arket, most m ills  b u ild  up as la rg e  an in ven to ry  o f rough r ic e  as possi­
b le , being lim ite d  on ly  by storage space and fin a n c ia l c a p a c ity . On a 
d e c lin in g  m arket, th e  m ills  operate on a hand-to-m outh bas is  and avo id  
th e  accum ulation o f r ic e  stocks, buying ahead o n ly  a t a s u b s ta n tia l d is ­
count under norm al c lean  ric e -ro u g h  r ic e  p ric e  re la tio n s h ip s .
The unusual im portance o f buying and s e llin g  operations in  th e  
r ic e  m illin g  in d u s try  probably accounts to  a considerable ex ten t fo r  
th e  absence o f te c h n o lo g ic a l improvement in  th e  processing and handling  
o f r ic e . M ille rs  a re  p r im a rily  occupied w ith  m arketing problem s, and 
processing problems rece ive  secondary co n s id era tio n . M illin g  m achinery 
has changed l i t t l e  in  a q u a rte r o f a cen tu ry , except fo r  m inor improve­
m ents. Just re c e n tly  a f i r s t  m ajor change was made in  the s u b s titu tio n  
o f a  sm all r o l le r  device fo r  th e  t r a d it io n a l stone in  s h e llin g  rough
r ic e , which is  rep o rted  to  y ie ld  a s u b s ta n tia lly  g re a te r o u ttu rn  o f
12whole head r ic e  p e r b a rre l*  Although th e  m illin g  process is  not un­
d u ly  complex, a d d itio n a l improvements could undoubtedly Increase m illin g  
e ffic ie n c y  and reduce costs .
new mill built at &inice, Louisiana, in th e  summer of 1941, 
w ith  a l l  modern machinery available, has only this machine as a signi­
ficant change from machinery used in the old mills.
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Inventory Problems of Rice Kills
Of 25 mill operators expressing an opinion on inventory policy, 
15 stated that under normal market conditions they would try to keep be­
tween seven to fifteen days /Billing requirement on hand in rough rice 
stocks. On a declining market, however, mills may shut down completely 
and there may be practically no market at all for a farmer wishing to 
sell rough rice. The mill operators are constantly trying to outguess 
the market trend. As a result, the rough rice market goes through peri­
ods of extreme activity and extreme dullness.
Bice mills occasionally sell rice "short,” that is, they make 
sales of clean rice for future delivery before they have purchased rough 
rice to cover the sale. This highly speculative practice is avoided by 
conservative operators, but is nevertheless an important factor in mill 
operation, Naturally, short sales are most prevalent when the rough 
rice market is declining. Humors of short sales at low prices are a 
depressing influence in the rice market, and the farmers generally feel 
that millers use this device intentionally to force prices down. As a 
matter of fact, there is nothing inherently damaging to fanners if a 
mill takes a short position in the rice market, since similar inventory 
speculation is involved when a mill is long on rice stocks. The associ­
ation of short sales with a declining market, however, has earned a bad 
reputation for such operations in the rice trade.
The difficult inventory problems lead to frequent charges of 
collusion between mills in buying policies, to frequent disputes between
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farmers and millers when mills try to escape inventory losses on a de­
clining market, and to attempts to eliminate inventory losses by stabi­
lisation operations in the rice market. In recant years, two court 
eases have risen which illustrate some of the difficulties faced by rough 
rice growers in the unstable market resulting from intermittent attempts 
at monopoly and from the hazardous nature of mill rice inventories.
These cases, one in Texas and one in Louisiana, have been decided in 
favor of the rice growers.
In July, 1940, the state of Texas filed suit against eleven Texas 
rice mills, alleging that the mills were guilty of violations of the law 
of Texas against trusts, monopolies and restraints of trade. The state 
charged that the rough rice buyers of the various mills met regularly to 
determine the prices they would bid on lots of rice at the various ware­
house sales, that they determined which buyer was to submit the highest 
bid, that they would boycott and refuse to buy certain lots of rice, and 
that they indulged in various similar practices in order to restrain com­
petition, These practices included, in general, the allocation of rice 
to various and control of the price in the interests of the mills.
A group known as the Rough Rice Buyers Club was alleged to meet regular­
ly in Houston for purposes of restraining competition.
This case did not cane to trial, but was settled by a judgment 
rendered by the court without admission by the defendants of the vio­
lations charged in the petition of the state of Texas. In the judgment, 
the state recovered penalties and costs of $15,000 from the mills, and 
the mills were permanently enjoined from all practices tending to re-
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• t r a in  com petition  In  th e  purohase of rough r ic e , including such activi­
t ie s  as th e  Rough R ice Buyers Club • ̂
Another oase o f p a r t ic u la r  s ig n ific a n c e  concerns & p ra c tic e  f r e ­
q u en tly  condemned by r ic e  grow ers. A t tim es a m il l  purchases a lo t  o f 
r ic e  and previous to  d e liv e ry  o f a l l  the  s ice  th e  m arket p ric e  d ec lin es  
sh arp ly . In  such eases, a m il l  fin d s  i t  advantageous to  invoke i t s  r ig h t  
to  re je c t  r ic e  a t th e  agreed p ric e  i f  th e  r ic e  f a i ls  to  equal the sample 
on which th e  r ic e  was purchased. Since th e re  is  no d e f in ite  system o f 
grading rough r ic e  in  gen eral use, a m il l  can ta k e  advantage o f the  
grower in  case o f a m arket d e c lin e  and re je c t a la rg e  p o rtio n  o f th e  r ic e  
as fa il in g  to  meet th e  sam ple. O rd in a rily  th is  re je c te d  r ic e  is  then  
purchased a t a d isco u n t.
On September IB, 193&, the Standard Rice Company mill at Crowley 
purchased a lot of rice then being threshed by a member of the American 
Rice Growers Cooperative Association. The agreed price was &4.0& a 
barrel, not to exceed 1,100 sacks of rice with an option to limit the 
quantity to 1,000 sacks. After only 375 sacks of rice was threshed and 
delivered, the rice market started to decline. The mill thereupon re­
jected the remaining 629 sacks as inferior to the sample, and refused 
to accept the rice except at a discount. In November, the rice was sold 
by the cooperative association to another rice mill for $3•10 a barrel, 
and the association and the grower brought suit to recover $792.89, the 
difference in price plus the additional costs of storage.
^ S ta te  o f Texas v s . Beaumont Rice M ills , et al. No. 62,431, in 
th e  D is t r ic t  Court o f T ra v is  County, Texas, 53rd Judicial D is t r ic t .
Agreed judgment on July 26, 1940*
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The argument in  th is  case d ir e c t ly  in vo lved  the problem  o f rough 
r ic e  g rad ing* The coo p erative  in s is te d  th a t th e  c e r t if ic a te  grade, based 
on fe d e ra l standards, in d ic a te d  th a t th e  r ic e  was equal to  th e  sample and 
th a t th e  m il l 's  re je c tio n  was sim ply an avoidance o f th e  m arket lo ss *
The m i l l  contended th a t th e  eup-w eight and rubbing system o f i t s  own 
buyers should be accepted above th e  c e r t if ic a te ,  and th a t th e  r ic e  was 
in fe r io r *
The low er co u rt decided in  fa v o r o f th e  growers* An appeal co u rt 
refused  to  decide th e  case on th e  issue o f th e  cooperative grade versus  
th e  s i l l  g rad e , but looked in to  th e  c lean  r ic e  y ie ld  o f th e  m il l  buying 
th e  re je c te d  r ic e  as compared to  th e  y ie ld  e a r l ie r  obtained  by th e  defen­
dant m ill*  F ind ing  th a t th e  y ie ld s  were e s s e n tia lly  th e  same, th e  court 
decided in  fa v o r o f th e  g ro w e r*^
Both o f these decisions have been acclaim ed as m ajor v ic to r ie s  
fo r  l ic e  grow ers, as th ey  e s ta b lis h  le g a l precedents fo r  th e  removal o f 
v ic io u s  p ra c tic e s  in  th e  m arketing o f rough r ic e *  The p r in c ip a l issue  
in  both cases re s u lte d  from  th e  dominant p o s itio n  o f th e  m ills  in  com­
p a ra tiv e  b arg a in in g  s tren g th * On a d e c lin in g  o r weak r ic e  m arket, the  
fa c t th a t th e  m ills  c o n tro l the grading p ra c tic e  and th a t th e  r ic e  
buyers u s u a lly  are  in tim a te ly  acquainted w ith  each o th e r, makes p o ss ib le  
a l l  so rts  o f devices to  in s u re  th e  m il l  the  best o f any barg a in *
When th e  r ic e  m arket is  strong o r advancing th e  c o n tro l o f th e
^ N e ls o n  Thomas and American R ice Growers Cooperative Associ­
a tio n , In co rp o ra ted , versus Standard R ice Company, In co rp o rated ,
F ifte e n th  J u d ic ia l Court fo r  th e  P arish  o f A cadia, S ta te  o f Lou isiana*
Decided March, 1940,
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mills over buying is relatively insignificant. At such times, the atti­
tude of the growers and their reluctance to sell puts them in a dominant 
position. At the same time, sharp competition among mills assures the 
grower the full value of his rice. In all situations, however, actual or 
rumored changes in market trends cause violent, although often temporary, 
reversals in the dominant bargaining position of either growers or millers.
Failure of a Rice Futures Market
When rice production was first becoming established along the 
Mississippi liver the principal rice market was New Orleans, the central 
milling point. Until the decade after the World War, New Orleans was re­
garded as the markst center for rough and clean rice. Rice was frequent­
ly consigned by growers to commission sellers in New Orleans, who dis­
posed of the rice to the local mills. This practice was similar to that 
now prevalent in the terminal and mill markets for wheat and other grains. 
As the center of rice milling shifted to the southwest producing area, 
however, the New Orleans market gradually lost its dominant position.
The rough rice commission men were displaced by mill buyers dealing di­
rectly with the farmers.
The value of a central market as a stabilising influences has been 
generally recognized in the rice trade, as rice mills always have been 
eager to avoid speculation in rice inventories. Such a central market is 
most useful when organized futures dealing is practiced In order to per­
mit hedging. Since the rice trade had experienced violent price fluctu­
ations after the i/orld v/ar, the Rice Millers Association began agitation 
for the establishment of organized spot and future trading in both rough
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and clean rice at New Orleans,
On November 5, 1923, the New Orleans Rice Clearing Association, 
Incorporated, opened a Rice Futures Market under the auspices of the 
Louisiana Sugar and Rio© Exchange, where spot trading was already 
practiced*^ This market, sponsored by the Rice Millers Association, 
had for its avowed purposes the stabilisation of the rice industry, the 
provision of hedges for both growers and millers, the provision of a 
market for purchase of future rough and clean rice requirements, and the 
attraction of speculators to carry the marketing risks* Considerable 
stress was placed on the third purpose, that of providing an organized 
market for purchasing future requirements* In the rice trade, sales of 
clean rice are occasionally made for future delivery, but such agree­
ments cause considerable litigation when either the buyer or seller
16fails to deliver according to commitments*
The published rules of the exchange, 47 in number, provided the 
usual details regulating future trading on a commodity exchange* The 
alee of rough rice contracts was 1,440 bushels (400 bbls*) of Choice or 
Fancy Blue Rose, while clean rice contracts were 40,000 pounds (400 
pockets) of Choice or Fancy Blue Rose clean rice* The contracts speci­
fied rcij muni delivery requirements and discounts for lower grade de­
liveries* Contracts could b© delivered on five days notice in quanti­
ties not lese than a half contract at one time. Trading was conducted 
in the 12 calendar months in units of 1/100 cent per pound of rice*
^Klce Journal* November, 1923# 
^^Rioe Journal* March, 1926.
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Two calls ware oade each trading day, and regulations were prescribed 
for brokerage fees, membership requirements, and similar details.17 
Cash margins required were 1200 a contract, or 50 cents per pocket of 
clean rice or barrel of rough rice. All deliveries on contracts were 
handled through the clearing association.
This market was greeted with enthusiasm, but futures trading 
never assumed an important position in the rice trade. Although there 
is no written record of its failure, various weaknesses are generally 
recognised by men who were familiar with the market during the time of 
its operation. Trading in rough rice futures was the weakest element.
New Orleans was not a central market for rough rice, mills dealt directly 
with the farmers, no objective grades were generally accepted for rough 
rice, and rough rice is extremely variable in quality. Since the of­
ficial spot market itself was not important to the trade, there was lit­
tle possibility for wide trading in rough rice futures.
In the clean rice market, similar difficulties were encountered. 
Deliveries on clean rice could be highly variable in quality, and arbi­
tration was difficult and unsatisfactory. Buying for future delivery 
did not appear extensive enough to support any volume of trading. For 
hedging purposes, the volume of trading was too small and the mills too 
few to carry the weight of extensive hedging operations. Finally, specu­
lators were not attracted into the rice market, and such trading as oc- 
cured was altogether among rice millers and clean rice buyers.
17B1qs Journal. November, 1923.
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For several years, an effort was made to maintain daily quotations 
on rough and clean rice, both spot and in twelve future months, at the 
l̂ uiaiana Sugar and Rice Exchange.^* Gradually, since these quotations 
would remain nominal for days and even weeks at a time, interest in sup­
port of the market lagged. Trading, never large, dropped to practically 
nothing because of the variability in quality of rice delivered, while 
uncertainty concerning the liquidity of the market effectively prevented 
hedging operations. Obviously, a mill could not relieve itself of a 
speculative risk in a non-liquid market where buyers and sellers might 
not be available when necessary.
As a result of this loss of interest, the futures market gradu­
ally passed out of existence, and all pretense of operation ceased in 
1927. Its failure, according to T. B. iise, official of the Rice Millers 
Association, could be ascribed to the fact that "the industry is too 
narrow to maintain a successful future board.
Since that date, the rice industry has made a few attempts to 
operate a central market, but factors resulting in the failure of 
futures trading in the 1920-1930 decade apparently still exist today.
In 1928, plans were discussed for a rice market at Crowley, where daily
20market reports on rough and clean rice might be assembled and distributed. 
Apparently the direct nature of trading, and the problem of variability 
in both rough and clean rice, however, discouraged this effort for the
l^See financial pages of Times-Picayune, November 1923 to 1927*
^Rice Journal. June, 1928.
^QRice Journal. August, 1928.
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collection and dissemination of official market information. At present 
dean rice quotations are available at the New Orleans Board of Trade 
from brokers and mills in that city, based on actual sales, but when the 
market la inactive these quotations are wholely nominal. Hough lice 
quotations are always entirely unofficial, being assembled from scattered 
reports as to actual sales taking place in the rice area,
location of Rice Mills
Since efficiency in purchasing rough rice and in selling clean 
rise are the two principal factors influencing the successful operation 
of a rice mill, location in regard to freight rate structure is of vital 
Importance, With intense competition in marketing clean rice, any dis­
advantage in shipping costs must be absorbed by the mill or the high 
rate will force the mill out of the markets* Although dean rice is
ordinarily sold in Louisiana f*o*b, mill, a guaranteed freight rate is
21quoted in order to give the buyer a definite delivered price*
Rice mills are located in the interior Louisiana-Texas producing 
area, in the Arkansas area, in California, and outside the producing 
area at Memphis, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans* The latter three milling 
points are in Southern territory where rate structures are lower than 
those in Arkansas and the Louisiana-Texas interior, which are in South­
western territory* However, the river mills originate their rough ripe 
in Southwestern territory, and have the disadvantage of a long rough
2XInt«rstate Commerce Commission Docket No* 26430, si. &!•, 
qp* sit •, p* 1463.
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r ic e  h au l* In  a d d itio n , occasional California competition, and the us© 
of w a te p -ra il ra te s  from Gulf ports, results in a bitter struggle for 
shipping advantages. At recent hearings on freight rates for rice, the 
fact was emphasised that "rice is perhaps one of the most litigated com-
V
sodities with which the Interstate Commerce Commission has been called 
22upon to deal,w Bach mill argues that it should receive the benefit of
its location, but that in addition it should be enabled to ship competi-
23
t iv e ly  against other mills to all markets. In this situation, the 
mills are not protesting the level of rates as such, but are fighting 
each other for preferential treatment in a competitive struggle,2^
The s p e c ific  problems brought before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission have usually dealt with the efforts of Mew Orleans, Baton 
Rouge, and Memphis mills to secure rates on inbound rough rice that would 
permit them to  reach markets with clean rice on just as advantageous a 
basis as the through rate on clean rice from mills in the producing area; 
w ith  the e ffo r ts  of Louisiana and Texas mills to secure clean rice rates 
that would remove location advantages of Arkansas and Memphis mills in 
reaching interior markets in the northern states; vdlth attempts of Mm 
Orleans mills to secure rough rice rates that would enable them to buy 
r ic e  in all four producing states, including California; and with com­
plex rate situations involving all of the factors plus the effects of
“ ibid., p. 579.
23Ib ld .. p. 654.
^♦Testimony of millers was to the effect that the mills were not 
fighting the carriers, but each other* Ibid., p, 6*
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truck and water rates.^
Transit arrangements are available on rough rice originating in 
Louisiana and Texas, which permits rice to move from the point of origin 
of the rough rice to its final destination at the clean rice rate, 
stopping in transit for milling* This enables interior Louisiana mills 
to buy rice without suffering disadvantage in location if all movement is 
by rail. Since most rough rice is now hauled to the mill by truck, this 
privilege has lost much of its advantage. Although New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge also have transit privileges, the differential rate structure be­
tween territories is such that transit is more costly than payment of the 
regular rough rice rate inbound and clean rice rate outbound.
In the most important rice rate case of recent years, all the com­
plaints of the mills were expressed in an extensive transcript of testi-
26mony before the Interstate Commerce Commission* The southern mills 
attacked the reasonableness of clean rice rates as compared to California 
rates, Louisiana mills attacked the rough rice rates from Arkansas into 
Louisiana, and milling in transit and rates into principal consuming
^American Rice Milling Company, et al.. versus Abilene Southern 
Railway Company, et al., Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26618; 
Memphis Rice Mill versus Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad Company, ejt al*. 
Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26527$ New Orleans Joint Traffic 
Bureau versus Akrapee and Western Railway Company, et al*, Interstate Com­
merce Commission Docket No. 2646O; Beaumont Chamber of Commerce, eb al., 
versus Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad Company, et al,, Interstate Commerce 
Commission Docket No. 2663#> Arkansas Rice Traffic Bureau versus Aberdeen 
and Rockfish Railroad Company, at al., Docket No. 26430.
26Interstate Commerce Commission, Hearings on Dockets No. 26530* 
2661B, 26460, 26527, and 26430, in 1934 and 1935, previously referred to 
as Docket No. 26430, et al. An intensive study of rate problems based on 
these hearings has been made by T. W. Douglas, Freight rcates on Rice. 
University of Pennsylvania, (Privately printed Ph. D. dissertation.) 
Philadelphia, 1939*
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territories were attacked and defended according to the interest of each
group of millers, kills in general wanted rough rice rates that would
keep other milts out of their local producing area but which would enable
then to buy all over the producing belt, and clean rice rates that would
preserve their advantages and yet enable them to compete in all consuming
centers. Farmer groups were interested in a rough rice rate structure
that would pemit outside mills to buy in their area, but would prevent
local mills from buying outside the area. The decision settling this
dispute made few changes in the rate structure, and obviously could not
27be satisfactory to all groups involved.
At the present time, New Orleans mills have a relationship of 
rough rice rates to dean rice rates expressed by the ratio of 17.5 to 
27*5* This gives a relationship of rough rice rates to clean rice rates 
of approximately 64 per cent. Considering that the clean rice yield, by 
weight, is approximately 68 per cent of the rough rice, this relation­
ship appears to give the millers located nearer the consuming market a 
28slight advantage. This advantage cannot be altogether offset by the 
lower cost of truck receipts at the interior mills, since a great pro­
portion of Louisiana rice is sold in the Southeast and thus moves in the 
same direction as New Orleans.
At interior points in the United States, the Arkansas mills have 
an advantage in marketing clean rice because of the rail rate structure*
^Interstate Commerce Commission, Docket No. 26430* ®t al*. 
decided November 9, 1936#
^Douglas, ojo# clt. * pp. 102-103.
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At point* on tho South Atlantic coast, however, Louisiana and Texas mills 
have a distinct advantage because of water transportation. This latter 
fact also accounts for the greater Importance of the export market to 
port mills, Hie Interstate Commerce Commission has in general left these 
competitive advantages as established,
A recent case in which Louisiana mills attempted to improve their 
purchasing advantage for rough rice was brought before the Interstate Com­
merce Commission in 1941* In this case, Louisiana rice mills, particular­
ly those at New Orleans, attempted to secure rates on rough rice from 
California that would permit them to buy and mill California rough rice.^ 
This case, obviously, was supported by Louisiana and Texas millers, as 
any enlargement of rough rice buying territory would be advantageous to 
the millers. More competition in the California rough rice market would 
also be an advantage for the independent growers of California, where 
price has long been under rigid control of a grower-stiller organisation* 
Principal opposition to the reduction came from the California millers 
and the Louisiana-Texas growers, who dislike the prospect of more compe­
tition in buying and selling rough rice, respectively.
The Louisiana rice mills supported their case on the grounds 
that the existing rough rice rates from California were unjust and un­
reasonable because they prohibited rice millers located at New Orleans 
and other southern milling point® from drawing on California rough rice,
^Rickert Rice kills, Incorporated, ©t al*, versus Abilene and 
Southern Railway Company, et al. Interstate Commerce Commission Docket 
No, 28,572, briefs for complainants and defendants, karch, 1941.
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In order to offset this disadvantage, the southern mills requested lower 
rates and milling-in-transit privileges on California rice*
In this case, Mr* Rickert of New Orleans also contended that 
lower rates on rough rice were justified because rough rice is less sus­
ceptible to damage in transit* Hough rice is more easily salvaged if 
wet or damaged in sacks, while clean rice is damaged by odors, dust, 
sails in car, insects, and all the hazards which render a food less at­
tractive for human consumption* As reasons for the maintenance of rice 
■ills at New Orleans, Mr* Rickert stated that ’’the outstanding reason for 
the early and late construction of rice mills in New Orleans is not alone 
because of the production of rice cm the Mississippi River but particular­
ly because New Orleans is the largest rice consuming market in North 
America.” Also, terminal facilities for land and ocean transportation 
were said to make New Orleans a logical nation-wide distribut ing point, 
drawing rice from all producing states* For example, Mr. Rickert stated 
that his mill in 1941 had from two to three buyers each in the states of 
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.*^
The interest of Louisiana rice growers in rough rice rate dis­
putes was clarified by the remarks of Thomas 5. l lunket, representing 
the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association*^ Mr. Plunket, in 
the course of his testimony, stated ” we are opposed to this issue 
(California rough rice case)— for the reason that there has consistently
3$5ee brief for defendants, Interstate Commerce Commission Docket 
Bo. 28572, pp. 37-38. This argument was reversed by the defendants to 
illustrate the advantages already held by New Orleans mills*
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been a surplus of rough rice in these {southern} states, and t© reduce 
the rate from California will only have the offset of causing a greater 
loss to the producers whom we represent by permitting the rice mills in 
Arkansas, touisiana, and Texas, to secure rough rice from California in 
competition with our growers, --— Any further loading of this market by 
increased shipments of rough rice from California will not result in an 
increased consumption, but merely the lowering of prices of all rioe, re­
gardless of origin, — The production of rough rice in the three Southern 
rice states is not only sufficient, but in excess of the requirements of 
the natural southern rice market, — Should there be placed in effect a 
lower rate on rough rice from California, the Southern rice grower would 
be ianediately confronted with a new and greatly disturbing competitive 
situation,”
In dealing with the Louisiana miller's argument that Japan rice 
from California would be non-competitive with the varieties grown in the 
South, Mr, Plunket pointed out that the Southern states could quickly 
meet any demand from southern mills for Japan rice. If Japan rice could 
be purchased cheaper in California, it would displace Japan rice in the 
southern states and thereby add to the surplus already on the southern 
market, Mr, Plunket concluded that "the normal markets of Southern and 
California growers have been fairly well protected from each other by 
geographical considerations, rate structures and taste preferences— be­
cause of these factors, there is little competition between the two 
groups in their respective normal markets— if Southern millers of rough 
xioe should get a lower rail rate on rough rioe from California, it 
could be used as a competitive sledge hammer to drive down the prices of
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Southern varieties, not only of our Japan variety, but of all others."^
These bearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission indi­
cate, in particular, that the location of rioe mill® is materially in­
fluenced by the freight rate differential® between rough rice and clean 
rice products, With the great increase in truck transportation of rough 
rise in recent years, mills located within the producing areas are not 
directly concerned with the rough rioe rate. However, if clean rioe from 
mills in the producing area moves to the consuming centers at rates equal 
to the rough rice rate to mills in the consuming centers, the interior 
m ills  lose their transportation advantage over mills in the consuming 
center, particularly those in New Orleans, These facts explain the con- 
timed operation of rice mills at Memphis, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans,
Bcidently the rough rioe and clean rice rate structure has not been un-
33duly disadvantageous to these mills.
The continuing struggle of Louisiana mills to secure favorable 
rough rice rates from Arkansas and California is baaed on their desire 
to secure fuller utilization of their milling capacity throughout the 
year, and to relieve themselves of their dependence on Louisiana and 
Texas rough rice. Obviously, there are occasions when only one of these 
tire motives is dominant. Freight rates that would permit Southern mills 
to draw on rough rice supplies anywhere in the United States would tend 
to create more competition between mills and between growers by removing
^ A n  article in the New Orleans Times-Plcayune ■ June 4, 1941, 
states that the Interstate Commerce Commission examiner recommended 
that the case on California rice rates be dismissed.
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the rat© tariff barrier which now limits th® market In the California 
and Southern areas*
Whether or not this increased competition would be In the public 
interest is questionable. Ultimately It would tend toward centralisation 
of mills In the consuming area, and the longer hauls on rough rice, since 
they require more freight space than clean rice, might be considered de­
trimental to the public interest. In this connection the Interstate Com­
merce Commission has commented: "As the milling of rice appears to re­
quire only a small capital outlay and as one-fifth of the weight and 
probably one-third of the bulk of rough rice consists of hulls and chaff, 
it is  questionable whether under any defensible relation between the 
rates for rough rice and those for clean rice it would be profitable to
move rough rioe any considerable distance or whether it would be in pub-
34lie interest that It should so move." And further, ''because of its 
high content of chaff and hulls, any lengthening of the hauls of the 
rough rice represents a transportation waste, the cost of which will ul­
timately fall upon the public." The Commission recognized that "the 
most insistent complaints of inability to compete have come from millers 
who are obliged to transport their rough rice considerable distances," 
and that rates established must consider that "clean rice is approximate­
ly four times as valuable per unit of weight as rough rice, and on the
average a carload of rough rice weighs about 40 per cent more than a
35carload of clean rioe."
2^219 Interstate Commerce Commission. Decision on Interstate Com­
merce Commission Docket No. 26430, November 9, 1936.
35Ib ld .
176
Concerning this attitude of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
which in effect controls the location of rice mills, Douglas says:̂
"With the shift in emphasis to distance as a rate-making factor and with 
the threat of disruption of established relationships due to inter-carri­
er competition, it became evident that expansion in the industry for es­
tablished companies would be brought about only by an increase in the 
number of plants rather than by an increase in individual plant size, A 
company with a number of plants sca ttered through the rice-producing 
areas is enabled to fill its requirements from local fields at low trans­
portation costs, and, further, can ship more economically to certain 
territories than could a company with one large centralized plant*
Freight rates, therefore, partly explain the organization characteris­
tics of such companies as Louisiana State Rice Milling Company, and 
Standard Rice Mill Company. "37
Millers who are unfavorably affected by these factors continue 
to present their cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
accounts for the extensive litigation. In general, it appears that 
cost advantages or disadvantages in large scale milling are relatively 
unimportant as compared to the necessary requirement for an efficient 
purchasing and selling organization. Small units apparently can pur­
chase most efficiently. The organization of small units in one company 
permits the company to combine the benefits of a large scale selling 
organization with the efficiency of small scale location advantages In 
buying and in freight rates.
3^Souglas, oj>. cit., p. 84-
37These two companies have plants widely scattered through the 
rice producing areas of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.
CHAPTER V 
MARKET OUTLETS FOR RICE
Since the expansion of rice production during World Car I, the 
United States has had an annual production of rioe greater than annual 
consumption. Although most of the clean rice, and all of the by-pro­
ducts, are consumed within the United States, the annual surplus for 
export links the price structure with all the haaards of foreign affairs.
Rice production in the United States is protected by a duty of 
2-1/2 cents per pound on clean rice, 1-1/2 cents per pound on brown 
rice, 1-1/4 cents on rough rice, and 5/® cents on broken rice and flour, 
meal, polish, and bran. To what extent the American rice industry is 
dependent on this tariff protection it is difficult to say, for the 
domestic market preference for the quality of iunerican rice would sup­
port a considerable portion of the industry without tariff protection.
On the other hand, preferences of certain Japanese groups on the Pacific 
coast bring Asiatic rice into the United States regardless of the tariff 
wall. The tariff is of principal value to United States growers in 
keeping out foreign broken rices and rice products which sell on a price 
basis for manufacturing purposes in the continental market and In pro­
tecting the price market existing in the insular possessions of the 
United States. Without tariff protection, American production would be 
restricted largely to a limited acreage of rice which would sell above
177
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imported rices because of the quality price differential*
The consumption of rioe in the United States and its possessions 
during recent years is shown in the accompanying table* The possessions, 
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska, are ithin the United States tariff 
wall and account for more than a fourth of the total consumption of 
American rice* These countries purchase rice on a price basis rather 
than on a quality basis, so that Asiatic rice would gain the larger part 
of these markets were it not for the tariff barrier* Although populations 
in the territories are small, the per capita consumption is very high, and 
the outlets are extremely important to American rice growers*
The Hawaiian and the Puerto Rican market absorb most of the 
California rice consumed within the United States tariff boundaries*
In 1939-40, about 1,380,000 barrels, or 57 per cent of 2,420,745 barrels 
of California rice consumed domestically went to these possessions* On 
the other hand, of 10,221,255 barrels of Southern rice used in the United 
States and territories in 1939-40, only 2,194,773 barrels, or 21 per cent, 
were shipped to insular possessions* California rioe is of the Japan 
variety, more closely related to the quality of Asiatic rice, and is 
preferred by the Oriental residents of the Pacific coast and Hawaii*
In the past five years, an average of only 6*5 per cent of the 
annual disappe&rance of California rough rice was accounted for by ex­
ports, while an average of 17*4 per cent of Southern rioe moved outside 
the United States tariff boundaries* In recent years, this average for 
the southern states has been closer to 25 per cent of the annual disap­
pearance* Because of their location near Gulf ports, the importance of 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































who in some /ears export as much as $0 per cent of rioe that moves from 
these two states into distribution channels,1
Rioe Growers end the Export Market
As has already been mad© evident, the domestic market for rioe 
is relatively inelastic. Each year the United States uses about the 
same quantity of rice, regardless of price. The insular market within 
the United States tariff wall is somewhat more elastic, since rice, al­
though a staple food, is bought on a price basis and is subject to some 
competition from foreign rice.
The total amount of rice products imported into the United States 
and its possessions has usually been equivalent to one million bushels, 
except under unusual conditions. In 1925, and again in 1936, imports 
of rice produets increased sharply while exports decreased, so that the 
United States was actually on an Import basis during those two years, 
this reversal was caused largely by unusually high domestic prioes of 
rioe in the United States relative to Asiatic prices* Foreign countries 
did not purchase American rice at these high prices, and large quanti­
ties of Asiatic rice, particularly cheap broken rioe, were profitably 
shipped into the United States over the tariff wall. The 1925 high 
price was caused by an actual shortage of American rice and consequent 
high prioes, but the 1936 drop in exports was caused largely by the 
government price maintenance programs which had been operating since 1933*





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































United States foreign trade in rice has always been very ir­
regular, Before the Givil War, when rice production was confined to 
the south Atlantic states, the United States was a net exporter. Pro­
duction and trade were practically wiped out during the Civil War, and 
did not become of importance until production began its rapid expansion 
in Louisiana and the Gulf states. By 1910, the United States was pro­
ducing sufficient rice for domestic food requirements, but still im­
ported broken rice for brewing purposes. In 1916 the nation became 
again a net exporter of rice and held this position until the present 
time. In 1933* 1934, and 1936, however, the net exports dropped so low 
that the nation almost changed into an importer again, although huge sur­
pluses of rice were at the time piling up in this countxy. The reason 
for the low net export i>osition was principally the artificial mainte­
nance of a high price, and the consequent inflow over the tariff wall
2of cheap foreign zlce for brewing purposes.
The pronounced fluctuation in exports depends partly on the 
characteristics of an elastic foreign demand for rice. When United 
State8 prices are low, large quantities can be exportedj when prices 
are high, exports are drastically reduced. The situation is not alto­
gether the result of price elasticity, however, but also one of change 
in demand from foreign markets. If any disturbance in international 
trade, such as nationalistic policies or shipping shortages, causes a 
change in foreign demand or competitive supplies, the foreign outlet
2The best recent discussion of rice in international trade is 
an article by Fred J. Rossiter, 0World Rice Production and Trade,” 




























































































































(barrels) (barrels) (barrels) (barrels)
1935-1936 751,499 3,112 20,627 780,238
1936-1937 619,228 374,281 9,385 1,002,894
1937-1938 2,814,550 101,939 15,363 2,931,852
1938-1939 3,106,570 77,407 36,955 3,220,932
1939-1940 2,950,928 69,556 29,097 3,049,581
5-y ear (1935-1939) 
average 2,048,555 126,259 22,285 2,197,099
Normal exports (estimated) 3,000,000
ifcn table 3 °f Annual Market Summary of Southern Kioe, Agricultural 
Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, and table 4 
of Annual Market Summary of California Rice, Agriculture*! Marketing Ser­
vice, United States Department of Agriculture, cooperating with California 
Department of Agriculture Market News Service, and for California rough 
rice from unpublished records of the Agricultural Marketing Service, United 
States Department of Agriculture.
^Assuming 100 pounds milled rice equals one barrel of 162 pounds rough 
rice.
oConverted from ba s milled rice to barrels rough rice on basis of ratio 
of rough rice to milled rice turnout each year.
^Converted from 100-pound bags rough rice to bar^ls of 162 pounds.
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for American rice may decrease or increase regardless of price elas­
ticity*
American rice, because of its quality and high price in the 
domestic market, is ordinarily priced substantially higher than Asiatic 
rice* In 1937-3®# the average London quotation (c.i.f. basis) was 13*37 
a hundred pounds for American rice as compared to &1.95 end 11*99 for 
Buima and for Saigon rices, respectively. This margin of more than one 
dollar a hundred pounds was relatively low, since the London price for 
American rice has frequently been two dollars or more above Asiatic 
rice* In years when American exports have been lowest, this price differ­
ential has generally been the greatest. Evidently, American rice is 
priced far out of a competitive range with Asiatic rice, and can main­
tain export sales only on a quality basis or through decided tariff pre- 
ferentials*
Compared with the large rice exporting countries of the world,
the United States contribution of rice to world trade is very small. In
1937# the United States exported 204 million pounds of rice out of a
total of 8,143 million pounds exported from the nine principal exporting
3countries of the world, or less than three per cent. The bulk of the 
rice entering importing countries comes from Burma, Indo-China, and Siam. 
In addition to the United States, countries ith minor exports include 
Italy, Spain, Egypt, Brazil, and Madagascar.
These exporting countries contend for markets available in
3lbld.
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Tab le XXIX. United States exports of rice^ to specified countries, 1926* 
30 average, and 1935-38*
Country
5-yr. av.
1926-30 1935 1916 . 2932 _ 1938 1939 1940
1,,000 pounds
Belgium 14,275 11,485 1,592 7,893 13,342 11,922 1,400
France 11,366 14,945 1,690 5,527 5,393 46 541
Germany 33,981 5,500 585 1,353 444* T t * t 180
Greece 4,290 13,085 1,750 9,625 10,829 11,154 2,930
Netherlands 16,762 3,956 311 6,916 8,492 7,453 767
United Kingdom 33,453 11,334 3,447 6,300 8,123 13,120 4,195
Canada 13,238 10,502 7,282 7,872 16,783 18,792 17,813
Cuba 11,510 65,396 2,621 135,587 204,724 209,753 289,690
Argentina 20,402 23 11,510 4,007
Chile 13,693 15,865 20 3,642 18,821 •?*
Japan 16,851 2 254
Others 36,956 12,256 2,428 7,414 19,716 29,212 18,660
Total 226,777 164,347 21,728 203,639 310,674 301,632 336,250
f̂tough rice converted and included.
4.Lees than 1,000 pounds.
Sources F o reig n  Agriculture, October, 1938, and data of the Foreign Service 
Division, Bureau o f Agricultural Hfconooics.
187
practically every other nation of the world, as the consumption of rice 
as a foodstuff is general. The principal importers of rice are China, 
India, British K&laya, the Netherland Indies, and Japan. These Asiatic 
markets, of course, are held by the large Asiatic exporters. Principal 
markets for the rice of the other exporting countries are the nations of 
Europe and Latin America.
It is easy to see what this situation means for the United States 
rice industry. The export surplus of rice available each year in the 
United States must find its market in deficit countries where the price 
is principally dependent on the supplies of rice available from the prin­
cipal exporting countries. This means that the export market for United 
States rice is certain to be extremely variable. Whether the quantity 
available for export from the United States in any given year is small or 
large has no significant influence on rice price in any importing country, 
under normal conditions, for the United States contribution is too small 
to have an appreciable effect on world price.
In an export market of this type the volume of exports from the 
United States cannot escape abrupt and violent fluctuations. This is 
true even under normal peace time conditions. The slightest increase in 
United States price relative to prices in the major rice exporting coun­
tries can wipe out the foreign market for American rice, except in 
European countries where quality is preferred. Conversely, a shift- in 
price relationship8 in favor of American rice permits all available ex­
port stocks to be sold readily without any further effeot on rice prices.
These conditions are particularly true in regard to the Cuban 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reg ard  to  quality* Raxoro and Early Prolific varieties approach closest 
of all American rice in quality to preferred Asiatic rice varieties, and 
th e  Cuban market prefers these varieties in the American market when 
price relationships are favorable* The American market in Cuba, there­
fore, is principally dependent on price relationships for similar varie­
ties with the rice crop of Burma, Indo-China, and Siam. If price 
relationships are favorable to United States rice, the entire export sur­
plus can be disposed of in this market without risking further price de­
clines; if price relationsh ps are unfavorable, no rice at all can be 
sold  in Cuba.
ihen quality influences the demand for any product, demand tends 
to  become more inelastic „ This principle is clearly illustrated in 
European markets for American rice. During the past twenty years fluctu­
a tio n s  in  purchases of American rice by European countries have been 
somewhat less than in  Cuba, largely because there is a preference for 
th e  higher quality American rice regardless of price* Europe is there­
fo re  a more preferred market, and a more dependable outlet for rice*
Tfhen used as an outlet for large quantities, however, this market becomes 
more elastic, since European consumers in the lower Income classes also 
buy principally on price.
International Politics and Rico
In  the current situation there are factors which complicate the 
simple economic analysis of export price relationships. These factors 
are the growth of economic nationalism and i.iilitary us© of consumption 
goods for political purposes. Under such conditions, economic analysis
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is of little value since the actual course of events is based on politi­
cal motives, not on the economic welfare of men* European nations during 
the past ten years have attempted to reduce their dependence on imported 
supplies of rice, regardless of the cost in quality or in price* Spires 
have given preferential treatment to rice from their own colonies, and 
encouraged the production and use of their own rice* At the same time, 
European nations without colonies, of which the best example is Germany, 
have discouraged the consumption of rice in favor of substitute foodstuffs 
available within the country. Both of these arrangements had a distinctly 
unfavorable effect on United States rice exports during the decade pre­
ceding World war II, The establishment of price advantages by government 
subsidy is relatively ineffective in gaining an export market under such 
conditions. In theoretical terms, nationalistic trade restriction causes 
the foreign market to become rigidly inelastic, removing the normal price 
elasticity and variable demand for United States rice in foreign markets*
In South America, nearly all countries have adopted programs to 
increase rice production and decrease imports* From 1926 to 1930 net im­
ports for South American countries averaged 320 million pounds annual­
ly, but by 1935, exports exceeded imports by nearly 30 million pounds*^
As a whole, the continent of South America has become approximately self- 
sufficient in rice production, vdth the surplus of exporting countries 
being disposed of largely in the neighboring deficit countries. The lat­
ter relationship is particularly important in the case of Brazil, the
^I b l d .
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largest exporter of rice in South America, and Argentina, the largest 
importer.
The situation in Europe and South America, then, is badly com­
plicated by factors that cannot be remedied by manipulations of American 
export prices on rice. But additional complications have also risen in 
Asia. Rice production in the great importing countries of China, Japan, 
and the Netherlands Indies has been greatly increased in the past decade.
At the same time, the great surplus production of the rice exporting 
countries has beer, maintained. This has made available more abundant 
supplies from Asia for the export markets in Europe and South America.
The net result has been that the price differential against American rice 
has been growing steadily larger in the markets where the surplus from 
Asia is offered. As a result, the price relationship necessary to obtain 
the markets for American rice has became steadily more difficult to secure.
Canada imports rice in fairly steady quantities of about 45 million 
pounds annually. The principal sources of Canadian imports have been Burma 
and the United States. Under the British empire preference established in 
the Ottawa agreements, Burma rice obtained about 75 per cent of the 
Canadian market before World War II, About two-thirds of Canadian imports 
consist of rough rice, since such rice is imported free of duty as against 
a rate of one dollar per 100 pounds for cleaned rice. Clean rice from 
Snplre countries enters Canada at a 50$ rate, however, while United States 
rice pays a duty of 72$ under the reciprocal trade agreement. Under nor­
mal conditions, the Canadian market is an important but not a major outlet 
for United 3tatee rice.
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Tariff Preferences in the Cuban Market
Cuba is the last remaining market for United States rice which 
is open to any great degree* With the inception of the World War II 
shipping shortage, this market became unusually favorable because of the 
automatic restriction on the movement of Asiatic rice* Per capita con­
sumption is unusually high in Cuba, exceeding 100 pounds annually, and 
total consumption for the island is estimated between 350 million and 500 
all!ion pounds annually* This quantity is greater than the usual amount 
of American rice available for export* Domestic production supplies less 
than 10 per cent of the requirements, and th© bulk of the imports ordina­
rily cones from Siam, Burma, and French Indo-China. United States rice 
in this market is normally a marginal source* If price relationships 
are favorable, large quantities will be purchased— if not, very little 
rice will move to Cuba*
From 1904 to 1934 the United States enjoyed a tariff preference 
of 40 per cent in the Cuban duty on rice as compared to other countries. 
This preference was increased to 50 per cent in the trade agreement of 
1934. However, this marked preference was not sufficient to give th© 
price advantage necessary to move American rice in th© Cuban market* 
During the last five months of 1935# the Cuban government made further 
drastic changes in duties to give preference to American rice* These 
changes were sufficient to increase exports greatly to Cuba at that time. 
The former duties were in substance restored in 1933# removing the price 
advantage temporarily enjoyed by American rice which permitted the large 
export movement* In the years immediately preceding World War II,
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Table XXXI. Change in Cuban import duties on clean rice, 1937 bo date.
Pesos 
uer 100 kilos
Equivalent U. S. dollars 
per 100 lbs.
Prior to Anril 2. 1937
From United States 1.85 10.84
From other countries 3.70 1.68
Anril 2. 1937 to Aucust 9. 1937
From United States 1.8$ 0.84
From Saigon-Burma 3.70 1.68
From Siam 7.40 3.36
August 10. 1937 to December 31. 1937*
From United States .92^ 0.42
From other countries 4.70 2.13
From January 1. 1938
From United States 1.8$ 0.84
From Saigon-Burma 3.70 1.68
From Slam 4.70 2.13
^Presidential Decree No. 2438.
Sources Customs Tariff Item 253-B
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American rice was not favorably situated in the Cuban market*
Since the Cuban market is largely a price market, American ex­
porters have attempted to offset price differentials by adding large 
percentages of broken rice to the export product* In 1938, large stocks 
of broken idee were utilized in this way* This action leads to some mis­
understanding among growers in the United States. Deliberate action to 
lower the grade of clean rice by including broken rice results in lower 
prices on rice sold abroad* Growers assume that these lower prices are 
prejudicial to them through lower prices for rough rice. However, the 
inferior rice is necessary to enable the movement of rice at any price. 
Growers areJaatter off when rice is sold at some price than not sold at 
all* If United States rice must sell on the basis of price, not quality, 
it becomes necessary to meet the demands of the foreign market*
The present war situation has intensified the difficulties of 
two conflicting agricultural groups in Cuba and the United States* Cuban 
sugar finds its most profitable market in the United States, and the eco­
nomy of the island is dependent largely on United States attitude toward
the entry of Cuban sugar* Since the outbreak of World War II, about 85
5per cent of American rice exports have gone to Cuba* Louisiana sugar 
interests h; ve long waged a strong battle to restrict the entry of Cuban 
sugar into the United States, It has now become imperative that as strong 
a battle be waged to retain the Cuban market for exports of Louisiana 
rice* Geographically, the rice and sugar growers are closely related and 
to some extent overlapping* The conflict of interests In southern Louisiana






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in regard to Cuban trade relations with the United States, consequently, 
is a very difficult one.**
Because of the necessity for favorable tariff treatment to main­
tain exports to the Cuban market, and because of th© fact that a tariff 
sufficiently low to give American rice the necessary preference over 
Asiatic rice in a peace-time market would deprive the Cuban government of 
essential revenue, leaders in the American rice industry have recently 
proposed that United States negotiations viith Cuba should attempt to se­
cure a preferential quota of 300 million pounds for American rice.^ 
Through use of the quota system, Cuban tariff revenues could be main­
tained at a high level but American rice could dominate the Cuban market* 
The fact that price could be maintained at any desired level under the 
quota system could be used to encourage domestic rice production, which 
the Cuban government apparently desires*
In regard to this conflict, Homer L. Brinkley, manager of the 
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, nays: "The entire matter
is greatly complicated by the United States-Cuban relations with respect 
to sugar production and sugar quotas* Many attempts have been made in 
various places to play off the two commodities against each other, but 
we have so far been able to resist such efforts* We have looked with 
grave concern on attempts on the part of domestic sugar interests to cur­
tail Cuban sugar quotas feeling* and with reason, that if Cuba's nugar 
quota were further reduced retaliatory measures would be attempted aga3.nct 
Increased importations of American rice to Cuba. The continuation of this 
market on its present, or an expanded basis, is a matter of economic life 
or death to the rice industry, and extreme vigilance is required to Insure 
its retention*n Annual Report of the American Hice Growers Cooperative 
Association* 1939*40, June, 1940, p* 13*
^Brief of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association and the 
Rice Killers' Association with respect to consideration of rice as an ex­
port commodity in sup. lemental trade agreement negotiations with Cuba, 
submitted to Committee for Reciprocity Information, United States Tariff 
Commission, August 21, 1941*
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Although a preferential quota and a high tariff on American 
rice would be a hardship for Cuban consumers, the United States may 
be in a position to bring sufficient pressure on Cuba to secure this 
advantage for the American rice industry. International trade rela­
tione in recent years have been established more and more on quota 
regulations and political alliances* The Cuban rice market may per­
haps be secured for American producers by international political moves 
rather than by price competition with Asiatic rice. The sugar situation, 
however, must always be considered in negotiations concerning the welfare 
of the xlce industry.
R ecip ro cal Trade Agreements
The reciprocal trade agreement program established in 1934 
o ffe re d  distinct benefits to Louisiana rice growers* Since American 
rice was admittedly losing its markets abroad because of the price dif­
ferential, any effort to lower the tariff walls against American rice 
was a move toward decreasing the unfavorable price differential 
s tra n g lin g  export outlets.
Im p o rtan t concessions for rice were secured in trade agreements 
w ith  Cuba, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In the latter 
case, a reduction from the former duty of 1.95 cents per pound was 
achieved, the new rate being established at 1.30 cents a pound. Slight 
reductions or "bound” low rates were also secured from Belgium, Nether- 
land, Sweden, and France. The fact that exports were reduced even after 
these reductions took place indicates only that the reductions were not 
s u ffic ie n t to offset other unfavorable factors. Without the concessions
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In  th e  tra d e  agreem ents the rice export situation would probably have be­
come s t i l l  w orse*
The principal barriers preventing more general and material con­
cessions on r ic e  with other countries are associated with the facts that 
independent importing nations already admit rice free of duty, are estab­
lis h in g  domestic rice production, or are establishing systems of empire 
p re fe ren c e . As has already been mentioned, in one trade agreement the 
U nited  States itself made a concession on rice when it reduced the duty on 
im ports of broken rice from the Netherlands from 5/3 cents to 5/16 cents.
For the duration of World War II, the reciprocal trade program 
can affect the rice export situation only through further negotiations 
with Cuba. The United States already has a decided tariff preferential, 
but more direct action appears necessary if the Cuban market is to be 
made permanently secure. Whether additional tariff negotiations can be 
used to achieve this result depends largely on the course of the war in 
the next few years. In the meantime, shipments of xiae to Europe will be 
concerned not with trade agreements, but with government policy regarding 
r ic e  as a food available for shipment under the ”lend-lease” program of 
a id  to the Allies,
O utlook fo r  R ice Exports
In summ&zy, assuming the restoration of European markets to some 
degree, Cuba and Canada must be considered as the only potential markets 
for increased quantities of American rice. Both markets can be held 
only on a price basis. Past experience lias indicated that Asiatic rice 
can obtain these markets even when American rice obtains a marked tariff
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p re fe re n c e , for Birope, on a quality basis, has in the past been the 
U n ited  States best foreign customer for rice* The problem of future 
exp orts of rice, then, is largely the maintenance of a low price in the 
Canadian and Cuban markets after the war is over* Cuba has already em­
barked on a program to expand domestic production,® while the possibility 
o f priee competition from Asiatic rice in both Cuba and Canada holds a 
constant threat to unericon exports in a peace-time world.
According to Leonhardy^ the causes for future reduced demand 
for United States rice may be summed up in the following remarks:
1. Countries which produce quality rice and compete with the United 
States are increasing their production - Italy, Spain, Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Uruguay.
2. Countries which import quality rice but can produce some of their 
own, are expanding production - Argentina, Columbia, and Japan.
3* Countries importing quality rice are decreasing their consumption 
by substitution of other foodstuffs - Chile, and Gemany,
4. Countries buying inferior rice on a price basis but able to grow 
their own are increasing production - China, Japan, Ceylon, Malaya, 
and Netherlands Indies.
5. Countries importing quality rice have established empire preference - 
United Kingdom and France.
®The United States government is considering a loan to Cuba for 
the purpose of building facilities to establish a rice industry* Such 
action, of course, will meet with violent opposition from United States 
rice producers.
^T. G. Leonhardy. Louisiana Rice in World Trade. Unpublished 
U* S. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1939*
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6* Countries exporting poor quality rioe are being forced to improve 
their quality and compete with American rice on both quality and 
price basis - Burma, Indo-Chlna, Siam, and British Guiana*
Under such conditions, the measures adopted to facilitate ex­
ports of United States rice have been relatively ineffective* Several 
of the reciprocal trade agreements have provided reductions in cJutiea 
against American rice, but, except in Cuba, these reductions have not 
provided any great encouragement to exports* With the curtailment of 
the European market after the outbreak of war in 1939s the export sur­
plus problem would have been great except for the occurrence of shipping 
spaoe shortages, high shipping rates, and crop shortages in Asia* These 
factors threw the Cuban market to United States rice, and, as previously 
discussed, if United States rice can get into the Cuban market on a 
price basis at all, it can find an outlet for all export stocks.
The United States still imports considerable quantities of 
brewer's rice* Several reasons are advanced for this situation other 
than that the tariff is not sufficiently high to keep it out* quality 
is not an objective in brewer's rice, hence price, and not quality, is 
the only factor governing sales in the domestic market* Ocean freight 
rates are low by water, and brewer's rice can be shipped very cheaply 
to the Atlantic seaboard from long distances* Xn addition, brewers 
often place orders six to twelve months in advance in their business* 
Domestic rice mills are unwilling to accept orders for deliveries that 
far ahead, since they operate closer to the current market * As a re­
sult, the rice is purchased from importers who secure it at th© more
201
constant markets in foreign countries
Development of Rice Markets
The markets for United States rice have been demonstrated to 
be, in order of price advantage, the domestic continental market, the 
Insular market, the mropean market, and the Latin American market.^* 
these various markets have distinct characteristics which require dif­
ferent industry and government policies in regard to the maintenance of 
rice sales and rice prices.
Rice growers will secure the greatest benefit if they take ad­
vantage of the inelastic domestic demand by placing a relatively limited 
supply of rice on the domestic market, and if they take advantage of the 
low per capita consumption by using methods designed to increase do­
mestic consumption. The first objective is accomplished to some extent 
by quality preferences within the United States. Long grain varieties 
and Extra Fancy rice find their principal outlet in the American market, 
and since quality rice has been only a small portion of the total sup­
ply, it brings a higher price to the producer©. In order to preserve 
this segregation of the American market, rice producers should not 
greatly expand production of high quality rices, since price would drop 
rapidly to a point inhere the superior quality would have little advan­
tage in price over ordinary qualities. The demand for a product which
^Lsonhardy, o£. cit.. p. 119*
^■For extensive proof of this proposition by persons actively 
engaged in the rice trade, see testimony of millers, Interstate Commerce 
Commission Docket No. 26430, op. cit.
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sails by virtue of its quality is more inelastic than for a product 
which sells in prioe competition* Only if consumers can be educated 
to demand more high quality rice, and costs of production of this 
better rice are no greater than those for ordinary rice, can farmers 
benefit by increasing the supply of high quality rice placed on the do­
mestic market*
A second method of improvement in th© domestic market involves
an increase in the rice consumption per capita in the United States*
dver since the price decline of 1921, proposals for advertising rice
12have been suggested in the rice trade* These proposals have most 
frequently attempted to enlist the cooperation of all mills in contri­
buting to a fund for industry advertising* Wore ambitious plans have 
attempted to obtain farmer contributions toward advertising funde. The 
pressure for rice advertising culminated in the establishment of a fund
for such purposes under the government-sponsored marketing agreement in 
131933 end 1934* The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has
14also sponsored industry advertising programs*
12Few issues of the monthly Rice Journal after 1920 omit refer­
ence to proposed plans for national advertising for increasing the con­
sumption of rice*
13See Chapter 71. The marketing agreement was too short-lived 
to put this fund into practical use. In addition, the legality of use 
of the funds for advertising was challenged*
^*The American Rice Growers* Cooperative Association developed 
a radio advertising plan in 1939-40, sponsoring a branded rice packed 
by cooperating mills and advertised by the association* little of 
this branded rice was sold, since mills preferred to push their own 
sales* Regarding all schemes of industry advertising by cooperation, Mr* 
Brinkley said in June, 1940: ”A’e have abandoned all hope of ever being
ab le  to handle this matter on a voluntary or cooperative basis— — repeated 
effort to develop voluntary programs has resulted in complete failure* It 
gees without saying that no component part of the industry would be justi­
fied in engaging in Industry advertising alone.” Annual Report, p. 16.
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All this effort of the past twenty years resulted in no more 
than sporadic advertising campaigns. Since complete cooperation of all 
wills and fanners was impossible to obtain under any plan, the sponsors 
of most plans have not felt justified in maintaining their own expendi­
tures for the good of the entire industry. Direct benefits of an adver­
tising program are so ftifficult to observe that complete cooperation will 
probably never be obtained, except under legislative pressure in all rice 
producing states. At best, rice advertising can result only in a slow in­
crease in per capita consumption, and temporary fluctuations in demand 
will wake short-run effects scarcely discernible.
In 1940 the Louisiana legislature passed a hill placing a tax of 
two cents per 100 pounds of clean ilce products to be paid by the mills, 
the proceeds to be used for an industry program to stimulate rice con­
sumption in the United States, The tax was contingent upon the passage of 
similar legislation in Arkansas and Texas, Both of these states acted 
favorably in 1941, and on August 1, 1941, the tax went into effect in the 
three states. Expenditure of the funds is vested in joint commissions of 
rice farmers and rice millsrs, with farmer representatives in the majority. 
The two—cent tax is expected to provide an annual fund of $250,000 to be 
expended largely in national advertising, but which can also be used in 
any program to promote domestic rice consumption.
From the fanner*s point of view, rice advertising should be di­
rected simply toward increasing the consumption of rice in general, not 
toward any particular brand. Advertising of specific mill brands, which 
is done by two large milling organizations, tends mainly toward pushing 
sales of the advertised brand in place of other rice, Education of con-
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sumcra on varieties, grades, and cooking qualities, however, can stimu­
la te  quality preference and permit higher prices for th© quality products 
so ld  on the domestic market.
In all industry-wide advertising plans, however conducted, the 
r ic e  growers take the burden of the risk involved, and it is therefore 
proper that farmer representatives control the present tax fund advertis­
in g  program . If an extensive advertising campaign fails to promote in­
creased demand for rice, the farmers pay the costs through lower prices 
fo r  rough rice; if it is successful, they gain through higher prices for 
th e ir  product* Considering the present iov; consumption and the ignorance 
of most American housewives concerning the quality and preparation of 
r ic e , a well-conducted advertising campaign offers possibilities for en­
larging the preferred domestic market* But, since the rice farmers and 
nillers are competitive and the industry is too large to. insure complete 
cooperation, the benefits from advertising a staple commodity will be 
obscure in the short run and will be offset by increased production and 
increased elasticity of demand in the long run* It is therefore doubt­
fu l whether any sustained advertising campaign will b© successfully main­
tained, although benefits to the industry can undoubtedly be achieved*
Other means of improving the domestic market include the sale of 
canned rice and brovm rice on the basis of their pec’Hiar advantages as 
health foods, lore effective utilization of by-products in feed find in­
dustrial uses is also advisable. Th© Rice fillers Association has con­
ducted a research program and holds several patents on processes designed 
for the above purposes. The speculative nature of the milling industry, 
however, has not been conducive to development of these minor sources of
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p r o fit*
Second in preference is the insular market, in which Puerto Rico 
is the most important outlet for Louisiana rice growers. Here consumption 
is already large, and the low Income of the people makes price the chief 
issue* The retention of this market involves a careful maintenance of 
tariff barriers against cheap Asiatic rice, and adaptation of quality to 
the requirements of the population. The stimulation of high quality de­
mand is ineffective here, and advertising to increase consumption is un­
necessary • Policy should be directed toward making a cheap rice available 
which suits consumer taste preference, as is now done through large sales 
of mixed and broken rice.
If European markets are to be regained after the war, the chief 
need will be a governmental policy favoring the restoration of free trade, 
particularly the elimination of empire preference and self-sufficiency 
programs. The quality market in Europe offers a £ table and profitable 
outlet for American rice at a premium above world prices, and will be 
particularly essential when American rice is pushed out of price markets 
by Asiatic rice following the close of the present war.
Hie last market for American rice, perhaps the least desirable 
but now the most essential, is Cuba. Since Cuba is a price market, 
American rice cannot be sold in great quantities at a premium above 
Asiatic rice. When Asiatic rice is available, it is doubtful if United 
States rice could be sold in Cuba at all without a decided preferential 
in tariff rates to create a competitive price situation. Policy toward 
Cuba, then, should be directed first of all toward the retention of 
tariff preferential3 or the establishment of quotas favoring rice from
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the United States* Second, efforts should be made in the United States 
to produce rice for export to this price market of a variety appealing 
to established taste preference, which means that most attention should 
be given to the export of high-yielding, low-cost rice varieties. Final­
ly, government aid in the establishment of a two—price system permit­
ting the "dum] ing” of surplus stocks in Cuba may be essential if this 
market is to be retained*
Separating Foreign and Domestic Demand
Rice production, an industry flourishing under tariff protection, 
has peculiar problems in the disposal of its export, surplus* The fact 
that domestic demand is peculiarly inelastic, and. that an eager price 
market for the export surplus lies immediately adjacent, affords an un­
usual opportunity for the establishment of a "two-price11 system* An al­
lotment scheme which would limit th© quantity of rice placed on the 
domestic market could effectively maintain desired prices on that portion 
of the crop consumed in the United States* i&cport surpluses could be dis­
posed of at the best prices available, as far as possible in the quality 
market of Burope, with the remainder in Cuba. If total returns from, the 
two-price system were considered incompatible with accepted standards 
for the rice industry, returns could be increased readily by means of ex­
port subsidies* Since American production is too small to have an ap­
preciable effect on world price, and since "dumping" will not invite 
retaliation as Cuba is eager to obtain low-priced rice imports, the usual 
hazards associated 'with "dumping" are not involved*
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The two-price system for rice is receiving wide support from 
leaders in the southern rice industry, A limited experience with a 
form of export subsidy in 1935 led to gener 1 acceptance of the plan 
throughout the industry. Sxcept for the recent acquisition of the 
Cuban market because of shipping difficulties on Asiatic rice, this 
plan would probably be receiving increased attention at present. Dis­
cussion of this means of improvement of the export market, however, is 
mar# properly included in the description anti analysis of government 
programs contained in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI
GOViENkENT PROGRAMS IN THE RICE IiMDUSTRX
There have been a long series of crises in the production of 
the great staple crops of the United States, during which farmers 
throughout the country have united In efforts to secure government legis­
lation favorable to raising farm product prices. Agitation for cheap 
money, for tariff protection, for marketing legislation., for export sub­
sidies, and finally for outright treasury subsidies, has resulted from 
this desire of fanners to improve their price and income situation by 
legislative means.
Government price-raising measures designed to aid rice producers 
have been among the most recent developments in American farm legislation. 
Rice, through all the years until the decade of the 1920's, was a crop ex­
panding into new and more profitable areas of production. Production was 
principally for the domestic market, and tariff protection was considered 
as the principal requirement of the industry. Even after an export sur­
plus slowly accumulated from the pressure of increasing production, the 
economic situation was such that price conditions remained relatively 
favorable.
When various programs relative to wheat and cotton were debated 
in Congress and throughout the country from 1921 to 1929, discussion con­
cern ing rice was almost completely neglected. Although rice was an export
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crop during th ese  years, such plans as the Mc^&ry-Haugen bills made no 
re fe re n c e  to raising the price of rice* The culminating feature of 
farm  relief in the decade was the Marketing Act of 1929 establishing 
th e  Federal Farm Board* This board engaged principally in stabilization 
operations with the objective of improving grain and cotton prices by 
more orderly marketing. By this time, th© price of rice had gone into a 
sharp decline* Considerable effort and funds were expended by the Feder­
al Farm Board in the establishment and promotion of cooperative marketing 
among rice growers, since rice was included in th© general grain program*
In the disastrous price declines which followed the crash of 1929, 
r ic e  fan n ers suffered as severely as any other agricultural group* The 
December 1 l a m  price of rice fell frora an average of £1.16 in the seven- 
year period 1919-26 and 78 cents in 1930, to 42 cents a bushel in 1932, 
w h ile  the carryover rose from a normal of about ICO million pounds to 
220 million pounds in 1932.^ The inability of the Federal Farm Board to 
cope w ith  such price fluctuations was soon demonstrated, since the causes 
wsre fa r  mors deep-seated than the inefficient marketing which the Board 
was designed to remedy* As the demoralized price structure created more 
and more serious disturbance in the national economy, the pressure for 
farm  r e lie f  culminated in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933*
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1^33
On May 12, 1933, the President approved the Agricultural Adjust-
^Edwin G* Nourse, Marketing Agreements Under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration. Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1935, Chapter VI.
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sent Act* This act was passed to relieve the economic emergency result­
ing in the "severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agri­
cultural and other commodities*11 The federal government was granted five 
general powers under Section 8 in order to effectuate the policy of 
Congress in establishing and maintaining a balance in the production and 
an equality in the purchasing power of farm products*
These five powers of Section 8 included* (1) a provision for re­
duction in acreage or production of any basis agricultural commodity 
through agreements between the Secretary of Agriculture and producers, 
with rental and benefit payments made to the producers, (2) the Secretary 
of Agriculture was empowered to enter into marketing agreements with pro­
cessors, producers, and others engaged in handling agricultural commodi­
ties in interstate or foreign commerce, (3) the issue of licenses was 
permitted to enforce the marketing agreements provided above, (4) reports 
on quantities and movements of agricultural products were made compulsory 
on handlers, and (5) storage legislation was adopted to regulate the move- 
meat of agricultural produota.2
Rice was named in the original Agricultural Adjustment Act as one 
of the basic farm commodities to which the provisions of the act were to 
apply. Since the number of growers Involved was relatively small, the 
rice industry, although included in the legislation, did not appear 
prominently in discussion on the measure, as did wheat, com, cotton, and 
tobacco* Discussion on rice was characterized by brief, effective argu-
5H. R* 3835, Agricultural Adjustment Act, No. 10, 73rd Congress, 
approved May 12, 1933*
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menis, and by lack of opposition to the speakers, which was in sharp 
contrast to the rambling testimony generally given In hearings on farm 
legislation. ̂  The inclusion of rice as a basic commodity was almost 
wholly the result of organised pressure from the American Rice Growers 
Cooperative Association*
In the hearing on the original Agricultural Adjustment Act, repre­
sentatives of both the rice millers and the rice growers urged acreage re- 
4duction. In testimony on other commodities, such as wheat, processors 
were generally opposed to acreage reduction, in contrast to the attitude 
of the rice millers* Evidently the close relation of the rice milling and 
rice growing industries In the South was responsible for this attitude, 
since many millers were also Interested in production* In addition, the
millers recognized that profitable disposal of their large inventory
stocks required acreage restriction if prices were to be raised to a 
profitable level*
After the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed, the immediate 
problem in the rice industry appeared to be one of providing some means 
for liquidating the abnormal carryover on as favorable terms as possible, 
meanwhile making sure that acreage would not increase along with higher 
prices.^ Acreage reductions had already proceeded so far by voluntary 
reductions of the farmers between 1929 and 1933, that future aoreage re-
**See Hearings on H. R* 3635 before the Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, United States Senate, 73**d Congress, 1st Session*
4Ur* W. M. Reid represented the rice millers and Mr* James
Broussard spoke for the rice growers.
5Wourse, op. cit* * p. 100.
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duotion was generally regarded as unnecessary.
Adoption of Marketing Agreement
Rioe, as one of the basic commodities in th© original Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act, was eligible for the processing tax and production
control provisions as well as for the marketing agreement provisions.
For various reasons, however, the marketing agreement method was chosen
as the sole means of dealing with the commodity. Among the reasons
6given for the adoption of the marketing agreement plan were theses
1. The California rice industry had considerable experience in volun­
tary regulation and control between both growers and processors, and 
the success of this control encouraged a wider attempt throughout 
the industry.
2. The Southern rice industry and the California industry are geographi­
cally compact, the number of processors small, and the growers well 
localized. Therefore, like a specialty crop, it was thought that 
all members of the industry could act together.
3. Rice mil 1 era and growers in California were already experimenting 
with prioe-stabilization by subsidizing exports and their experience 
indicated considerable success for the marketing agreement method of 
raising price.
4. Rice prices in 1933 were already rising toward parity as a result of 
a short-crop prospect, together with the speculative enthusiasm an-
^Agricultural Adjustment in 1934. United States Department of 
Agriculture. Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1935, p* 10.
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gendered by the inclusion of rice ao a basic camaodity. Any proces­
sing tax named would have to be small in amount, whereas conditions 
pointed to a large crop in 1934 which would require heavy benefit 
payments*
5* Southern rice interests, particularly the growers, thought that prices 
to the farmers could be increased by eradicating certain marketing 
practices regarded as hamful to the producer* A government agreement 
to regulate the sale of rough rice was considered a means of eliminat­
ing these practices*
6* A marketing agreement as a means of adjustment was extremely attractive 
to the government as it apparently avoided the levy of new taxes and 
the administrative detail of compulsory control of production*
A marketing agreement for the Southern rice milling industry was 
approved on October 16, 1933 wldch was thereafter effective, with amend­
ments, to larch 6, 1934* This agreement, No. 17* was superseded on March
76, 1934, by No. 39, which controlled the industry to April 1, 1935. At 
this time, the entire marketing agreement and licensing program was dis­
carded in favor of the processing tax program.
Nature of the Southern Iiice Marketing Agreement 
The first rice marketing agreement for the Southern rice industry
7Mimeographed copies of No. 17 and No. 39 in the Marketing Agree­
ment Series issued by the Agricultural Adjustment Adndnist ration are 
available in the library of Louisiana State University* Much of the dis­
cussion in this chapter is based on personal analysis of the application 
of the provisions of the agreements to growers and millers in the Louisiana 
rice industry*
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in 1933 w&s a voluntary plan in which the millers agreed to fix both 
rough rice prices and clean rice prices at levels profitable to both 
the farmers and the Killers. Hie assumption was that price to the
farmers could be raised ©imply by getting the millers to agree to pay a
higher price for rough rice and to quote higher prices on clean rice.
In other words, the establishment of a monopoly among the millers was
assumed to be a means whereby the growers could receive benefits. Bene-*
fits were not to be limited to growers, however, since th© monopoly 
powers granted to millers were also to be used for their own benefit. 
Obviously, the mills were interested in monopoly benefits for themselves 
more than in improvement of the farm price of rough rice. This fatal 
flaw apparently escaped attention in the initial hearings concerning 
the marketing agreement program, and the scheme was accepted by rice 
farmers without much argument.
Informal conferences and hearings were held in Washington and in 
i/sailfliAHA throughout the summer of 1933* Although the Agricultural Ad­
justment Act had been passed on fay 12, 1933* end regulation of several 
crops began immediately, no attempt was made to adjust rice production 
during the current crop year. Finally, a fomul hearing was held on 
September 5 and 6, 1933, et which substantial agreement concerning a 
program was secured. These hearings were largely controlled and attended 
by the millers, who naturally engaged in a battle to seoure the largest 
possible milllng allowance between th© prioes of rough and clean rice.
In order to settle this Issue, the government made an audit of several 
Southern rice mills and secured data considered relevant to reasonable 
milling charges.
2X5
The marketing agreement was readily accepted by the miller1 s 
committee. On September 29 all but three of the (southern rice millers 
signed the agreement. Two of these were the largest millers in the in­
dustry who objected to some of the powers conferred on the tentative 
miller's control committee. These two millers later signed the agree­
ment, however, so that all Southern iuills but one were registered in 
accord with the agreement.
After approval by the Secretary of Agriculture, the agreement 
became effective on October 16, 1933• In order to enforce the regu­
lations on all mills, a license essentially identicin its terms to 
the marketing agreement became effective on October 17* In addition, 
under the National Industrial Recovery Administration, the Southern mil­
lers also completed a code of fair competition which was approved by 
the President on Itovember 21, 1933* Besides covering hours, wages, and 
general labor provisions, the National Recovery Administration code de­
fined unfair methods of competition as including false advertising, 
misbranding, producer standards, milling of rice not purchased by the 
miller, rebates, and similar matters. Under government sponsorship, 
the rice milling industry was thus organized in a rigidly monopolistic 
manner.
Neither grower representation nor crop regulation was provided 
in the 1933 marketing agreement. The object of this plan was to raise 
rice prices sheerly by the establishment of monopoly in the milling in­
dustry, with government sanction and even a government license to en­
force monopoly regulations on non-cooperative millers. A control com­
mittee of seven members was to be elected by th® millers, with three
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members from Louisiana, two from Arkansas, and two from Texas • The 
method of voting was weighted by the volume of rough rice milled by 
each mill. The duties of the committee were to supervise th© perfor­
mance of the agreement, to administer the marketing fund to be estate 
lished, and to dispose of all disputes arising from th© agreement.
On rough rice purchases, the agreement provided that all pur* 
chases should be in units of barrels or bushels, with purchase of rice 
"round" being prohibited. Linimum prices were to be fixed for rough 
rice by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the miller's committee com­
puting iiinifflnm price discounts and premiums for the various grades as 
related to the fixed price for each variety. All controversies con­
cerning variety or grade of rough rice were to be settled by a Federal- 
State Grading Office, vlth the Qxpense of sampling and grading to be 
borne by the loser to the controversy.
No miller wxs to sell clean rice for domestic consumption at a 
price less than the replacement cost of the rough rice plus the cost of 
conversion, the actual cost of the container, and a marketing fund 
charge. Cost of conversion was set at 70 cents per barrel of rough 
rice. All terms for domestic sales were outlined and specified.
Brokerage charges for selling were to be uniform for all mills at eight 
cents per 100 pounds of clean rice. The marketing fund assessment was 
ten cents for each barrel of rough rice, which was to be used by the 
control co^imittee in administering the agreement and in the general inter­
ests of the rice industry. Since all these various processing costs were 
specified, the net effeot was the fixing of a clean rice price. The fact 
that inbound rough rice transportation costs were ignored later caused
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serious difficulties in maintaining these prices.
Broad powers were granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and to 
the Control Committee in investigating the accounts and affairs of any 
mill. Violations could be punished by damages and fines, and a licensing 
plan was agreed upon.
This agreement, after being signed by 35 millers in th© southern 
states, controlled the industry during the winter of 1933-34. By the 
time it went into effect, the heavy marketing season for rice was already 
in progress. The 70 cent conversion charge for rice was immediately de­
clared along with a complete system of premiums and discounts for rough 
rice of the various grades and varieties. In order to enforce the agree­
ment, the license was immediately established covering the same provisions 
as the marketing agreement.
Minimum prices established by the Secret&xy of Agriculture ef­
fective October 16, 1933, in accordance with the marketing agreement, 
represented substantial increases in the price of rough rice in the South. 
These prices, based on a barrel of 162 pounds of grade one prime milling 
quality rough rice, were as follows: Early Prolific $2.751 Japan 02*85>
Blue Rose $3.15; Lady bright $3.15; Edith $3.40; Fortune 13.45; and 
Rexoro $3*50. Elaborate systems of premiums and discounts according to 
grading factors were provided.
This schedule of prices raised average rough prices for most of 
the 1933 crop. Extra fancy Blue Rose clean rice at New Orleans averaged 
$2.25 in 1932-33 while in 1933-34 the average price was 03.85 per 100 
pounds. The average farm price for all grades and varieties of the 
1933-34 crop was 78 cents a bushel, or nearly twice as much as the 1932-33
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farm price« Although other factors, particularly previous acreage re­
ductions, encouraged the price rise in 1933-34, the agreement evidently 
had a marked short-run effect in increasing the price to farmers* To 
the extent that the high conversion charge plus the high rough price de­
creased clean rioe sales, however, the actual benefits of the program 
cannot be ascertained, from the price data* iiicport sales declined pre­
cipitously, and a large carryover accentuated the surpluses from former 
crops*
The Revised Marketing Agreement
As soon as the marketing agreement creating monopolistic control 
in the milling industry was completed and fixed prices were established 
for the 1933 crop? attention was directed to a production control plan 
for 1934* It was evident that the 1933 marketing agreement did nothing 
toward disposal of the surplus, and some provision was necessary to con­
trol acreage near the 1933 level in order to restrain expansion resulting 
from the higher prices. Local meetings of growers were held throughout 
the southern rice area, and it was agreed that an acreage cut of 20 per 
cant should be sought* Individual grower allotments were to be made on 
the basis of production during the preceding five-year period* This 
plan was discussed in hearings at Shreveport on January 22, 1934, and was 
approved by the millers*
The original design was to add this crop control provision as an 
amendment to the existing marketing agreement. Through an administrative 
slip, however, the old agreement was terminated and the amended form be­
came a new agreement, Humber 39, when it was approved by the Secretary of
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Agriculture to become effective on March 6, 1934* According to Nourse, 
this created new difficulties, since several jolliers took this oppor­
tunity to escape from the agreement by refusing to sign th© new agree*- 
ment. Already, after five months under the marketing agreement, indi­
vidual mills were becoming dissatisfied with high prices but no sales, 
and the competitive aspects of the milling industry were breaking through 
the surface. In addition, widespread dissatisfaction with the control 
committee's administration of the terms on which the mills were forced to 
purchase rough rice was becoming prevalent.
The minimum prices for number one grade prime A milling quality 
rough rice were continued as in the previous agreement. However, more 
stringent provisions were enunciated to enforce these minimum prices.
The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to prescribe compulsory 
grading Of rough rice and to prohibit s les of rough rice except on the 
basis of certificates, and to require that all rough rice be weighed by 
a licensed or bonded weigher. Still further, in order to prevent mani­
pulation of the minimum prices through successive sellers, stringent 
regulations were adopted to enforce direct dealing between the mills and 
the growers. These stipulations were necessary in order to sustain the 
minimi™ price regulations, which could easily be evaded if grades or 
weights were handled loosely.
More specific regulations concerning the minimum sale prices 
for clean rice also were necessary to enforce the spirit of the marketing
®Nourse, op, cit,. p. 111.
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agreement. The minimum domestic sale price was to be not less than the 
sum of the minimum rough rioe price, the conversion charge, the published 
car lot rail rate for rough rice from the customary farm delivery point, 
and the administrative assessment on the volume of rice milled. A maxi** 
mum discount of 20 per cent was permitted on sales of rice for export to 
foreign countries. The conversion charge was expressly defined as (a)
70 cents per barrel of rough rice, (b) 9 cents per barrel of rough rice 
if standard one-hundred pound single packages are used for the clean rice, 
and (c) if cotton or paper inner linings or regular burlap outer slips 
are used for the clean rice, an additional 5 cents per barrel of rough 
rice, or (d) if any other type of container is used for the clean rice, 
the actual invoice price for the container used.
Since the use of the marketing assessment for purposes other 
than administration of the agreement had been previously attacked, the 
administrative assessment in the new agreement was reduced to 5 cents 
per barrel of rough rice milled, and was separated from any connection 
with marketing funds. In addition, a marketing assessment could be es­
tablished by the Killers Committee of 5 cents a barrel of rough rice, and 
this fund could be used for industry purposes.
It will be noted that the total milling spread under the conversion 
charge provisions would be 84 cents, not including the marketing assess­
ment and freight on inbound rough rice. The fact that this charge was 
far above the usual 60 cent per barrel total milling spread found in the 
clean rice market under competitive conditions clearly indicates the tre­
mendous difficulty of sustaining the monopolistic agreement in the face of
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Idle capacity, surplus stocks, and competitive buying and selling policies.
The most significant feature of this second marketing agreement, 
however, was the provision for cro control. In order to provide funds 
to be paid to producers who cooperated in any crop control program, the 
contracting millers agreed to establish a trust fund. This was to be 
done by making two payments on rough rice purchased from the 1934 crop—  
first, a payment of 60 per cent of the price to the owner of the rice, 
and second, a payment of the remaining 10 per cent to the Secretary of 
Agriculture.
The Secretary was then to determine the total quantity of rice 
which should be produced in each of the states, and to fix acreage allot­
ments and production quotas for all farmers submitting applications.
Each producer who limited his planted acreage to his allotment was to 
receive payments from the Secretary from the trust fund for rough rice 
sold within his production quota. Total payments could not exceed the 
total sum paid to the Secretary during the crop year, less the expense 
of administration. That is, a producer furnishing satisfactory evidence 
that he had limited his planted acreage to the allotment assigned him, 
would receive a payment at the end of the crop year equivalent to the 
40 per cent of the price withheld by the mill, less a share of the ex­
penses incurred in carrying out the program.
In carrying out the provisions of the new marketing agreement, 
the former Control Committee was continued as the Miller Committee. In 
addition, a Millers Advisory Council was established. A Producers Com­
mittee of seven members was likewise established. Provision was made 
that al 1 questions, disputes, and complaints concerning the interest of
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both producers and millers were to be decided by the Producers Committee 
and the Millers Committee, acting jointly by majority vote of each com­
mittee.
Most of these latter provisions were inserted in the agreement as 
an amendment on July 21, 1934, when the agreement was revised into a much 
more detailed and orderly document. Although the entire agreement was 
largely rewritten, it was substituted as an amendment and new signatures 
were not necessary. The accompanying license was also revised, providing 
for the same actions as the marketing agreement, but with one vital differ­
ence, The provision for crop control could not be included in the license, 
since it was accepted only voluntarily by the mills signing the marketing 
agreement. This fact was of vital importance in contributing toward the 
breakdown of the crop control scheme.
By the time the 1934 crop began to be marketed heavily, the high 
conversion charge was breaking down the minimum price established for 
both rough and clean rice. Two important amendments to the marketing 
agreements and license were therefore made effective on October 15, 1934* 
The first amendment decreased the conversion charge sharply, with the
provision that "the conversion charge per barrel of rough rice shall---
be an amount equal to fifty (50 ) cents per barrel of rough rice and shall 
not be increased by adding to such amount any cost or other amount on ac­
count of containers of any description." This decrease of 29 cents in the 
conversion charge wrs a confession of grave error in the establishment of 
the original conversion allowance.
The benefits of the decreased conversion allowance were to be 
passed to the growers, since it was desired to continue clean rice prices
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at approximately the same levels* The prices of the different varieties 
of rough rice were therefore raised from 15 cents to 20 cents per barrel. 
Minimum rough rice prices after the amendment were: Early Prolific $2.90;
Shoemed $2.90; Japan $3*00; Blue Bose Type Prolific $3.10; Louisiana Pearl 
$3.15; Blue Rose $3.30; Lady Wright $3*30; Early Wright $3.30; Edith $3.60; 
Stormproof $3*60; Fortuna $3.65; Nira $3.65; and Rexoro $3.70.
Difficulties were numerous in maintaining this marketing agreement. 
Repeated amendments were made, but finally the provisions broke down so 
completely that on December 21, 1934, enforcement was practically abandoned 
and the government and the industry gave up their experimentation with the 
marketing agreement method of securing benefits for rice farmers.
Factors Causing Abandonment of Marketing Agreements
Although the price-maintenance clauses of the first marketing 
agreement operating in the winter of 1933-34 had already led to diffi­
culties, these troubles were only minor as compared to those experienced 
when the crop control provision was included after the spring of 1934.
The provision for withholding 40 per cent of the purchase price of rough 
rice was virtually impossible to maintain. Only the mills which signed 
the second agreement were bound by the plan, leaving several of the es­
tablished important mills free to pay the full price upon buying rice 
fro® the grower. The license could be used to enforce minimum price 
schedules and trade practices on all mills, but coild not legally be ap­
plied to the crop control provision.
As a result, the mills which could pay the full price immediately
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upon delivery had an advantage in buying rice and expanded their opera­
tions at the expense of other mills* In addition, a large number of new 
will* sprang up to take advantage of this situation, some of them spon­
sored by farmers* These were principally small huller mills not capable 
of producing a polished white rice as attractive as the product of the 
large mills* However, their rice co ld be sold readily in local terri­
tory, where consumption is high, and on a price discount basis, began to 
reach into more distant territories* Since the investment in most of 
these mills was considerably less than #5,000, they were able to multiply 
rapidly within one year* Many small enterprises, such as feed mills and 
grocery stores, added simple huller equipment to their business at a 
cost of only a few hundred dollars and began competing for local clean 
rice sales*
In addition, growing conditions in the area had been favorable 
and growers did not comply altogether with the production allotments* 
Over-quota rice was available which the growers were anxious to sell 
below the nim^m schedules* Pressure on both the mills and the growers 
led them to violate the marketing agreement provisions in order to pro­
tect their own operations.
The most obvious means of evading the minimum price regulations 
was by designating the rice as a lower grade than justified by its true 
character* Trds situation was met by an administrative order requiring 
ccopulsory grading of el3 rough rice under the inspection service of the 
United States Bureau of Agricultural Economics, effective August 20,
1934* However, the compulsory grading by no means solved the problem, 
but instead became one of the greatest sources of irritation in the
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entire program. The Inspection service was hastily set up, and inexperi­
enced men were necessarily hired as graders. Rough rice grades had never 
been commonly used, and were by no means generally accepted as measures 
of rough rice quality with either growers or millers. Probably most 
serious was the fact that the mills were required to pay the grading fee, 
and therefore directed their rice to graders who they believed might give 
them favorable treatment. Finally, a grade depends on the sample drawn, 
and all sorts of manipulation were possible in drawing a sample that would 
permit evasion of the minimum price regulation.
Faraers frequently combined with millers to defeat the minimum 
price regulations. This was particularly true in the latter part of the 
1934 season, when the breakdown of the marketing agreement was becoming 
increasingly evident. Mills hesitated to buy rough rice for fear that 
the high price could not be sustained much longer. As a result, many 
farmers could find no market at all for their rice, and a large carryover 
was accumulating in fanner’s hands. In order to dispose of rice at all, 
frequently it was essential that the faraor aid a mill to purchase his 
rice well below the minimum price prescription.
Pressure from growers who had planted above their allotments 
also became so insistent in the summer of 1934 that on July 23, permis­
sion was granted growers for a 5 per cent leeway in planting above their 
allotments. This concession being unsatisfactory, a ruling on August 27 
permitted growers to harvest all their acreage with only a small penalty 
in adjustment payments for acreage more than 5 per cent above their 
allotment. Later, an administrative order on September 17 dispensed with
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th8 check-off method of payment for all rough rice within a grower*a 
quota, so that thereafter farmers received the full 100 per cent of th® 
has® price on practically all rice sold. Additional adjustments on 
grades and discounts weî e made on September 26,
The reduction of the conversion charge on October 15 appeared to 
be as severe as the previous charge had been liberal. This factor, com­
bined with the competition of huller mills, general acceptance of ille­
gitimate buying practices, and breakdown of the restricted payment crop 
control plan, brought widespread demand from both millers and growers that 
the crop control plan be abandoned. On December 21, 1934, full payments 
were authorised for all rice and the marketing agreement was discontinued.
In less than a year of operation th® plan had proved a hopeless failure as 
a means of affording permanent farm relief through higher prices and con­
trol of acreage expansion.
Competition with cheap rice also presented a difficult problem 
under the marketing agreement. When the program was instituted rice 
could be shipped into the United States from the Philippines duty free, 
although practically none had been so shipped up to that time. The 
marketing agreements and licenses raised the prices of rice in this coun­
try well above world levels, and as a result the United States became an
9attractive market for Asiatic rice moving from the Philippines,' Exports 
also decreased considerably because of the high fixed prices, so that the 
problem of carryover was aggravated by market losses as well as by increased
9Agricultural Adjustment, 1933 to 1935, United States Department 
of Agriculture, Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1936, p, 239*
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production Tor American producers.
The marketing agreement plan for the rice industry presents one 
of the most interesting oases among the attempts to enforce monopolistic 
practices in the early days of the New Deal. The failure of the program 
for the rice industry emphasised the difficulty of enforcing monopolistic 
practices in an industry with a fairly standardized product and with free 
entry* clarified the fallacies of price-fixing without control of supply 
or attention to export demand, and made rice grow rs aware that basic 
economic difficulties in their industry could not be settled by a simple 
piece of price legislation.
An effective marketing agreement would have required that all 
mills combined in supporting the agreement, that free entry into th© 
milling industry be prohibited, that the fixed price be adjusted to a 
level calculated to move all rice into consumption, that export price 
concessions be made, that acreage control be rigidly Ktaintained, that 
grading standards for both rough and clean rice be generally accepted, 
and that each min be allotted a definite share of the clean rice sales 
quota for each year. These conditions were far from satisfied in the 
1933-34 plan; consequently, failure of the scheme was inevitable.
Amendment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
When the failure of the marketing agreement became evident in 
the fall of 1934* efforts were immediately centered on the formulation 
of a processing tax and production control program similar to th© pro­
grams previously established for wheat and cotton. Although the 
original Agricultural Adjustment act of 1933 provided such a program for
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rice, new legislation was necessary to provide for certain special phases 
of the rice situation* Accordingly, a bill to amend the Agricultural Ad­
justment Act was introduced on February 1, 1935 in the House of Representa-
10tives, and was approved by the President on March 13, 193$.
This bill directed the Secretary of Agriculture to declare before
April 1, 1935, that rental or benefit payments were to be jaade for rice,
and that a processing tax would be in effect after that date. From April
1, 1935 to July 31, 1936, the processing tax was established at the rate
of (me cent per pound of rough rice, the weight being taken when delivered
to the processor.
Although the DeRouen rice amendment provided for a processing tax
on rough rice at the rate of one cent per pound, it also provided for the
elimination of the floor-stocks tax on clean rice and the issuance of tax-
payaent warrants to be used to pay the rough-rlce tax on rice from the 1933
and 1934 crops which had been purchased in accordance with the marketing
agreements and licenses, or which remained in the hands of growers. The
special legislation providing for the removal of the floor-stocks proces-
sing tax and the issuance of tax payment warrants was necessary to avoid
penalizing millers and growers who had purchased or hold rice under th©
11marketing agreement program. As soon as the marketing agreement was 
completely abandoned, rice prices were ejected to fr.ll to the disadvan­
tage of those millers and farmers who held inventories at values previously
*°H. E. $221, No. 20, 74th Congress, approved March 13, 1935. 
Hereafter referred to as the DeRouen rice amendment.
11See hearings in Congressional Record, house Vol. 79, Part 3#
74th Congress, 1st session, 1935, pp. 2631-2637.
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established. It is estimated that about four million bags of rice were 
held by growers in the southern states because the mills would not buy 
under the speculative risk of a change in the program.^
Indirectly the issuance of the tax-payment warrants to holders of 
rough rice acted as an export subsidy and promoted a marked rise in exports 
during 1935* Since the federal government refunded the processing tax on 
xioe exported, the tax-payment warrants could be cashed the mills for 
rice exported, but not for rice sold in the domestic market. This tax- 
payment warrant provision was effective only until August 1, 1935 , when 
new crop rice entered the market. Frau April to August these warrants
acted as an export subsidy of one cent per pound of rough rice, or ap­
proximately $1*45 per pocket of 100 pounds.^
Under the new program, acreage allotments were assigned to the 
states by the Secretary of Agriculture, and distributed to the indivi­
dual growers on the basis of the grower's experience during the base 
period. These allotments were about 20 per cent smaller than the aver­
age seeded acreage in the pre-war base period of 1909-14* Under th©
contracts accepted by th© cooperating growers, a producer who planted
between 85 to 100 per cent of his allotment received a first adjustment 
payment of 1/2 cent per pound on 85 per cent of his production quota.
This payment amounted to 81 cents per barrel. In addition, a second pay­
ment was later del ©mined at the rate of A0.5 cents per barrel. These
^Ibid, p. 2632.
^Brief of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association and 
Rice l&llers Association before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, 
United States Tariff Coxximission, December 19, 1938*
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peymeiibs ware financed  by the processing tax of one cent a pound, or $1*62 
a b a r re l, paid by the millers. Total first benefit payments distributed 
in  1935 to r ic e  growers in the southern area were estimated at $5,157,OCX), 
w ith  additional second payments bringing the total to $7,663,357. Rice 
p ric e s  dropped sharply from the fixed price of 1934 when the marketing 
agreement was abandoned, but rose rapidly in the latter months of 1935 
a f te r  the initial effect of the change disappeared* The average price of 
70 cents a bushel in December, 1935, was only 8 cents below the average 
p ric e  in December, 1934, and in addition the growers received substantial 
b e n e fit payments*
Incidence of the Processing Tax on Rice
The weight of evidence indicates conclusively that the processing 
ta x  on the 1935 rice crop was borne almost entirely by the farmers through 
lower prices for their rice*^ According to the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, the average spread between the price of rough rice in the 
southern states and the wholesale value of equivalent milled rice products 
a t Hew Orleans was $1*16 per barrel from August 1933 to July 1935*^ The 
spread during the period, September to December 1935, when the processing 
ta x  was in effect, was $2*51. The difference between these two average 
spreads was $1*35, compared with the tax of §>1*62 a barrel* In the six 
months following the removal of the tax, the average spread was $1.29.
•^An Analysis of the Effects of the Processing Taxes Levied Under 




M oreover, if data ware available making it possible to allow for
the fact that not all of the rice milled during the period of the tax was
purchased concurrently, it is estimated that the figures would demonstrate
th a t none of the tax was absorbed by the processors*^ A comparison of
retail and wholesale prices of rice does not suggest that any appreciable
portion of the processing tax was passed on to the consumers, since the
retail price at New York increased only from 8*7 to 8*9 cents per pound
in 1935. It follows that the processing tax was in effect a deduction
from the price which would have been received by producers if the tax had
17not been in effect. '
Bice farmers therefore did not gain from benefit payments financed 
by the processing tax* They did gain, however, from the use of the pro­
cessing tax to achieve acreage control and to finance an export subsidy 
which relieved the pressure of accumulated rice stocks* Largely because 
of these latter reasons, the processing tax program was widely acclaimed 
as a success by both growers and millers* Little opposition developed, 
and plans were under way to continue the same type of program in future 
years* The production adjustment program developed for 1936, however, 
was not put into effect, since production adjustment programs involving 
processing taxes were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 
the Hoosac Mills decision of January 6, 1936*
It has been argued that the incidence of the processing tax on 






A laTgB surplus of rice depressed the price at the inception of the tax 
program, and unusually low prices on rough rice were necessary to move 
the surplus rapidly into export markets# By the time the tax was de­
clared unconstitutional, the surplus h^d been largely eliminated and the 
spread between rough rice price and clean rice price was rapidly narrow­
ing • Under conditions when no surplus existed, it is theoretically pro­
bable that a considerable portion of a processing tax would be shifted 
to consumers, since demand for rice is relatively inelastic.
Agricultural Conservation in 1936
On February 29, 1936, less than two months after the Supreme
Court decision invalidating the processing tax, Congress passed the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act to replace the invalidated portions
ISof the Agricultural Adjustment Act. After provision of funds, the new 
soil-conservatlon program authorized by the law was launched on March 20, 
1936. Marketing agreements were not affected by the court decision, but 
the processing tax feature of the successful rice program of 1935 had to 
be discarded.
Under the soil conservation program of 1936, payments were made 
for practices designed to conserve soil resources. These practices in­
cluded reduction in acreage of soil-depleting crops, of which rice was 
declared to be one. The base acreage for rice as a soil-depleting crop 
was established by the methods similar to those used in the previous pro-
^3. 3780, Mo. 461, 74th Congress, approved February 29, 1936.
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taction control program. Under the general rules of the soil conservation 
program, a farmer could qualify for soil-building payments up to on© dollar 
per acre by seeding soil-building crops or adopting soil-building practices. 
A second type of soil-conserving payment was also made for acreage diverted 
from rice. To qualify for payment it was required that an acreage not less 
than 20 per cent of the base rice acreage be devoted to soil-improving 
crops, while not less than 65 per cent of the base must be planted to rice 
in order to qualify. The rate of payment was 20 cents for each 100 pounds 
of the producer * s domestic consumption quota.
The base rice acreage for any farmer for 1936 was the annual aver­
age rice acreage grown in the years 1929-1933, inclusive, as allocated 
among the farmers participating in rice production in 1936. Contracts were 
not employed, payments being disbursed when it was established that the 
grower had satisfied prescribed conditions. All payments were financed 
direct from the federal treasury.
A similar program for rice was carried on during 1937, except for 
changes designed to increase flexibility and make use of the payments more 
effectively. Payments were made to rice producers in 1937 at the rate of 
22 cents per 100 pounds of their domestic consumption quota, provided that 
they planted between 85 to 100 per cent of their rice base acreage and 
provided further that they had an acreage of soil-conserving crops on the 
rice land equal to 25 per cent of their rice base acreage. If a producer 
planted less than 35 per cent or more than 100 per cent of his rice base 
acreage or if he did not have the 25 per cent soil-conserving acreage, 
certain deductions were provided. In addition, payments were continued
234
for carrying out specified soil-building practices, with rates stated 
in appropriate units for work done*
This soil-oonserv&tion program was not successful in controlling 
the acreage planted to major crops, including rice* In response to a 
general demand for more effective regulation for achieving production 
control, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was enacted on February 
16, 1938.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 strengthened and con­
tinued the agricultural conservation programs of 1936 and 1937, with
payments provided for farmers adopting specified soil conservation 
19practices* In addition, the act supplemented the conservation program 
with provisions for regulating interstate and foreign commerce in the 
five commodities listed in the act— cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and 
rice.
In general, the act provided acreage control for rice by em­
powering the Secretary to declare national acreage allotments and make 
payments to cooperating growers. Marketing quotas backed by penalties 
on sales in excess of the quotas could also be used, subject to ap­
proval of two-thirds of the producers voting, to obtain general parti­
cipation in a program designed to hold surplus supplies off the market. 
Commodity loans on the major commodities could also be declared In 
order to permit storage and sustain price.
R. 8505, No. 430, 75th Congress, 3d Session, approved 
February 16, 1938.
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The act afforded to ric© famers five types of income protections 
(X) payments for cooperation in the s 1 1 conservation program, (2 ) "parity" 
payments if funds were made available by Congress, (3 ) price rises result­
ing from curtailment of acreage, (4 ) marketing quotas, which if adopted 
could control the supply placed on the market even after heavy production, 
and (5) the authorization of storage loans to maintain price. The market­
ing quotas and commodity loans could become effective only when supplies 
exceed normal by amounts definitely specified, and then only when approved 
in a producer's referendum.
Under the 1938 act, the Secretary of Agriculture was required to 
d eten d n e  each year, before December 31# the national and state acreage 
allotments for rice and the allotments to be in effect for the following 
crop year* The national acreage allotment was to be that acreage which, 
a t the average yield of th e  preceding 3 years, would produce a normal 
y e a r*8 domestic consumption and exports of rice, plus 10 per cent as a 
carryo ver.
The national allotment was distributed by the Secretary among 
the rice-producing states on the basis of their previous acreages. In 
each state, the state allotment was distributed through local and county 
committees among rice growers, 3 per cent of each state allotment being 
reserved to be distributed among new producers* The distribution of al­
lotments among producers was based upon production, crop-rotation practices, 
soil fertility, and other physical factors affecting the production of the 
crop.
In addition to the acreage allotment the act required the Secretary
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to establish and proclaim the total amount of rice which would he needed 
during the next marketing year to meet the requirements of consumers in 
the United States* This domestic allotment was then apportioned among 
states in proportion to the average production of a five-year period, and 
the state allotments among growers on the basis of the yields of their 
acreage allotments.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193® prohibited the application 
of marketing quotas to rice in the marketing year beginning August 1, 193®. 
It provided that in later years, if the total available supply of rice ex­
ceeded by more than 10 per cent the normal supply, which was a normal 
year’s domestic consumption and exports plus 10 per cent, that fact should 
be proclaimed and a national marketing quota, subject to a referendum of 
growers, would be in effect during the following marketing year. This 
national quota would be apportioned among producers on the same basis of 
production on which the domestic allotment of rice would be apportioned 
among them. Rice producers marketing rice in excess of their quotas 
would be subject to a penalty of 0*25 cent for each pound so marketed.
The only portions of this program which have been applied to rice 
growers are the acreage allotments, conservation payments, and parity 
payments* Referendums on marketing quotas were held on both the 1939 
and 1940 crops, but were refused by the growers both times* Ho referendum 
was necessary on the 1941 crop, since supply was below the normal supply 
plus 10 per cent as specified in the act* Up to the fall of 1941* the 
loan program has not yet been utilized for rice. Ho loans could b© of­
fered unless supplies reach levels at which, the application of marketing
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quotas is authorized, and only if the marketing quota had been accepted 
by a favorable vote of the producers*20
Recapitulation
The experience of rice growers in the southern area under federal 
farm legislation may now be briefly summarized* Previous to 1933* rice 
as a crop received little attention in specific farm legislation* Although 
it was Included in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933* no attempt was 
made at a program to control the crop of that year* However* from October* 
1933 to March* 1934 a marketing agreement fixed prices of both rough and 
clean rice* This agreement was modified and continued in March* 1934 with 
the addition of crop control provisions* During the summer and fall the 
plan broke down* and enforcement was abandoned on December 21* 1934*
In April, 1935 a crop control plan embodying a processing tax on 
rice went into operation* This plan operated with considerable success 
until the supreme court decision in January* 1936 outlawed all proces­
sing tax plans as unconstitutional*
For the crop years 1936 and 1937 the rice growers received pay­
ments for participation in the soil conservation program* which* however* 
did not afford effective crop control* In 1938* this act was revised by 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 affording more effective crop 
control and permitting the establishment of marketing quotas* Marketing 
quotas were rejected in referendums by the growers* and the Agricultural
In May* 1941* the President approved & bill making loans at 85 
per cent of the 1910-14 parity mandatory on basic agricultural commodities* 
including rice. At the time of passage* rice was selling above the parity
price* On October 3, 1941, the loan program for rice was declared and 
provisions were made for its operation.
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Adjustment Act program in 1938 * 1939> and 1940 has functioned on practi­
cally the same plan throughout*
t Kffect of the Rice Programs
The avowed objective of agricultural adjustment legislation for 
the rice industry has been to raise the price of rough rice to “parity, * 
which was defined as a purchasing power equivalent to that enjoyed in 
the base period 1910-14* To achieve this, it was necessary to raise 
actual prices by reducing supplies either through acreage control or 
through elimination of abnormal annual carryovers* The only other method 
of raising price would be to increase the demand for rice, but the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Act was designed to attack the problem only from the 
supply side* Since both production and annual carryover increased after 
1933, when government restrictions were first established, it is at 
once evident that the only long time force which has raised the price of 
rice must be the improvement in demand conditions, a factor independent 
of government policies affecting the supply of rice*
In the 1932-33 crop year, the average price received by rice 
fazmers in the United States bordered on 40 per cent of the parity price* 
The marketing agreement in 1933 was effective in raising the farm price 
from less than 40 cents to 79 cents a bushel, or to 78 per cent of the 
parity price at that time. However, as previously described, raising 
the price of rice by price fixing did little toward eliminating the de­
pressing influence of large crops and surplus supplies* Carryover from 
the 1932 crop in the southern states was equivalent to 1,613,000 barrels 
of rough rice, and 1,468,000 barrels of the 1933 crop was still on the
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market when the 193A crop was harvested. Obviously this maintenance of 
a large carryover aggravated the price problem from the aspect of supply. 
Grower cooperation restrained rice acreage expansion to some extent under 
the marketing agre ment, since the 1934 crop was the smallest in a decade. 
The net result of the marketing agreement program of adjustment, however, 
was that it gave growers a temporarily high price, but did nothing toward 
permanent price adjustment.
Most of the 1935 crop was marketed under the processing tax pro­
vision which replaced the marketing agreement. The average price re­
ceived by Louisiana farmers for this crop fell below 70 per cent of the 
parity price, but payments approaching ne cent per pound brought net re­
ceipts close to the parity level. The stimulation to exports resulting 
from the issuance of tax payment warrants on carryover rice resulted in a 
great reduction in the carryover, from 1,46# million barrels in the summer 
of 1934 to 423 million barrels in the summer of 1935* This vast reduction 
in carryover resulted in a small total supply of rice in 1936. As a result, 
average price for the 1936 crop rose to as high as 86 per cent of parity, 
the highest level attained until the war boom of 1940-41*
Because of the expansion in production, the total purchasing power 
value of the United States rice crop has been greater since 1936 than the 
average for the decade 1921-1930. Government payments ranging from 1-1/2 
to 2-1/2 million dollars have increased this purchasing power still further, 
as is  evident in Table X X X III. Since the number of rice growers has not 
increased materially, the increased cro;. value created a relatively favor­
ab le  income position for rice growers in the past few years, which has been
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Tibi* XXXIII. Prices received by farmers for rice expressed as a percentage of 



























1930 72 67 64 63 61 63 66 66 67 66 66 65
1931 52 46 46 52 53 53 50 49 45 45 45 43
1932 43 43 39 39 40 40 40 44 49 59 63 63
1933 66 73 77 78 75 78 78 78 78 75 74 72
1934 73 72 75 75 72 77 73 75 76 78 81 80
1935 70 62 67 70 73 78 79 80 80 83 84 831936 82 86 75 74 71 78 83 83 83 79 75 72
1937 67 59 67 70 63 63 62 58 53 53 57 60
1938 61 58 62 64 65 65 64 62 60 61 60 59
1939 58 79 72 73 69 70 67 61 61 68 70 73
1940
1941.
72 60 61 70 73 84 93 93 106 109 107 102
Sourcet Hidmonth Local Market Price Report, Agricultural Marketing Service, 
United States Department of Agriculture, mimeographed release, June 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a continued spur toward larger production and non-cooperation in govern­
ment programs in areas where new rice land was available*
th e  1936 and 1937 rice programs were unable to control the forces 
c re a tin g  acreage and production expansion* The 1937 crop year began w ith  
another large carryover of 1,429*000 barrels of southern rice and the 
crop th a t year rose almost 3“ 1/2 million barrels above the low level o f 
1933* Coupled with a general collapse in farm product prices, this re­
s u lte d  in a drastic decline in rice prices and an accentuated accumu­
la tio n  of carryover* In 1939, total supplies of southern rice were the 
greatest since the World War, and the 1940 crop year began with a record 
carryover equivalent to 1,865,000 barrels of rough rice, almost a sixth 
o f th e  expanded annual production of recent years* Until the outbreak of 
th e  European war in 1939, prices drifted between 50 and 60 per cent of 
th e  p a r ity  level*
The experiments of the past seven years with the various adjust­
ment programs in the rice industry have thus resulted in a large expansion 
in acreage, an all-time record for production of rice in the southern 
s ta te s , and the accumulation of enormous carryovers of rice* Price has 
been raised twice by government action, the first time by price fixing 
devices which could not be maintained, the second time through the effect 
of an  indirect export subsidy by the issue of tax-payment warrants on 
carryover stocks* The value of the annual crop, even vdLthout government 
payments, has been larger than the 1923-1930 average, so that the pay­
ments have been simply an additional subsidy*
No basic adjustment in rice acreage or production has been 
achieved. The fact that the large expanded acreage by 1940 appeared
m
justified because of high price is the result of a drastically changed ex­
port demand condition, not in any way to be credited to the adjustment 
programs# The conclusion is inescapable that the four different types of 
rice programs so far attempted have contributed nothing toward the correction 
of basic supply maladjustments in the rice industry which depress price, 
and, in fact, have greatly accentuated these maladjustments* The economic 
welfare of the rice farmers has been improved only through outright federal 
subsidy payments and through change in demand resulting from current war 
conditions*
Geographical Effects
As was described in Chapter I, the percentage increase in rice 
acreage since 1933 has been greatest in Texas. In 1934 and 1935, growers 
cooperated in all four producing states to restrict increases in acreage, 
but the relaxation of acreage control in 193& brought an increase which 
has been maintained since that time in spite of the annual attempts by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to reduce national rice acreage by 
approximately 20 per cent* prom 1936 to 1940, Louisiana growers cooper­
ated sufficiently to reduce their acreage by 60,000 acres, or about 10 
per cent of 1936 plantings. During the same fcur years, Texas growers 
expanded their acreage by 40,000 acres, offsetting the larger part of the 
Louisiana reduction. Arkansas and California acreages have changed rela­
tively little since 1936. The failure of the acreage reduction program, 
therefore, is due largely to lack of participation by Texas producers, 































































































































































































































































































































































Although a majority of the rioe growers have cooperated in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration programs since their inception, 
sufficient growers have continually remained outside the programs to pro­
hibit effective acreage control* The degree of participation between 
1935 end 1938 is shown in the table* In 1935* acreage was effectively 
controlled, since farmers operating more than 85 per cent of the acreage 
in all states cooperated in the rice program. In 1936, participation 
declined to an average of 72*5 per cent of the acreage In the nationj In 
1937* only 61 per cent of the national acreage was in the program. 
Louisiana growers, up through 1937* cooperated to no greater extent than 
Texas growers* After the price declines in 1937 and 1938* however, par­
ticipation increased sharply in Louisiana and acreage control in the 
state become more effective. Texas participation, however, declined still 
further after 1937 and reduced the effectiveness of total acreage control* 
Acreage figures on participation for 1939 and 1940 were not computed by 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, but the trend of total acre­
age Indicates that less than 60 per cent of the Texas planted acreage 
has been participating, while about 80 per cent of Louisiana acreage has 
been controlled under the rice program.
The absence of acreage control in Texas is demonstrated by the 
following tables. In 1938, 62 per cent more Texas acreage was planted 
in rice than the 157,741 acres allotted to Texas growers. In 1939* al- 
through the state allotment was sharply increased, 42 per cent more 
acreage was planted; in 1939, after another increase in allotment, 46 
per cent more acreage was in rice. The growers in Louisiana, on the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































wdjr 13 per cent and 11 par oant above in 1939 and 1940, respectively.21
Although many parishes in Louisiana planted less rice than was 
allotted under the program, every rice-producing county in Texas has 
consistently planted far above ita respective allotment. This was true 
between 1938 and 1940 in spite of a more than 40,000 aore increase in 
total Texas allotments. The most important rice producing area in Texas, 
Jefferson county, planted 53 per cent above ita 1940 allotment of 36,471 
acres. Acreage has expanded sharply in Chambers county, which planted 
76 per cent above its 1940 allotment of 20,454 acres} in Brazoria county, 
which planted 33,500 acres in 1938 and 46,157 acres in 1940} and gener­
ally in all producing counties of the state. The greatest percentages 
for planting above allotments have been in the counties planting only a
few thousand acres of rice. Although the allotments in these counties
have been steadily increased, they continue to plant 80 per cent or more
in excess of their allotments.
In Louisiana, Cameron parish, near the Texas border, has been 
the principal area consistently planting rice far in excess of Its al­
lotment, In 1940, 54 per cent more acreage was planted than its allotted 
11,117 acres, which compared to an allotment of 7,051 aores in 1938, when
42 per cent more acreage was planted. Other principal rice producing
parishes and the percentage of acreage in excess of allotments In 1940
21In 1938 rice allotments were made only to participating farms, 
but the 1939 and 1940 allotments were based on the acreage of all lice 
farms. This accounts for the sharp increase in acreage allotments be­
tween 1938 and 1939* There is no comparable data for the 1935*37 pro­
grams, since allotments were made to individuals, not to counties and 
faz&s. Before 1938 a grower could apply for an allotment in one state











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































were Allen, 23 per cent) Calcasieu, 21 per centj and Jefferson Davis, 
16 per cent. These parishes are suitable for few crops except rice, 
are highly specialized, and have undeveloped peripheries of land 
adapted to rice production.
The two parishes which have the greatest acreages in rice, 
Acadia and Vermilion, planted close to their respective allotments of 
99,528 acres and 89,326 acres in 1940. These parishes were long ago 
thoroughly developed for rice production, and little acrea e is avail­
able for expansion.
Parishes in Louisiana which are on the eastern outskirt of the 
specialized producing area, and the river rice parishes, have consis­
tently planted less than their rice allotments. For example, the tfest 
Baton Rouge parish allotment has been reduced from 703 acres in 1938 
to 309 acres in 1940, but plantings were only 97 P«r cent of the re­
duced allotment of 1940. Similar conditions are evident in all of the 
river and minor producing parishes. Evidently the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Administration program has operated to bring expansion in special­
ised producing areas, while minor areas have given up rice acreage.
The unusual reduction of acreage on the eastern fringe of the 
Louisiana rice belt is due both to the absence of new land and to the 
fact that many of the farms in this area grow cotton and sugar cane.
In order to qualify under the cotton program, a farmer must also parti­
cipate in the programs for rice and other crops. Thus, both the avail­
ability of new land in western Louisiana and in Texas, and the practice 
of specialized rice growing without cotton production, has increased 
acreage in these areas at the expense of the older producing regions.
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Evaluation of Rice Adjustment Programs
Even under the relatively low prices of the past four years, 
rice growers, in specialised areas where new land is available, have 
evidently found it profitable to expand production* After large acre­
ages have been planted to establish increased allotments, the growers 
return to the program and receive benefit payments in addition to their 
rice receipts* In Acadia and Vermilion parishes, where growers do not 
have this opportunity, this aspect of the rice adjustment programs is 
definitely injurious to established rice farmers* Growers in this area 
have little alternative to participation in the rice program, and they 
recognise that expansion in acreage to the west more than offsets any 
supply limitation they achieve.
Increasing the Agricultural Adjustment Administration payments 
in order to gain more complete participation in acreage control plans 
would probably be ineffective, sinoe this action would merely make rice 
production in the expanding areas more attractive once a base has been 
established. Freezing of parish and county allotments at present acre­
ages would also probably be ineffective when non-cooperation is preva­
lent. Marketing quotas have been rejected by the growers in two years 
when large sup; lies justified a referendum, demonstrating the satis­
faction of the rice growers in regard to recent prices.
Apparently, the price of rice has been sufficiently high to 
make expanded production profitable, and the adjustment program has 
not greatly hindered the economic forces shifting acreage toward Texas. 
Parity payments and payments for soil conservation practices have been
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a subsidy to growers in the eastern part of the rice belt, and have 
added to the attractiveness of rice production in the western areas. 
There is little likelihood of acreage reduction under present price 
conditions, although the threat of increased supply and curtailed ex­
ports after the present war makes the acreage situation appear very 
22serious.
nTwo-PrioeK Proposals
Because of the ineffectiveness of acreage control, and in view 
of the nature of the domestic and export markets for rice, leaders in 
the industry have for several years advocated the abolition of re­
strictions on acreage and the use of a federal tax to separate prices 
between domestic and foreign markets. The most recent version of this
plan was a domestic allotment and certificate scheme proposed in con-
23gressional hearings in the summer of 1939. Under this plan, market­
ing certificates would be issued to farmers according to their allot­
ment in the national domestic marketing quota. Millers would be 
required to buy these certificates, in order to market the equivalent 
clean rice in the domestic market, and the proceeds would accrue to 
the farmers as an additional payment above the price received for rice. 
Rice produced in excess of allotments would receive no payment and
^This raises the always difficult problem of the extent to 
which farm relief programs should be used to prevent a shift in acre­
age arising from economic advantages.
2^See hearings before committees on agriculture on S. 2573, 
June 30, 1939, and H. R. 6654, July 11 and 12, 1939, 76th Congress,
1st Session, Washington, D.C.
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cou ld  h o t be marketed domestically without & severe penalty. Provision 
was made for marketing this excess rice in export markets without a 
certificate and the consequent t&x, so that rice could be sold abroad 
at a price below domestic prices by the amount of the certificate. By 
this means, the rice industry could take advantage of higher prices in 
the domestic market, dump surplus stocks in export markets, establish 
a self-financing rice program, and make unnecessary the elaborate but 
ineffective acreage control of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
The general outline of this plan is similar to those proposed In 
the schemes for separation of the foreign and domestic market as frequent­
ly suggested since the emergence of the export problem for farm commodi­
ties after World far I. As described in the preceding chapter, the na­
ture of the export market for rice furnishes an unusual opportunity for 
the successful application of a rice export price differential. From 
the 1935 experience with a processing tax on rice, it appears likely 
that the farmer might bear such a tax to a considerable extent. Never­
theless, the supply placed in the domestic market could be effectively 
limited, and the export outlet could be made secure regardless of the 
incidence of the tax. Total returns to the farmers, even after the tax 
was paid, could be increased if supplies were limited in the inelastic 
market and expanded in the Elastic market.
The effect of an export subsidy program on domestic consumers 
is to raise their price and limit their consumption, which is obviously 
against consumer welfare. The object of recent farm relief programs in 
general, however, has been to benefit the farmer at the expense of the
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consumer, 30 that this objection is valid only when applied to all 
price-raising legislation* Although processing taxes have once been 
outlawed by the Supreme Court, there is a general feeling that similar 
taxes may in the future be regarded more favorably* After the present 
unusual export situation passes, the rice industry vdll very likely 
exert pressure for legislation of the type here described,
At present, plans are being made to set a floor under rice 
prices of 65 per cent of ’’parity,” by means of the loan program of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation. If the high rice prices of mid-1941 are 
maintained, practically no rice will enter this loan. The collapse of 
high prices, however, would make the loan program operative on a large 
scale in the rice belt, With continued low prices, the rice loan would 
merely repeat the process of piling up surplus stocks already experi­
enced under the cotton loan. Leaders in the rice industry are not 
anxious to repeat the experience of building up large surplus stocks, 
and are dubious concerning the value of a loan program unless action
^Since export subsidies under this plan would be financed by 
higher prices to domestic consumers, it can be argued that a direct tax 
on social funds equivalent to the price increase would be a cheaper way 
to pay benefits to farmers. Theoretical analyses show that the injury 
to buyers of a good is less if the tax is in the form of a deduction from 
their incomes rather than an increase in the price of the good. ’ith the 
higher price in effect, individual buyers not only lose the amount of the 
tax but also are unable to reach the maximum utility position which they 
could have attained if the same sura were paid as a direct tax because with 
the increased price they cannot gain as much utility as formerly from sub­
stituting this commodity for other goods. For proof of this proposition, 
see J. ft. Hicks, Value and Capital. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939.
Politically, it appears more feasible to tax for an export subsidy pro­
gram. R. 3. Nelson, "iSxport Subsidies and Agricultural Income,” Journal 
of Faro Economics, 23:619-631, August 1941*
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is taken simultaneously for rapid liquidation of rice entering the
loan.^5
Additional difficulties are also ahead for rice loans. Eice 
in loan will have to be graded before valuation, and rice grades as a 
basis for price differentials are not generally accepted in the rice 
belt. Perhaps a loan program might result in general acceptance and 
use of grades, which would benefit the industry in general* Loans 
based on grades would at least be less difficult to administer than 
fixed prices based on grades* More serious, however, is the condition 
of available rice storage apace and the hazard of insect damage* Ware­
houses in the rice belt are too loose for protection against rats and 
insects in the summer, and all investigations have demonstrated huge 
losses from insect feeding in rice during the hot months of the year.^ 
This handicap, plus a general prejudice against old crop rice, indicates 
that prolonged storage of rough rice will be a costly operation, and 
that physical losses alone will more than exceed the 15 per cent margin
^ Annual Report, 1940-41. American Rice Growers Cooperative 
Association, p* 14-15•
^Investigation has shown that grain containing 12 per cent or 
more of moisture is most favorable for the development of insect infes­
tation* Rice, as it enters storage, invariably contains 14 per cent or 
more of moisture. An experiment conducted in 1939 showed that rice 
harvested in 193d and placed in storage had lost, by May 2, 1939, 4-4 
per cent of its weight from insect feeding. On November 21 following, 
or 12 months after storage began, this loss had increased to 21 per cent 
of its original weight. Owing to the loose construction of most rice 
mills and warehouses, fumigation can be conducted only in especially 
constructed chambers or vaults. Agriculture Department Appropriation 
Hearings» 1942, p. 837.
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27between the proposed loan rate and parity price*
0 7 Some of the trade considers that old crop rice that has been 
s to red  and dried has better consuming qualities than new crop rice 
freshly milled and containing more moisture. However, carryover rice 
does not have original color or freshness, and under normal conditions 
is sold at a sacrifice in prloe. Testimony of millers in Interstate 
Commerce Commission Docket No. 26430, eg. cit.. p. 217*
CHAPTER VII
COOPERATIVE MARKETING IN THE RICE INDUSTRY
In the preceding chapters, problems involved in rough rice 
marketing have been discussed in regard to market institutions, 
market outlets, and governmental action affecting the rice industry.
The most permanent, and perhaps most effective, market improvements 
so far achieved, have resulted from cooperative marketing associations 
among rice fanners. The rice industry is localized, with relatively 
large production units and progressive farmers, and has therefore af­
forded an unusual opportunity for the development of cooperative 
marketing.
Shortly alter the development of rice production in the south­
western prairies of Louisiana, loosely organized marketing associations 
appeared among the farmers. About 1B94* the Rice Growers Association 
of America was organized by Knapp, an early leader in the rice industry. *" 
This early association confined its operations largely to offering rice 
on sealed bids to mill buyers in order to eliminate competition In 
selling among the farmers of a community. Although this early Informal 
association was a significant development in cooperative action, it
Ĥosier L. Brinkley, ’’Cooperative Methods of Marketing Rice,” 
American Cooperation. 1929. Washingtont American Institute of Co­
operation, 1930, p- 97.
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accomplished little toward the establishment of formally organized co­
operative enterprise.
The first large formal organization established in the rice in-
odustxy was the Southern Rice Growers* Association in 1910-U. This 
organisation is reported to have had at one time a membership of from
360 to 73 par cent of the rice growers in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas* 
For several years its operations were very successful, and a substantial 
reserve of 1*50,000 was accumulated* Local offices and local sales manag­
ers were maintained to offer rice samples on auction tables for sealed 
bids* Marketing commissions were ten cents a barrel, which entitled 
members to the selling services and to market information distributed 
among the districts.
Prices were high or trending upward from 1910 to 1919 > the in­
dustry was expanding, and profits for the growers and the association 
were large* The drastic deflation of 1920, however, ended the boom 
period and the financial success of the association# When price de­
clined rapidly in 1920, mills refused to buy rice on any basis because 
of the serious inventory risks. In order to find an outlet for rice, 
the association sponsored a toll mill arrangement under which rice 
millers were to process the rough rice at a charge of one dollar per 
barrel. This arrangement ended in general distrust and dissatisfaction 
when it was discovered that special concessions had been made to one 
large mill. Consequent difficulties brought bo&h the association and
^Cooperative Marketing. Senate Document No# 95, 70th Congress,
1st Session, 1928, p. 204#
^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. op. olt#, p. 97#
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the idea of toll milling into general disrepute
A contributing factor to the failure of the organization was 
the fact that its once ample reserves had been dissipated by dividend
5payments, so that a few months of reduced income forced its dissolution.
In addition, it has been reported that the millers through a policy of
"peaceful penetration” rendered the association innocuous so far as bene-
fits to the growers were concerned.
A similar association was formed by rice growers on the Pacific
7coast about 1915, known as the Pacific Rice Growers Association. Its 
methods of operation were very similar to those of the Southern Associ­
ation, and its experiences were very similar. Its failure in 1920 was
caused by drastic deflation and problems similar to those of its con-
8temporary organization in the South.
The failure of these two associations in 1920, however, did not 
discourage the development of cooperative enterprise in the rice industry. 
The opportunity for profitable cooperative action in the unsettled market 
was more evident than ever before, and the failure of the earlier organi­
zations was recognized as being due largely to events beyond the control 
of the associations. In 1921, the American Rice Growers Association was 
organized at Lake Charles, Louisiana, About the same time, the Rice
4lbid., p. 9a.
^Ibid., p. 9a*
^Cooperative Marketing, o p. clt.. p. 204.
^Ibid.. p. 204.
^Brinkley, Amerioan Cooperation. 1929. 2£* Pit., p. 9S.
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Growers Association of California, and the Arkansas Rice Growers Co­
operative Association at Stuttgart, Arkansas, were organised in the
9other producing areas. In 1922 the Farm Bureau sponsored an addi­
tional rice association in southwestern Louisiana, and in 1923 the
same organization established a River Farm Bureau Rice Growers Cooper-
10ative Association, with headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The Arkansas association, sponsored by the Farm Bureau, and 
the two Farm Bureau associations in Louisiana were organized to pool 
and mill the rice of their growers. The California association and the 
Am erican Rice Growers Cooperative Association in Louisiana were organ­
is e d  as marketing agencies representing the growers in bargaining with 
independent mills. The history of all five of the rloe cooperative 
associations organized in the early 1920*3 is replete with the mistakes, 
fin a n c ia l mismanagement, and economic fallacies prevalent in the cooper­
ative movement of that decade. The three most important associations 
organized during that time, however, furnished the basic organization 
fo r  the three cooperative associations operating successfully at the 
present time.
The R ice Growers Association of California has been consistent­
ly the most successful of the cooperative enterpilses in the rice in­
dustry. Hie number of growers in the locality is small and practically 
*11 of them are members of the association. All rough rice is sold 
through a central office, with field men scattered through the area to
^C ooperative M arke tin g , op. o i t . ,  p. 204.
^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. o£. cjjt., p. 99.
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secure samples and maintain contact with the members. Each member*s 
ride is sold as a separate lot, the association acting as a marketing 
agent and supplying market information.
The degree of cooperation in California has been so great that 
the association has been able to establish export subsidies and other 
surplus relief programs on its own initiative, since its control of the 
California rice supply has been virtually complete. The growers associ­
ation has acted in close accord with the millers association, so that 
monopolistic practice has been approached in the marketing and processing 
of California rice. Monopoly powers, however, are closely limited by 
competition of Southern and Asiatic rices, which are close substitutes 
for California rice.
The operations of the Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Associ­
ation have been conducted on a totally different plan. Organized through 
the efforts of Aaron Sapiro in 1921, its object was to carry the growers* 
interest in the rice all through the marketing process into final con­
sumption channels as clean rice. Title to the rice passed to the associ­
ation upon delivery by the grower, and an advance payment was made based 
on the grade and value of the rice. The rice was pooled and processed 
in mills owned or leased by the association. After final sale of the 
rice in a season's operations, the growers received a final distribution 
of the proceeds from the rice.^
The Arkansas association has operated on this plan since 1921,
1^Cooperative Marketing* op. olt., p. 206j Brinkley, American 
Cooperation. 1929. op. clt.* p. 9®*
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although it had gone through three drastic reorganizations by 1934*
These reorganizations were caused principally by the accumulation of 
large carryovers of milled rice which could not be marketed at profit­
able prices to the producers* Financial difficulties arose from the same 
inventory risks inherent in rice milling as described in Chapter IV* Efy 
1941# however, the financial status and operations of the Arkansas associ­
ation had become secure*
The two associations organized in Louisiana by the Farm Bureau 
modeled their operations on the Arkansas plan* In southwest Louisiana, 
the farm Bureau association milled rice for several years after its or­
ganization in 1922, but difficulties in market fluctuations and finances
13caused early dissolution* The River Farm Bureau Rice Growers Cooper­
ative Association leased mills at New Orleans and Baton Rouge between 
1920 and 1930, handling the small volume of production in this area*
After the market decline in 1930, however, this association soon was in 
difficulty and ceased operation*
American Rice Growers Association
The American Rice Growers Association began operations in 1921 
with headquarters in Lake Charles, Louisiana* The association followed 
the mericeting plan of the California cooperative, with the association 
restricting its services to that of a marketing agent for its members* 
About 200 members, located in Texas and Louisiana, established seven
Testimony in Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26430# 
£&* cit., p. 775.
13See Rice Journal. September, 1923*
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local districts which handled the sales of the district members*
Although the association was organised to operate as a marketing 
agent, some pooling of rough rice was attempted on a rising market in 
1922 and in several latter y e a r s . A s  in similar experiences with other 
commodities, rice growers made the mistake of assuming that pooling was 
the source of increased average returns for their rice, whereas in reali­
ty the rising market was responsible for the higher average price* When 
pooling was attempted in later years on a declining market, the cooper­
ative became involved in financial difficulties and dissatisfaction among 
the embers increased rapidly.
From 1921 to 1928 the American Rice Growers Association handled 
annually between 50G,OOG to 2,000,000 barrels of the southern rice crop. 
(Table XXXH) Its greatest volume was obtained in 1921-22, the first 
season of operation. Thereafter the volume declined steadily to a low 
point of less than 300,000 barrels in 1923-26. Membership in the associ­
ation declined each year, dissatisfaction with operations was prevalent, 
and management of the financial affairs of the association was poor* 
Although the volume of rice handled increased after 1926, the 
situation in regard to membership and finances had become so serious 
that it was necessary to reorganize the association and obtain a fresh 
start. Accordingly, a complete reorganization was made, and the Ameri­
can Rice Growers Cooperative Association began operations on June 4, 1928
^Rice Journal. August, 1923, p* 36.
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Per cent sold 
through 
Association
1921-22 1,821,636 8,322,500 21*8
1922-23 1,430,639 9,258,610 15.5
1923-24 845,556 7,626,111 11.0
1924-25 576,366 7,986,666 7*2
1925-26 493,720 3,075,555 6.1
1926-27 771,730 9,158,611 3*4
1927-28 925,982 9,927,500 9.3
Source: Files of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake
Charles, Louisiana.
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under the amended charter and bylaws of the original corporation.*^ 
this association operates today as the only cooperative rice marketing 
organisation in Louisiana and Texas.
Structure of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association
The reorganisation of the Meric on Bice Growers Cooperative 
Association was accomplished with the aid of cooperative marketing 
specialists from the United States Department of Agriculture, who for
the first time participated in the marketing organisations of the rice
16growers. In 1929, the year following its organisation, the Federal 
Farm Board began its extensive program of cooperative financing and 
cCBSBOdity loans as a means of market improvement, and operations of the 
organization were initiated largely in accord with practices suggested 
by federal agencies.
In essential principles, the structure of the organization es­
tablished in 1928 remains the son* today. It was designed to operate 
in Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. Local districts were organized, 
self-controlled by local boards of directors elected by the growers in 
the district, and providing a local sales office, manager, and samplers. 
Each local district is represented on a central association board of 
directors by directors allocated on the basis of one to each 100,OCX) 
barrels handled, or fraction thereof. This central board of directors 
conducts the affairs of the central association, which from a main
^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. ô . oit., p. 99. 
16Ibld.
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of floe In Lak® Charles, Louisiana, coordinates the activities of the 
districts, conducts operations for unincorporated districts, and main­
tains a marieet news service and grading office for all the districts*
The local districts conduct their affairs independently of each other, with 
no rigid control over their policies exerted by the central association* 
The net result is a loosely federated group of local cooperative market­
ing agencies, with the central office providing those market services 
which can be more efficiently performed on a large scale*
Present District Organizations
The number of local districts organized under the American Rice 
Growers Cooperative Association has varied between six and fifteen 
during thirteen years of operation. In the initial year of 1920-29* two 
districts operated in Texas and four in Louisiana. In later years, ad­
ditional districts were organized in both of these states, and one in 
Arkansas. Sew districts were established in new rice areas, large dis­
tricts were broken up into smaller districts, and occasionally small 
districts ceased operations or combined with neighboring districts.
During the 1940-41 season, fifteen local districts were in 
active operation. Nine of these were in Texas, and six were in Louisiana* 
The Arkansas district discontinued operation after the 1938-39 season, 
since the majority of Arkansas growers interested in cooperation were 
affiliated with the Arkansas Rice Growers Association, and the volume 
handled through the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association as a 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Justified* In general, the oificers of the cooperative regard 75*000 
to 100,OCX) barrels as the minimum volume necessary to support the ex­
pense of a local district*
Although Louisiana produces much more rice than Texas, the prin­
cipal strength of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has 
always b e n  in Texas* In the first years of operation, about a third of 
the total sales through the association were made in Louisiana and two- 
thirds in Texas* In recent years, Louisiana has furnished only about a 
fifth of the total volume, with Texas volume increasing to 80 per cent 
of the total* Arkansas sales have been a small fraction of total co­
operative sales, and have been drawn from only a small portion of the 
total Arkansas crop, except in the 1937*3® season* The importance of 
the cooperative to Texas growers is striking when sales are compared to 
total production in the various states* In Louisiana, slightly more 
than ten per cent of the state *s crop has ordinarily been marketed, through 
the association, while more than half of the Texas crop has been marketed 
by the cooperative*
Although many of the district offices were originally organized 
under the charter of the central association, the policy of the officers 
has been to urge the separate incorporation of each district* Separate 
incorporation removes the liability of the central association for debts 
incurred by the districts, and also promotes membership interest in the 
local association* Incorporation is particularly desirable when the 
local association owns and operates physical facilities. In 1941, nine 







































































































































































































































































































































































































districts operating extensive physical facilities* Two Texas districts 
and four Louisiana districts remained unincorporated. Two of the unin­
corporated Louisiana districts were operated as private selling agencies 
paying the central association fee in order to secure market news service, 
while the remaining two were districts which operated without a separate 
charter*
The charters of the incorporated districts permit them to engage 
in all types of activity in rice production, marketing, and processing.
All of the associations are organized as non-stock corporations and no 
membership fee is charged. Any excess of commissions over operating ex­
penses is used to accumulate such reserves as are desired. The Texas 
districts, by charging a high marketing commission, have been able to 
provide excellent offices, unusually competent personnel, diverse member­
ship services, and a strong credit standing with lending agencies which 
has permitted them to finance warehouses, elevators, credit corporations, 
and farm supply enterprises on favorable terns. The central office does 
not participate in any of these local activities except for occasional 
loans and general aid in establishing services and physical facilities.
The Louisiana districts have operated on a lower marketing fee 
than Texas districts and have not built up membership interests in local 
facilities. Membership support has therefore been more difficult to 
maintain since there is nothing tangible about the looal cooperative ex­
cept its marketing services at th< time of harvest. With little liabi­
lity involved, incorporation has been a less important matter for 
Louisiana districts than for Texas districts.
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Membership Contracts
The only formal requirement for membership in the American Rice 
Growers Cooperative Assooiation is signature on a membership contract. 
If a district is incorporated, the contract is made between the local 
district and the grower; if unincorporated, it is made between the cen­
tral association and the grower* In the agreement the grower appoints 
the association as his exclusive selling agent, and agrees to pay the 
central association fee of two cents per barrel, plus the specified 
charge for local expenses, on all rice sold by him. The detailed pro­
visions concerning the obligations of each party to the contract are 
specified in the agreement. Earnings and assets of the association are 
the legal property of individuals marketing through the associations, 
with shares based on patronage in each enterprise*
The contract is drawn for a period of ten years. After the 
first two years, the contract may be canceled by either party upon 
written notice. In effect, the contract is a two-year agreement in so 
far as it is binding upon the growers. Although the agreement speci­
fies damages collectible by the Association in the event a grower 
breaches the agreement, in practice little attempt is made to enforce 
the contracts. Cooperatives generally have found that enforcement of 
membership agreements is more costly in disrupting membership relations 
than is the loss resulting from occasional failure of a grower in ful­
filling his obligations.
Since the volume of rice handled is more important to the 




AMERICAN RICE GROWERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION
This agreement made and entered into by and between the undersigned hereinafter referred to as Grower, and the Amen 
ican Rice Growers Cooperative Association hereinafter called the Association, witnesseth:
1. Grower hereby appoints the Association as his sole and exclusive agent for the purpose of selling all rice grown, acquired, 
controlled, or produced by him, or in which he has an interest, except such rice as may be used for seed or feed personally by 
Grower; and the Association hereby agrees to act as such agent on the terms and conditions herein described.
2. Grower hereby agrees to notify the Association promptly a fte r the harvesting of his rice in any year of the place where 
said rice is stored, and he hereby gives the Association the right to examine said rice, through its representatives, a t any time 
for the purpose of taking samples thereof for the grading of each lot of rice, and Grower agrees to give complete information 
regarding the quantity of rice in each lot in which he has an interest so tha t the Association may determine the amount of rice 
corresponding with each sample.
3. The Association shall have exclusive charge of the grading of the rice, and shall provide for the grading of said rice in ac­
cordance with recognized standards for rough rice. In the event Grower is not satisfied with the grading of his rice, a  new 
sample of each lot shall be obtained and graded as aforesaid.
4. Unless the rice of Grower shall be sold by the Association in some other way, Grower shall specify in writing to the Associ­
ation a minimum price which he is willing to accept for each lot thereof, which minimum price shall continue fo r a period of 10 
days and thereafter until Grower shall give the Association 10 days written notice to the contrary; Provided, that when mutually 
agreeable the parties hereto may change the price, which change shall be immediately effective. The Association shall seek to 
obtain a better price than the minimum named if possible bu t shall not sell fo r a lower price unless authorized to do so by the 
Grower, but in the event the Association believes that the minimum specified is below the m arket price it shall not be required 
to sell a t the minimum price. In  the event the Board of Directors of the Association afte r acquiring the favorable consent in 
writing of seventy-five per cent of the members of the Association determines that it would be advisable for the Association to 
sell any part of the rice of its members on a pool basis or in any other way the Association may then determine the time of sale 
and the price of sale and Grower under such circumstances agrees to accept said price and to deliver his rice promptly as and 
where directed to do so by the Association in fulfillment of such sales.
5. Payments for all rice sold shall be made to the Association or for its account, and this Association shall deduct from the pro­
ceeds derived from the sale of rice a t the rate of two cents per barrel of one hundred sixty-two pounds rough rice fo r the main­
tenance of Central and State offices which amount may be changed by the Board of Directors with the w ritten consent of two- 
thirds of the members, and an amount to be fixed by each local district and approved by the Board of Directors for the costs of 
local services. These deductions to provide for the maintenance, conduct and operation of the Association and for the handling, 
grading, preparation for m arket and marketing of said rice. The foregoing deductions shall be promptly made and the balance 
of the proceeds from Grower's rice promptly remitted to him.
6. The Association agrees to obtain production, m arket and other information with respect to rice and to furnish the same to 
Grower from  time to time for the purpose of enabling him to betcer determine his production and marketing plans.
7. Grower agrees to give the Association information concerning the acreage of rice, crop conditions and yields, the amount of 
rice which he has on hand and other like information as requested by the Association. Grower agrees that, in the event he desires 
to borrow money upon his rice during the producing period, or a f te r  harvesting the same, tha t he will comply with the require­
ments of the Association with respect thereto.
8. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as requiring Grower to continue the growing of rice. I t  is understood that the 
Association has a power coupled with an interest with respect to  the sale of the rice of Grower; and tha t the pnnopai object of 
Grower in entering into this agreement and of other growers signing agreements similar hereto is to obtain the advantages accru­
ing from the cooperative marketing of rice.
9. I t is mutually understood and agreed th a t it is now and ever will be impracticable and extremely difficult to determine the 
damage that would be suffered by the Association and by other growers signing agreements with the Association similar to this 
one in the event Grower breaches his contract. Grower hereby agrees tha t should he sell, market or dispose of any of his rice 
other than in accordance with this agreement th a t he will pay the Association twenty-five per cent of the market price of said 
rice, per barrel or its equivalent as of the time of its sale as liquidated damages for breach of this contract.
10. This agreement shall be in force fo r a  period of ten  years, beginning as of the first day of May, 19____ , provided th a t
either party hereto, by w ritten notice delivered to the other party  between May 1 and May 10 of any year after two years, may 
cancel this agreement; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. Such cancellation shall not affect any uncompleted 
sales or transactions between the parties hereto, nor release either party  from any indebtedness unpaid thereafter accruing under 
this contract, nor relieve the Grower from his obligation to sell through the Association any rice acquired or produced by him dur­
ing the preceding season, nor shall it relieve the Association from selling rice produced during tha t season, nor shall the failure 
of Grower to comply with this agreement or the release of him by the Association or the failure of other growers to comply with 
their agreements or their release by the Association have any effect upon any other agreement.
11. Grower hereby applies fo r membership in the Association and agrees to abide by the charter and by-laws of the Association. 
The parties hereto agree th a t there are no oral or other conditions, promises, covenants, representations, or inducements in addi­
tion to or a t variance with the terms hereof, and th a t this expresses fully and completely the understanding of the parties hereto.
12. Grower desires to be affiliated with the district a t or near-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
The charge for local expenses shall be-------------------  cents per barrel of 162 pounds rough rice plus two cents per
barrel for central office expenses, making total charge  .....    cents.
In witness hereof the parties hereto have executed this agreement.
Grower.
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association
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increase the efficiency of operation have centered on increasing the 
volume of rice in membership contracts rather than the number of agree­
ments themselves* In general, members of the association are large 
growers of rice* Two Louisiana districts are in reality large corpora­
tions which sell rice, received by them as water end land rent, through 
the cooperative association* The assooiation does not stress small 
grower membership, since the expense of sampling, grading, and marketing 
small lots is much higher per barrel than for large lots, while ability 
to pay the marketing fee is lower.
Somewhat less than 500 rice growers are formally affiliated 
with the cooperative district associations in Louisiana* According to 
estimates of the managers in 1940-41, the Welsh district was the largest 
with approximately 200 growers, Crowley next largest with about 110 
growers, and Elton and Iowa had 72 and 40 growers, respectively. The 
Holswood and Kaplan districts are selling agencies maintained by large 
irrigation and land companies. The number of growers formally affili­
ated with the associations, however, does not Indicate accurately the 
number of fanners whose rice is handled through the associations* For 
example, a large landowner may sell all his tenants' rice through the 
cooperative association. Similarly, rice in which several persons have 
interests may be sold as a single lot. These situations are frequent 
in the Louisiana rice area.
Irrigation and land companies contribute a very large proportion 
of the rice marketed through the cooperative association in Louisiana.
The Holnrwood and Kaplan districts, both selling agents for such corporations,
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are the source of more than a third of the total Louisiana volume. liuoh 
of this rice is owned outright by the companies; however, tenants have 
an interest in many of the lots. In addition, canal companies in the 
Welsh and Iowa districts sell their rice through the local association® 
and are important contributors to total volume in these districts#
Large incorporated irrigation and land companies thus are probably re­
sponsible for LQ per cent or more of the total association sales of 
Louisiana rice, and their support is an extremely important element in 
the maintenance of cooperative rice marketing in Louisiana#
Other than mild campaigns conducted by district managers in 
signing up membership contracts, the association makes little direct 
effort to increase the number of growers formally affiliated with the 
cooperative, two reasons probably account for this attitude; first, . 
small grower membership is not important to success of the organization, 
and, second, the high-pressure membership campaigns of preceding organi­
sations have left a bitter memory, among both growers and officers, of 
the dangers inherent in sudden but unstable membership interest.
Marketing Fees
The principal source of revenue for both the local districts 
and the central association is the commission collected on each barrel 
of rice marketed, except for a small amount of miscellaneous revenue 
from interest and special services. The fee collected by th© central 
associations has been two cents a barrel since the beginning of it® 
operations in 1928-29. Total annual revenues derived from thin source
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Table XIII. Marketing commissions charged in local districts of the 














Orange 64,249 4 2
Beaumont 384,756 8 2
Anahuae 138,325 6 2
D avers 309,221 8 2
Houston 364,997 8 2
Katy 288,495 6 2
Eagle Lake 304,704 3 2
Garwood 191,610 3 2
Rosharm 132,779 4 2
Louisiana:
Holmsrood 58,329 # 2
Iowa 68,431 4 2
Welsh 147,740 4 2
HI ton 63,551 4 2
Crowley 61,297 4 2
140,953 # 2
* These districts are privately organized and pay only the central 
association fee.
Source: American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, lake Charles,
Louisiana.
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have varied from $40,000 to $50,000 annually.
The fee collected by the district association is dependent upon 
the policy of the local organizations. In 1940-41, local districts in 
I/yuisi&na charged a fee of four cents, which apparently was sufficient 
to cover minimum operating costs without providing supplementary services 
or accumulating a reserve fund. Total charges in Louisiana districts, 
including the central fee, were thus six cents per barrel of rice, in­
ceptions were the two districts which paid only the central association 
fee and handled their rice on a private basis.
In Texas, charges made by local districts ranged from three 
cents to eight cents per barrel. The lowest charges of three cents were 
made in two districts where rice was handled on a bull: basis in large 
lots, with elevator facilities owned by the district association. The 
highest charges of eight cents were made in three districts which pro­
vided unusually good offices, personnel, and supplementary services, 
and which operated various physical facilities. In addition, two Texas 
associations charged a local fee of six cents, and two charged four 
cents.
In a district handling 100,000 barrels of rice, a charge of 
four cents provides a local revenue of $4,000. Most of this is neces­
sary to cover the salary of the manager and expenses for office main­
tenance, sampling, and incidental costs. A charge of eight cents 
accumulates an annual revenue of $8,000, which can be utilized in addi­
tional services and in achieving strong financial standing.
Four of the six Louisiana associations handled less than 100,000 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ship interest remaining after operating expenses were paid was practi­
cally negligible. Two districts in Texas charging the high fee of 
eight cents had the greatest volume of all di at riot a, providing ample 
revenue for the support of cooperative activities.
Subsidiary Organizations
The Texas districts of Beaumont, Houston* Devers, and Orange own 
and operate large warehouses for their members. These warehouses are 
large and well-maintained. Storage charges are or a total of
25 cents per large bag per year, a standard rate in Texas. Earnings 
have been applied to reducing warehouse debt, since all structures were 
financed by loan agencies. In addition, the Beaumont, Houston, and 
Devers districts own the Gulf Coast Agricultural Credit Corporation.
This corporation was organised under the influence of the Federal Farm 
Board in order to furnish production credit on a cooperative basis. In 
its earlv years, operations were financed by loans from the Federal 
Farm Board and from the central association. At present, the entire 
debt has been repaid from earnings and investment by the districts, and 
with independent capital the credit corporation is able to discount the 
notes of its members with the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank. Control 
of the local credit situation is thus in the hands of the cooperative 
association in this area.
In 1940, the American Rice Growers Exchange was organized to 
distribute fertilizer to members of the cooperative association. This 
enterprise was established as a stock corporation, with stockholder 
eligibility restricted to the local districts of the American Rice
279
Growers Cooperative Association* The exchange required little invest­
ment , since it operated only as a buying pool to obtain a quantity dis­
count 011 fertilizer from the principal wholesale distributor in the 
rice area, list prices were paid by the members and patronage dividends 
were paid from the rebates received by the exchange* In Its first year 
of operation, the exchange did not handle a volume sufficiently large 
to justify its existence, but was effective in forcing fertilizer dis­
tributors to cut prices in order to meet the quantity discounts and re­
bates offered by the cooperative enterprise*
The central association has also loaned funds to finance the 
purchase of a rice elevator by the Stuttgart district in Arkansas. By 
1940 all these central association advances to the various districts 
had been repaid. Miscellaneous activities of district associations 
also include a Houston interest in a canal company*
Marketing Services 
The local offices usually take a representative sample from each 
lot of rice and mail it to one of the two grading offices maintained by 
the cer&ral association* A certificate showing the grade is made out 
in triplicate, with the copies distributed to the owner, the local sales 
office, and the central office* The central association stresses the 
value of these grade certificates in sales bargaining and in maxket 
news service* Grade certificates are not obtained in all oases, however, 
and in recent years the practice has been declining* In early years the 
cooperative shared the cost of maintaining official Federal-State grading 
offices at Crowley, Beaumont, and Eagle Lake* During the period of the
2m
marketing agreement in 1934 and the accompanying difficulties in grading 
for price-fixing purposes, this arrangement broke up. 'Hie central associ­
ation now maintains its own grading offices at Beaumont and Eagle Lake, 
and all grading is under its own supervision. The United States grades 
for rough rice are used by this private grading service.
Samples of the rice offered for sale are available to mill buyers 
on the sales tables of the local district offices* All sales are made on 
sealed bids opened by the manager, with the highest bidder getting the 
rice, the manager arranges for delivery to the mill, weighs the rice, 
makes adjustments for rice not equalling the grade, and handles collection 
of money for the grower.
In local associations which maintain physical facilities, the 
manager of the sales office usually manages the other enterprises. This 
pemlts more economical operation for each phase of the activities*
Several districts attempted pooling and milling of rice after 1930 when 
the market was dropping and rough rice could not be sold to mills, but 
in recent years, they have made no attempt to engage in this type of 
operation.
The major activity of the central association other than the 
maintenance of the grading offices is a market news service. Each sales 
manager is kept informed by telegraph concerning prices for rice sold 
in other districts as rapidly as these prices are reported to the cen­
tral office, with sales being designated by grade, variety, and purchas­
ing mill. The central association mimeographs the Weekly Rice Market 
Review issued by the Agricultural Marketing Service and distributes it 
to all members of the district associations, adding to the government
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release a recapitulation of cooperative sales for the week and notes 
concerning the affairs of the cooperative and the rice industry* Sta­
tistics concerning rice movement and stocks are also compiled and dis­
tributed to sales managers Mid members when they are useful*
Supplementary activities of the central association in recent 
years have included sponsorship of a blanket rice insurance plan for 
stored rice of its members, by means of which insurance costs in 
Louisiana warehouses were considerably reduced, and establishment of 
the fertiliser distributing corporation. In addition, much of the 
personnel and resources of the central association has been employed in 
representing the rice growers in legislative activities pertaining to 
the various agricultural programs of the past thirteen years* These 
activities have been largely in the nature of services to the rice in­
dustry rather than confined to cooperative benefits, and will be dis­
cussed as such in the following sections*
Average Annual Prices Received
In most years the average annual price received for all rice 
handled by the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has been 
somewhat above the average annual prioe reported by the Agricultural 
Marketing Service in Louisiana and Texas. Whether or not this higher 
price can be attributed to' the association is, of course, debatable, 
since it may be influenced by differences in quality, variety, and 
bulk handling in the Texas districts* During several seasons, the 
average association price has been little different from the average 
price reported as received by all farmers. Without a doubt the
Table XLIV. Average price received for rice sold through the American 
Rice Growers Cooperative Association compared to govern­
ment estimates of prices received by Louisiana and Texas 
farmers, 1928-1941.
Association average 










1928-29 3.43 3.24 3.17
1929-30 3.85 3 .6 0 3.71
1930-31 2.84 2,74 2.84
1931-32 1.91 1.91 1.94
1932-33 1 .6 2 1.55 1 .5 8
1933-34 2 .8 8 2.81 2.92
1934-35 3 .0 2 2.95 2.99
1935-36 2.57 2 .5 6 2.74
1936-37 3.18 3.24 3.49
1937-38 2 .5 8 2.48 2.56
1938-39 2.44 2.34 2.48
1939-40 2.78 2.81 2.99
1940-41 3.04
Sources Files of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake
Charles, Louisiana, and Agricultural Statistics. United States 
Department of Agriculture*
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a s s o c ia tio n  growers make sales from a bettor bargaining position than 
o th e r fan n ersj however, price differences are influenced by too many 
o th e r fa c to rs  to demonstrate price advantages In actual figures* The 
single fact that the association price is an average of actual prices, 
while the government-reported price is an estimate based on a small 
sample, destroys the effectiveness of price comparison.
S ervices to  th e  R ice In d u s try
The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has served 
the rice industry in two ways: first, through making available a sales
agency which enables the maintenance of a reasonably efficient selling 
structure for all rice growers, whether members or non-members 5 and 
second, by presenting the rice growers' point of view in industry action 
and in the extensive government legislation affecting agriculture during 
the past decade. The first of these services has been rendered primarily 
by the local district associations, with limited aid from the centred, 
association; the second has been a principal function of the oentral as­
sociation, although dependent on the sentiment of the district member­
ship.
The operations of the Federal Faxm Board from 1929 to 1933 
brought the American ilioe Growers Cooperative Association into immediate 
relationship with government agencies. In fact, Federal Farm Board of­
ficials virtually made aid to rice growers dependent upon participation 
in the cooperative organisation, being quoted as saying that they could 
not aid the rice industry unless growers united in a large cooperative
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17Quit* r Stabilisation operations through the cooperative were then 
attempted following the drastic market decline after 1929. During 
the 1930-31 season, more than #900,000 in commodity loans were dis­
counted through the central association with the Federal Intermediate 
Credit Bank, the Federal Farm Board, and acceptance corporations, 
these loans were, of course, the responsibility of the individual 
growers, but the central association assumed a tremendous contingent 
liability in underwriting these loans on its limited resources.
3y May 31, 1931* the new association had an outstanding con­
tingent liability of $312,OCX) for commodity loans of this type, with 
only $2 1 ,0 0 0 in net membership interest accrued from earnings of the 
preceding three seasons. During the following year, liquidation of 
these loans was largely accomplished, but the central association still 
carried $8 8 ,5 0 0 in notes underwritten for district associations which 
had established physical facilities with Farm Board funds. Losses from 
these operations in 1931*32 almost ruined the association, reducing the 
net membership interest from almost $2 1 ,0 0 0 to slightly under $1 0 ,0 00  
during the course of the year, besides absorbing all the revenues of 
that year. In addition, this remaining membership interest was tied 
up in accounts receivable from the local districts and in other assets 
which could not be promptly liquidated.
In 1933, the drastic new legislation which resulted in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act was proposed in Washington. Officials of
2*7see Rice Journal. August, 1929#
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the American Bice Growers Cooperative Association claim entire credit 
for the inclusion of rice as a basis commodity in the Agricultural Ad* 
justment Administration* The only rice grower representation in 
Washington was sent by the cooperative organization and expenses were 
paid from the central association funds*
The adoption of the marketing agreement as the instrument of 
rice adjustment passed the major control over the entire industry into 
the hands of the rice millers* The central association opposed many 
of the provisions, in the original agreements, which were drawn pri­
marily for the benefit of the millers, and was successful In eliminating 
some of the defects* To the credit of the cooperative management, many 
of the difficulties which finally led to discard of the marketing agree­
ments were foreseen by the association officials* Without grower
pressure through the cooperative, the years of the marketing agreement
19would have been more distressing than they were* 7
The central association later forced amendment of the marketing 
agreement, reduction of the excessive conversion charge, and the final 
elimination of this type of agricultural adjustment* It was largely 
responsible for the change to the processing tax and the accompanying 
legislation eliminating the 1935 floor stocks tax, which acted as an 
export subsidy and relieved the industry of the large carryover which
^Annual Report. American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, 
1935, p. 2 (mimeographed).
19Annual Report, American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, 
1934 (mineogiaphed). Apparently no representation would have been given 
to growers* interests at all in the rice millers* plftns for industry 
action, since even the officials of the association had difficulty in 
participating in early hearings.
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20had bean depressing price*
During the years from 1933 to 1936 the major activity of the 
central association officers was concerned with rice legislation and 
program administration* This participation in industry affairs, often 
in cooperation with officers of the Rice Millers association, has con­
tinued since that date. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration of 
1936# annual administrative changes, suggestions for new programs, ad­
vertising tax legislation, and similar industry affairs have absorbed 
the time and funds of the central association* Direct appropriations
have also been made from central association funds to subsidize re-
21search and advertising for rice products.
It is clear that most of these activities are important to all 
rice growers, regardless of their affiliation with the cooperative as­
sociation. However, these activities have been paid for by the cooper­
ative members from the two-cent central association fee on each barrel 
of rice marketed. Although the wisdom of much of the Agricultural Ad­
justment Administration legislation as applied to the rice industry is 
questionable, the fact that millions of dollars in federal funds have 
been paid to rice growers under the various programs more than justifies 
the cooperative expenditures, from the rice farmers* point of view.
More important, however, is the fact that the cooperative officials have 
consistently opposed features in the rice programs which were based on
^Annual Report. 1935# ££•
B. Reid, "These Farmers Know Their Markets," Hews for 
Farmer Cooperatives. Farm Credit Administration, June, 1941-
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economic fallacies, and have advocated programs designed to achieve 
benefits without continued dependence on government subsidy*
Financial Operations
Since the unprofitable experience with financial entanglements 
under the Federal Farm Board, the central association of the American 
Rice Growers Cooperative Association has carefully* avoided any opera­
tions involving the freezing of its funds in non-liquid assets, and has 
followed a policy* of accumulating and retaining a large reserve to care 
for any contingency and thereby to insure the permanent solvency of the 
association* Annual revenues in recent years, when two million or more 
barrels of rice have been marketed, have exceeded $50,000* Expenses for 
officers* salaries, grading offices, traveling expanses, market news 
service, and office maintenance have bordered on $35,000 a year. In 
nine seasons, the excess of revenues over expenses has increased the net 
membership interest from a low point of &9,620 in 1932 to $*86,336 in 
1941. Practically of this latter sum was in cash and accounts re­
ceivable, an extremely liquid condition for the assets of any business 
concern*
Hot of the district associations have experienc ed similar 
financial success* Several districts have attempted to charge a fee 
sufficient only to cover actual expenses of operation without accumu­
lating a reserve* In other districts, the volume handled has been too 
email to establish financial security. Associations in Texas have 
built substantial membership Interests in physical facilities, being 
aided by some accumulation of funds from marketing commissions greater
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than annual expenses. The investments in physical facilities are now 
returning an income to the members of these local associations. Seme 
Texas associations h&vo built up net membership interests in excess 
of $100,000.22
The accumulation of large idle reserves in the central associ­
ation is establishing a difficult problem for the management* In the 
present organisation there is no immediate outlet for these funds, 
since the district associations carry on their financial operations 
independently. The reserves could readily be dissipated in patronage 
dividends, but the management feels that large reserves are essential 
for permanent financial security. Investment in central facilities 
such as a fertilizer mixing plant has been proposed, and it is likely 
that such arrangements may be carried out in the future. Under present 
methods of operation, investment in facilities may be necessary, since 
the existence of so much idle cash is a constant incentive toward lax 
financial methods, pressure for dissipation of reserves, and pressure 
toward ill-advised expenditures.
Future Activities
From the point of view of service© rendered and profits earned, 
the American P.ice Growers Cooperative Association in recent years has 
been extremely successful. There are several types of cooperative 
activity, however, in which the organization has done little work, often 
because of failures experienced by previous associations. Perhaps the
22Reid, ££. olt,
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most important of these neglected activities has been the; promotion of 
cooperative membership. Campaigns to sign up members have been infre­
quent, and little personnel or funds have been engaged in this work.
The success of the association has made promotional activities unneces­
sary, and the existing membersliip has been unusually loyal. Neverthe­
less, a considerable Held of service to rice growers v;ould involve a 
campaign to break down suspicion and distrust of cooperative methods, 
and to obtain more members in the cooperative association. I articularly 
valuable to the rice industry, although probably not particularly pro­
fitable from a business point of view, would be the enlistment of small 
grower sup ort in cooperative marketing.
A membership campaign should stress the service of the associ­
ation to the industry, not to the individual. In fact, services to the 
individual are of ter. obscure in cooperative marketing. The American 
Rice Growers Cooperative Association insures competitive rice buying 
throughout the industry, disseminates market news which aids all farmers, 
aai represent3 the growers in federal legislation. Farmers who are not 
members of the association benefit by these services without paying for 
them. Membership campaigns should stress the ethical nature of this 
problem, endeavoring to persuade more Turners to bear their share of 
the costs of the services, so that coats for all members may b© reduced 
by increased volume of rice marketed through the association.
Increased volume of rice marketed through the cooperative might 
eventually mean a considerable reduction in the processing margin re­
quired by rice millers. The present system of buying by mills, in which 
each mill supports two or more buyers who comb the countryside, is unduly
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inefficient and expensive. If all rice were mrketed by means of 
samples on a few district sales tables, mill buying costs could be 
drastically reduced. Insistence by farmers on present marketing 
methods requires that the mills continue these buying costs, whereas 
the producers in general would profit by a more efficient system of 
rough rice selling.
another field of potential activity is increased construction 
of physical facilities by the central and district associations. The 
most profitable field lies in the ownership of warehouses by district 
associations, and. the Texas associations are already extensively en­
gaged in such activities. In Louisiana, present storage conditions 
provide an ideal opportunity for purchase of existing storage facili­
ties by cooperative associations, although the erection of new ware­
houses in face of ample space now available would appear unwise. How­
ever, cooperative warehouse development is retarded by the fact that, 
in Louisiana districts where membership is sufficient to support a co­
operative warehouse, existing warehouses are owned and privately opera­
ted by leading members of the cooperative association. As a result, 
cooperative warehousing in Louisiana will probably experience very 
slow development.
Other activities, including farm supply purchasing, have al­
ready been sponsored by the central and district associations with a 
moderate degree of success. Credit facilities have also been provided 
in Texas. These developments have been confined to Texas, and the 
Louisiana districts have a wide field for expansion of such enterprises.
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Cooperative milling of rice has occasionally been suggested as 
a field of activity* iSxperiences with pooling and milling of rice by 
cooperative associations in Louisiana, however, have demonstrated that 
milling is likely to b© unsuccessful* The fundamental reason appears 
to be the existing excess capacity and the bitterly competitive nature 
of the Louisiana-Texas milling industry* Conversion charges in this 
competitive structure are likely to be frequently below long-time costs, 
with intermittent reorganizations and capital losses for the mills* A 
cooperative mill would experience tremendous difficulties in satisfying 
its members under such conditions* Farmers can market more efficiently 
simply by taking advantage of the competitive nature of the present 
milling industry, 3y holding the constant threat of cooperative milling 
over the competitive industry, however, the association can enforce the 
retention of competition and make the establishment of monopoly impossi­
ble. This service nay require occasional operation of a mill under a 
cooperative lease if monopoly practice can not be curbed by other means* 
Past policies of the nmerienn Kice Growers Cooperative Associ­
ation have been highly conservative in nature. Some liberalization of 
its policies in regard to membership relations and the promotion of co­
operative enterprises related to rice production and storage appear de­
sirable* However, the success of the conservative policies, and the 
disappointing experience of farmer*s cooperatives which have attempted 
more extensive operations, Indicate that the present policies of the 
association require no immediate or drastic revision*
CHAPTER VIII 
SUH34ARX A?© CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters have been devoted largely to the de­
scription of the Louisiana rice industry and its economic problems, 
with minor attention to desirable policies in regard to these 
problems. Efficiency in commodity marketing is difficult to secure, 
and in many cases efficiency is difficult to define. Practices which 
appear unduly expensive are often based on physical peculiarities of 
the commodity or on psychological reactions of the individuals con­
cerned. Inefficient marketing can endure only if efficient competi­
tors are eliminated by monopolistic enterprises or by the prejudices 
of producers or consumers. As a result, recommendations for the im­
provement of marketing seldom meet with unanimous approval, and are 
often resented by those whose vested interests or intangible values 
will suffer if the recommendations are adopted.
There are two broad difficulties In the Louisiana rice indus­
try which retard the development of improved marketing practices. 
First, the highly speculative and competitive nature of the milling 
industry, leading both to cut-throat competition and to intermittent 
attempts at monopolistic practice, has created an atmosphere of sus­
picion under which each mill and each farmer trusts only his personal 
attention in bargaining for rice. Combined with this factor is the
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extensive control over rice exerted by mills and irrigation companies 
through credit, storage, or direct participation in making a rice crop# 
Second, the principal advantage of establishing improved marketing 
practices in the Louisiana rice area is the assurance of a fair competi­
tive value for rice, which means that direct comparative values can 
rarely be demonstrated to farmers except in extreme cases. Direct 
profits are especially difficult to demonstrate for the nusnerous small 
rice growers in Louisiana, who usually are interested only in the short- 
run approach toward immediate gain rather than the improvement of the 
economic position of the rice industry.
The first difficulty can never be entirely removed in a free 
market, but farmers through intelligent organisation can frequently 
utilize speculation and competition in the milling industry for their 
own gain. Intelligent regulatory laws and standards enforced on the 
industry can aid in the elimination of undesirable practices. The 
second type of marketing obstacle can be attacked by a program of edu­
cation among rice farmers, based on organized research, that will 
teach farmers to appreciate the long—range significance of a well- 
organized marketing structure as compared to intermittent individual 
gains and losses occurring in the present disorganized system.
The foregoing statistical and descriptive data have described 
the present statue of the Louisiana rice industry in regard to the 
various phases of these general problems. The remaining task is to 
utilize these data as a basis for specific policies which if adopted 
can aid Louisiana rice farmers to increase income from rice production.
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The objective of these specifio policies is primarily that of achieving 
benefits for rice farmers with as little injuxy as possible to other 
economic groups* In general* fanners benefit (1) by reducing the ex­
pense of moving threshed rice from the farms to the mills* (2) by 
decreasing the costs of milling and distributing clean rice, (3) by 
influencing market outlets to permit increased sales of rice at high 
prices* and (4) by exerting pressure for favorable governmental action 
in regard to domestic and foreign policies affecting rice production 
and sale*
Marketing Between the Farmers and Millers
If costs incurred in assembling rice at the mills could be re­
duced* farmers would gain either from the savings or from the higher 
prices paid by the millers* The marketing costs intervening between 
farmers and millers include those for transportation* storage* in­
surance* purchase* and assembly of rough rice* To reduce these costs 
to a miniaaim, it is essential that competition among mills and ware­
houses be strictly maintained, that fanners retain independent control 
over their rice crop* that market news and quality differentials be 
generally available* and that farmers and the millers both act to re­
duce present costly methods of purchasing rice*
The problem of rice storage for Louisiana farmers is not one 
of excessively high rates* but one of control of rice for the purpose 
of reducing the bargaining strength of the farmer. Farmers should 
maintain independent control over their rice until they decide to sell*
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Such control is reduced when rice Is stored in mill warehouses or in 
warehouses dominated by agencies interested in phases of the rice indus­
try other than growing. This creates a serious marketing problem which 
should be met by the stimulation of efficient independent rice ware­
houses, even though average storage coats might be increased by such - 
operation.
Jlnce rates are not sufficiently high to encourage private 
operators to establish warehouses, it appears that cooperative ware­
housing offers the best possibilities for increasing independent storage 
in Louisiana. Cooperative operation of storage facilities is also ideal­
ly adapted to combination with other cooperative marketing and buying 
ventures, so that farmer interests could control the rice crop up to
final sale to the mill. In Texas, cooperative warehousing has been
very successful, but ample storage space has retarded such development 
in Louisiana. Since Independent control of existing storage capacity 
Is the prime requisite, cooperative activity in Louisiana should not 
endeavor to force out present independent enterprises nor to create un­
profitable excess capacity in the area, but rather should take over
present independent business or furnish warehouses in areas where there 
are no independent facilities.
Cooperative warehousing among rice farmers is now limited by 
lack of interest, by absence of prospective savings in storage costs, 
and by the practice of mills in waiving storage charges. From a long- 
run point of view, indejindent or cooperative warehousing is Important 
in maintaining a competitive marketing structure. An educational
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program to present these facts to farmers is therefor© an essential 
stop in improving rice storage in Louisiana.
Insurance and transportation are minor costs in the marketing 
structure, and probably are best cared for by individual action* Data 
on insurance costs Indicate, however, that blanket warehouse insurance 
on stored rice can be obtained more cheaply than separate insurance 
contracts written for individual growers. For this reason, insurance 
on rice should be furnished either in the warehouse fee or by groups 
of faraers acting together in cooperative enterprises to obtain blanket 
insurance at the lowest possible cost.
The buying practices of mills are vitally important in their 
effect on the net receipts of rice farmers. The present system of 
numerous mill buyers scouring the rice area, negotiating personally 
with each farmer, ia extremely expensive to the mills. Those costs 
must be covered in the processing margin taken by the mill. In addi­
tion, the mill buyer grades the rice', and in the absence of objective 
grades, the fairer often does not know whether lie received the proper 
premium or discount for the quality of his rice. If methods could be 
established reducing expenses of assembly and giving farmers an ade­
quate knowledge of rice quality, a major improvement would obviously 
result in the marketing system.
Both fanners and millers recognize that the maintenance of 
numerous buyers is unduly expensive, but th© system is necessary be­
cause of the Individual nature of each rice sale. iSxpenses of buying 
could be reduced only if farmers were willing to offer their ric© for
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sal* at a centr&X location on competitive bids, instead of by personal 
negotiation. Louisiana farmers prefer to negotiate directly with mill 
buyers, and as a result bear the costs of an expensive system of as­
sembling rough rice* Some millers also prefer the present system of 
buying, largely because it can be used to reduce competition and to 
avoid the pressure exerted by competitive bidders or by shrewd sales 
managers*
Centralised sales could be made through an auction or through 
a central sales manager acting as agent for the farmer* The latter 
method is embodied in the present selling plan of the American Rice 
Growers Cooperative Association, which, however, handles only ten per 
cent of Louisiana rice* Marketing through centralized agents could 
also be utilized to place more adequate comparative values on different 
qualities of rice* Under the present method of individual bargains, 
price comparisons according to quality are difficult to make since the 
farmer at best has intimate knowledge of only a few sales* The American 
Rice Growers Cooperative Association has approached this problem through 
use of official grading standards and dissemination of price ne/s on & 
grade basis* General recognition of grades throughout the industry 
would aid price establishment and increase competition in rice buying. 
Individual advantages are difficult to demonstrate in comparative 
profits, but undoubtedly exist for the industry as a whole.
The establishment of a weekly market news service by the Depart­
ment of Agriculture in 1928 was one of the most important marketing im­
provements so far furnished the rice farmers. The principal need at
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present is for a daily market news service furnishing reliable current 
information as to price and volume of sales* Such services are per­
formed by the /. isrican Rice Growers Cooperative Association for its 
members* More general dissemination of current information by public 
agencies through radio broadcasts or releases is a step which should 
be encouraged in the interests of the majority of Louisiana farmers 
who are not members of the cooperative association, even at the risk 
of some injury to the association by reducing the personal value of 
its market news service*
the chief value of all improvements in the marketing structure 
between the farmer and the mills is the assurance of competitive pur­
chase for a farmer's rice* Consequently, on a long-time basis, it is 
difficult to measure objectively the savings of competitive storage 
and buying to the farmer* 12ven in the short-run, the introduction of 
competition in some portion of the industry tends to enforce compe­
tition *11 through the industry, so that price differentials do not 
appear. Such has been the experience of members of the American Rice 
Grower's Cooperative Association, many of whom see no comparative price 
advantage but recognize the necessity of maintaining the cooperative 
association in order to enforce competition for the entire rice growing 
industry*
Since the principal requisite of marketing improvement between 
the farmers and the mills is the enforcement of competition in order to 
establish the competitive market value of a lot of rice, programs for
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marketing improvement should endeavor to acquaint the farmer with market 
conditions, quality of rice, and the price situation, and to establish 
competitive practices In selling rice. Competition could conceivably be 
enforced by private enterprisej for example, private market services and 
sales agents. Rice growers, however, are suspicious of such private 
services, whic ■ often are utilized for private gain or cater to the more 
powerful financial interests. For these reasons the enforcement of com­
petitive practices appears to depend largely on the establishment of co­
operative enterprise so that the farmers can control the policies of the 
individuals and organizations furnishing the market services. The College 
of Agriculture and the state and federal governments are amply justified 
in carrying on extension work favoring the maintenance of cooperative rice 
associations. At the same time, the grading of rice and the current 
market news service should be adapted by public agencies for use by all 
rice farmers.
Not to be neglected, of course, is improved quality of rice 
through better seeding, cultivating, and harvesting practices. These 
factors are largely technical problems of production, which are outside 
the scope of this marketing analysis.
Efficiency £n Milling and Distribution
The second principal source of marketing improvement in favor of 
the farmer is reduction in the processing margin between rough rice and 
clean rice. For the rice milling industry as a whole, the evidence does 
not indicate that monopoly power is used to exact a greater than reason­
able milling profit. Indeed, excess capacity and frequent reorganization
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In the milling Industry suggest that profits over a long period are 
barely sufficient to maintain operation of th© mills and that capital 
losses are frequent. This situation is not a result of competitive 
efficiency in milling, however, but of price competition in buying and 
selling rice.
Technological improvements to achieve greater milling efficiency 
in terms of output of clean rice froci rough rice, and more profitable 
utilisation of by-products, are very likely possible in the industry. 
These practices could serve to reduce processing margins -without impair­
ing the profit margins of the mills, and the competitive processes would 
pexmlt the benefit to be passed back to the farmer or forward to the con­
sumer. However, there is a powerful force discouraging the improvement 
of milling efficiency. This force arises from the fact that speculative 
gain and loss on rice inventories, and shrewd buying and selling of rice, 
are more important than milling efficiency in affecting profits. As a 
result, the primary attention of millers is focussed on market operations, 
and technological aspects draw only secondary consideration.
The ideal solution for this problem would be a futures market 
which could absorb the speculative risk and permit millers to concentrate 
on milling efficiency to make profit. The industry Is too small to per­
mit a futures market, however, and the attempt of fifteen years ago was 
a complete failure. Present conditions do not offer more cheerful pro­
spects for a successful futures market in rice. As a result, the specu­
lative element will tend to remain the primary factor in rice mill 
operation.
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Since greater efficiency In milling la obviously desirable, 
research toward improvement will have to proceed largely from some im— 
pstus other than the profit motive. Governmental agencies are well 
justified in engaging in research toward greater rice milling efficiency, 
since & real benefit for farmers can be achieved. VJhen private profit 
is an insufficient spur toward beneficial practices, public research 
agencies fulfill a necessary role in the achievement of technological 
efficiency.
Other factors involving costs of processing and distributing 
rice include the size and location of milling units, and the distribution 
of clean rice* The relation of size to costs would be a difficult pro­
blem to analyze in face of substantial excess capacity even if data were 
available concerning this problem. Apparently efficiency in both size 
and in location is worked out by competition within the Industry, although 
again there is a strong likelihood that both of these factors are in­
fluenced by purchasing and selling efficiency, not by technological con­
siderations. Of more direct interest to Louisiana farmers, however, is 
the establishment of competitive rail rates permitting Louisiana mills 
to reach the interior United States markets now dominated by Arkansas 
rice*
Clean rice is distributed in bull: through brokers, which appears 
to be the cheapest method available in commodity marketing. Packaging 
of rice for retail distribution at higher prices would probably have 
little effect on prices received by farmers. Increased costs of distri­
bution would offset higher retail prices, so that changes in distribution
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methods are a method of market competition between mills, not of getting 
higher prices for the faimer.
Influencing Market Outleta
A third improvement possible in rice marketing lies in securing 
larger and more stable markets for clean rice, which will result in a 
more stable income for rice farmers and will permit a larger volume of 
sales. The problem here must be separated into two distinct phases: 
the domestic market and the export market. In tbs domestic market, ef­
forts should be made to increase the consumption of rice as a staple 
foodstuff. This increased consumption can be achieved by a national ad­
vertising and educational campaign, and by offering consumers a quality 
that will encourage widespread substitution of rice for other foods.
The state-sponsored advertising program of 1941 is furnishing the first 
experiment with such an advertising and educational campaign, and should 
be supported until its relative effectiveness in affecting consumption 
becomes known.
Research in the adaptation of rice to consumer tastes should 
be encouraged from two directions. Variety experiments should be di­
rected toward the breeding of rice specifically adapted to both domestic 
and foreign consumer preferences, once these preferences have been defi­
nitely ascertained through consumption studies in various areas. At 
the same tire, research into the nutritional value of rice and preferred 
methods of preparation in various areas should be utilized to develop 
an educational program to increase rice sales.
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The recovery and maintenance of the export market Is at present 
dependent upon war conditions, and in the future will be affected large­
ly by world developments in regard to trade barriers. In peace-time 
European markets, American rice can be eold on a quality basis at a 
profitable price if tariff barriers are not unduly discriminatory.
Latin American markets, however, are essential for the disposal of large 
stocks, and United States rice requires highly favorable tariff or quota 
discrimination against Asiatic rice if a profitable outlet is to exist 
in these areas after the present war* The rice growers of the United 
States, therefore, should exert pressure toward gaining free trade in 
Ehrope, and toward gaining favorable discrimination toward American 
rice in Latin America*
Governmental Policy
During the past eight years, government programs have been an 
important factor affecting the total income of rice growers* The 
earliest government programs attempted to secure greater income for 
rice growers through marketing agreements, which were essentially at­
tempts to establish a paternalistic monopoly for the rice millers*
These programs achieved temporary high prices for growers only at the 
cost of demoralizing the entire industry through the accumulation of 
surplus stocks and the loss of markets. Acreage and production rose 
to new high levels, and the marketing agreements did not accomplish 
acreage or production adjustment, stable price, or improved market 
practices*
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The chief reason for failure of the government-sponsored market­
ing agreements was the fact that they attempted to force the milling 
industry, by nature highly competitive, to operate as a monopolized indus­
try# Only if the federal government took over rigid control of all ele­
ments of the southern rice industry could a marketing stablization pro­
gram be carried out, since excess capacity and free entry quickly breaks 
down monopolistic practices in holding supplies of rice off the market 
or in practicing price maintenance# Such practices are against present 
government policy, although the government is tending now to utilize 
taxation to enforce desired market and business practices# A compulsory 
tax, similar to a processing tax, can achieve desired market control 
ouch more effectively than voluntary marketing agreements#
Since the failure of the marketing agreements in 1935, govern­
ment programs in the rice industry have accomplished only the payment 
of subsidy to farmers, and have not been effective in regulating pro­
duction or price# Rice acreage in Texas has expanded greatly, and 
production In the new areas appears to be prpfit&ble to non-cooperatora 
in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration program# Louisiana rice 
growers, since they had little acreage available for expansion, have 
cooperated to restrict rice production, but production and price bene­
fits from their efforts have been dissipated by non-cooperation in 
Texas# Apparently, acreage control can be accomplished onl' if price 
is so low as to make non-cooperation in the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration programs definitely unprofitable in all areas.
At present the emphasis in agricultural programs has swung
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fFor supply to demand* The war situation has created unusual demand 
conditions, and a profitable market exists for all American rice* It 
is certain, however, that there is no permanent market for an expanded 
United States rice industry* American rice cannot compete in open 
world markets with Asiatic rice under normal conditions* The problem 
of restricting rice acreage in order to avoid price-depressing surplus 
production will undoubtedly arise again within the next decade.
In the case of rice production, a permanent subsidy without 
effective acreage restriction is not justified from the national point 
of view* The rice Industry already is partially dependent upon tariff 
protection, and direct subsidy to support a still larger industry cer­
tainly appears unreasonable* Therefore, a subsidy program should be 
established only when rice prices are so low that sufficient cooperation 
can be obtained to secure effective acreage control, whereupon the sub­
sidy will not act to maintain uneconomic production*
Federal aid to the rice industry through tax legislation de­
signed to establish an export subsidy program for the rice industry 
offers a distinct possibility of maintaining a larger rice industry 
than otherwise possible* In the post-war world, export subsidies or 
pressure to obtain favorable quotas may conflict with idealistic inter­
national policies. The Latin-American rice market will welcome cheap 
rice, however, so that the artificial stimulation of rice exports need 
not damage world trade policy directed primarily toward free trade*
The most feasible long-run government program for rice growers 
would be one under which the industry would adjust its production to
306
the price conditions obtaining in the world, as qualified by tariff 
protection and possibly by an export subsidy program under which do­
mestic consumers would pay the cost. This means the elimination of 
direct subsidy except as a means of relieving temporary distress among 
rice growers until production can be adjusted. When rice prices are 
high, subsidies should be adapted to the existing distress of the growers. 
Coincident with this short-run program, a long-run program for acreage 
adjustment and for export subsidy should be established.
The fact that such a sound economic program would meet obvious 
political difficulties should not prevent education and propaganda 
from being directed toward its achievement. The principal difficulty 
with the rice program, as with other farm commodity programs, has been 
the confusion of short-run relief with long-run plans for pemanent 
adjustment. There is no apparent reason why the two objectives cannot 
be separated, with frank establishment of a short-run subsidy to re­
lieve current distress and of a long-range plan to gain a desirable 
scale of production. The long-range plan is particularly easy to es­
tablish in the rice industry, since both physical and economic limi­
tations make clear that the Industry can never be secure economically 
on a domestic market basis without markets for the current large pro­
duction.
Finally, government-supported agencies of the state of Louisiana 
have important functions to perform in all phases of the rice industry. 
Extension work in agriculture should encourage the use of rough and
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clean rice grading devices in order to establish fair market prices 
between farmers and millers, and should support cooperative agencies 
and efficient private dealers who facilitate competition In rice 
buying. Experiment station research in adapting rice quality to con­
sumer preference should be carried on to a greater extent than at 
present. Regulatory laws concerning rice storage and milling should 
be enforced more rigidly. Experiments in improved technology of rice 
milling and utilization of by-products should be sponsored as a 
government function. Market news service and education of farmers 
concerning current rice situations should be carried as far as possi­
ble. Particularly valuable would be a daily market news service for 
rice and other crops which could reach farmers in time to guide their 
marketing activities.
A Positive Program
Many of the recommendations in this chapter for the improve­
ment of rough rice marketing have been general in nature, since the 
intent was to outline policies rather >han practices. In order to 
give objectivity to the recommended policies, the following practical 
procedures are suggested below. They require aggressive action by 
fanners, millers, and public agencies in Louisiana. In some cases, 
personal or vested interests in existing marketing practices will be 
injured, but it is believed that general benefits to the industry re­
sulting from adoption will far outweigh minor individual damage. As 
mentioned previously, the primary objective of these suggestions i®
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Improvement of the economic situation of rice growers , and slight 
injuries to other economic groups are therefore disregarded*
(1) Agricultural agencies, Including federal, state, and farm 
organizations, should carry on an educational campaign to convince 
Louisiana rice farmers that essential requirements for improved market­
ing are independent control of rice until time of sal© and thorough 
knowledge of both rough and clean rice markets.
(2) Independent control of rice and dissemination of market in­
formation can be achieved by cooperative storage and marketing, and by 
securing credit from agencies not actively engaged In the rice industry. 
Cooperative activities and Production Credit Association facilities 
should thus reach more farmers than at present,
(3) The sale of rice through bids on samples at centrally lo­
cated sales offic s should be especially encouraged, in order to re­
duce the cost of expensive buying practices and to promote competitive 
evaluation of rice,
(4) The state Extension Service should educate farmers on the 
principle and use of rough rice grades, not as a specific guide to 
price differentials, but as a guide in familiarizing growers with 
their product.
(5) During the months of heavy rice marketing, the Extension 
Service should assemble daily reports on rice sales and arrange for a 
brief current market report through radio stations at Lake Ghstrles and 
Lafayette.
(6) So long as excess capacity and bitter competition is prevalent
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in the rice milling industry in Louisiana, farmers should not attempt 
cooperative milling but should take advantage of the competitive 
struggle among mills. Cooperative mills should be regarded only as a 
tool to enforce competition among mills, along with the enforcement of 
state and federal laws against restraint of trade.
(7) Practices of mills designed to meet price requirements, 
such as mixing various grades and varieties of rice, should be elimi­
nated primarily by stimulation of domestic consumer demand for better 
grades of rice. In the export market, mixing of rice is probably es­
sential in meeting price competition.
(8) The rice industry and the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment 
Station should embark on a systematic research program. Research in
rice varieties should be directed more vigorously toward the development 
of varieties specifically adapted to preferences in each of the leading 
rice markets. Intensive study of the utilization of rice and its by­
products in human and animal nutrition, and of the industrial and 
chemical properties of rice, is needed to stimulate domestic demand. 
Finally, the rice millers should furnish information and cooperate in 
technical studies of the milling, packaging, and distribution of rice. 
Particularly valuable would be studies of comparative clean idee out­
turn from rough rice, annual rice distribution and preferences in 
specific localities, and the effect of packaging and advertising on 
rice sales.
(9) The rice industry should take advantage of the inelastic 
domestic demand for rice by limiting supplies in the domestic market.
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This requires federal aid in the establishment of appropriate tax 
measures, tariff preferences, or favorable quotas to maintain the 
Cuban market*
(10) Hie recently established tri-state tax program to create 
a fund for advertising rice in areas of low consumption within the 
United States should be supported for a period of at least five years, 
since the assessment on individual mills and growers is relatively in­
significant and shifts in consumption habits are long-run phenomena*
(11) Louisiana farm groups should exert pressure in freight 
rate litigation to insure the maintenance of a rate structure that 
will permit the maximum number of mills to buy rice throughout the 
Louisiana growing area, and that will prevent as far as possible the 
purchase of rough rice in other areas by Louisiana mills.
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Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station
Study of Rough Rice Marketing
Rice Warehouse Schedule
Date taken______  Name of warehouse
GENERAL:
1.Location S.Person interviewed
2.Type of ownership 6.Number employees
5.Owner* s name 7.Number whses operated
4 .Years in this whse 8.Location of other whses
II. BUILDINGS:
1.Number construction
2.Present capacity age, oldest part
3.Equipment: loading platform rail facilities
scales other
4 .State or federal bonded are receipts negotiable
5.Estimated cost of reproduction
II. STORAGE PRACTICES (1940-41):
1.Describe charges
2*Are charges uniform for all rice
3.Does charge include: unloading piled in whse
insurance_____________ moving out of whse________________ wei ghing
selling_______________ other services
4.Services to farmer(give charges): price quotations______________selling on
commission______________weighing and storing in cars cleaning
seed rice_______________________________ drying rice_____________________ _
5 .Does warehouseman ever buy rice for own account_____________________________
320
warehouses - 2
6*Is any rice rejected for storage______________________  usual causes of
damage in whse liability of whse
7.Normal loss in stored rice weight adjustment
made for excessive loss
8.Protection from rats insects
9,Largest quantities stored(rough) : 1940_____________1939____________1938
10*7® of 1940-41 storage owned by farmers__________________ other_________
11 rice leaving warehouse by truck____________________ rail
V* MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES:
1*7° of owner^s gross income from warehousing
2.Supplementary enterprises of warehouse (feed, twine, fertilizer, etc.)
Type GrossReceipts
% of totgil gross receipts
SP.Other storage (describe) :
4.Financing: rice production_____________
stored r i c e ______________
5.Relationship to mills, irrigation companies, farm organizations
6.Rice acreage operated by owner_______ ___________ number farms____
79% of stored rice coming from farms paying rents to whse operator 





2.Usual grower: fire premium________  tornado premium______________total
premium cost valuation covered carrier
VII. BUSINESS PROBLEMS!
1.Years v/hen volume was too low for profitable operation_____
2.Does rice come from same growers each year__________________
3.1s total warehouse capacity in vicinity greater than needed
4.Greatest distance rice traveled to warehouse, 1940__________
5*% of stored rice subject to lien, 1940______________________
6.Does warehouseman make all salos_________________ _________
7.1s ARGCA rice stored___________________________
8 .What mills bought most rice from warohouso this year_______
9.Do costs or competition determine storago charge____________
10.Attitude toward possibility of bulk storage in Louisiana___
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Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station
Study of Rough Rice Marketing
Farm Storage Schedule
I. General:
1• Name pari sh
2. Location
3* Total acres in farm, 1940 » crop acres , in rice<
total available for rice » water supply
4. Tenure type of rent contract
5. Number of tenants do tenants sell own rice
II. Storage facilities on farm:
1. Describe building(construction, roof, walls)
2. Uses of building other than personal rice storage(
3. Approximate storage space (sq;ft«) .bags of rice
4. Year built original cost usable life remaining^
5* Average annual cost of repairs and upkeep
6. Estimated annual saving on storage charges
7. Estimated annual saving in hauling costs
III. Advantages and disadvantages of storing on farm:
1. Farmer's opinion on advantages
2. Farmer’s opinion on disadvantages
3. Nearest public storage has mill paid drayage from farm storage
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Study of Rough Rice Marketing 
Farm Storage Schedule cont’d.
2
4. Is it more difficult to contact buyers at farm than at public warehouse
5. Have local mills bought all rice
6. 1940 transportation: distance from thresher to farm storage 
hauled by ,contract rate
cash outlay for hauling
7. Is rice insured reasons
cost
17* Marketing problems:
1. Usual quality of rice chief factors lowering grade on 
recent crops
2, Does farmer feel that he has adequate knowledge of value of his rice when 
he sells
3* Does farmer store rice every year what determines storage policy
4* Mill practices farmer regards as undesirable
5* Describe affiliation with farm organizations 












































































































































































































































































































































Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station










6.Ago of this mill
7.Milling capacity
8.Months operated, 194-0 
9oProduction,193C-40
II. BUYING PRACTICES:
1.Number and description of buyers,1940-41
2.Months when buyers are employed___
3.How are buyers paid________________
4.Territories assigned to each buyer
5.Are farmers contacted during growing season ______ _____
6.Are farms visited at threshing___________________________
7.Aro buyers familiar with all warehouse rice in territory
8.How is rice examined before bidding______________________
9.How docs mill chock buyer’s estimate_____________________
10.7/hat percent of rice is bought without competing bids___
11.Average size of lot bought, 1940-4-1_________ _____________
III. MILL POLICY:
1.Usual terms of purchase_______ _ ___________ _______________
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Rice mills - 2
2.How is fanner paid
3*Territory furnishing percent of mill p u r c h a s e s _______________
4.Most distant purchase in 1940-41__________________ ________________ _______
5.1s out-of-state competition for rough rice serious _______ ___________
6.Are large lots preferred
7.Varieties preferred for milling
8.Reasons for preference
S.Is any growing area preferred
10.Are certain warehouses preferred
11.Percent of rough rice rejected, 1940-41 
Reas on s_____________________________
12.Rough rice inventory policy
13.# rough rice bought before offsetting clean rice sales__________ _______
14.Docs mill attempt to move rice from country/ warehouse immediately after 
purchase________________________________________ ___________________________
15.Principal outlets of mill: domestic (areas&^)___________________________
exports (arcas&/5)________________________ ___________ _____________________
V .M ISC ELLAi'IE 0 US:
1.Total investment in mill facilities_________________ |___________________
2,Cost of reproduction ______ _____________________________________________
3.Other enterprises of mill owner ___________________________________
4.Percentage of rice received by true]:________________by rail____________
5*Does mill operate t r u c k s ______________  |_______________________
5.Mill storage capacity: rough ricc______ i___________ clean rice____________
7.Hours operated per day
maximum days per year over oporated
8.Average milling outturn: Blue Rose _
R e x o r o _______ Lady bright
9.Average processing margin: Blue Rose_
Roxoro   Lady Wright
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10.Usual rough rice price differentials: Blue Rose 100%, Early Prolific 
Roxoro Lady Wright___________ Other
11.Docs mill buy ARGCA rice do buyers consider cooperative grade
12.Major quality factor determining rough rice price
13.Rough rice grading: could mill buy on govTt. grade 
Principal difficulties______________________________
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